

MAR 20 1953

# THE ROUND TABLE

*A Quarterly Review of*

## BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

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*Contents of Number 170*

THE LAST EMPIRE-BUILDER

RHODES AND RHODESIA

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH

SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA

GENTLEMEN AND PLAYERS AT WASHINGTON

FRANCE AND THE FRENCH UNION

And Articles from Correspondents in


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A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF  
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

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## THE LAST EMPIRE-BUILDER

FEW words of introduction are required by the centenary study of the career of Cecil Rhodes which forms the principal contribution to the present issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*. The thirty years of Rhodes's work in Africa show the last phase in which British imperialism still possessed complete faith in its own civilizing mission, before the era of doubt and self-distrust began with the second Boer War. Rhodes still believed with all the great empire-builders, as simply as a Raleigh or a Clive, that the expansion of England was a good thing in itself, because his people possessed and could bestow upon less favoured races the secret of the good life. His outlook curiously recalls that of the Spanish pioneers of the expansion of Europe, the missionary priests who followed immediately in the wake of Columbus, convinced that the discovery of the new lands presented a supreme historic opportunity for the salvation of souls. He even resembled them in his vision of fabulous riches, derived from the explorer's exploitation of precious metals and gems, as a mere instrument towards the achievement of the spiritual goal.

To this noble conception, tarnished already by centuries of the failures of human nature to live up to the grandeur of its own ideals, Dr. Arnold Toynbee in his Reith Lectures has held up the converse by challenging his hearers to look at it from the point of view of the continents into which the European peoples have tried to export their culture. He calls it the aggression of the West upon the world. The description is not to be denied; nor, as Dr. Toynbee showed, should the present general reaction of the non-European peoples against this aggression have taken the West by surprise. It does not follow that aggression of this character is morally evil. Rhodes was unashamedly aggressive; but his aggression, like that of all the great empire-builders, was directed against ignorance, superstition, slavery and the slave-trade, against the tyranny of the blood-feud and the murderous despotisms of savage potentates.

His method of rooting out these immemorial plagues of negro Africa was to settle among the native peoples a sufficient number of his own countrymen to propagate the more humane manner of life which their ancestors had worked out in the centuries of English history. If the settlers were to civilize the land they must have authority over it—they themselves, not officials far away who were not personally involved in its fortunes. But to plant them as a privileged race in the country, destined to rule it in perpetuity and maintain the native peoples in permanent subjection, would be a manifest injustice. The rule of the white man could be justified not by the colour of his skin but by his superiority in the arts of living which he had come to teach, and all who attained to his level in those arts must be admitted to his privileges and his responsibilities. Thus Rhodes was led to his famous doctrine of "equal rights for all civilized men".

With its natural corollary "equal opportunities for all men to become civilized" it is the necessary touchstone for all European policy anywhere in Africa—or for that matter anywhere in the world where the European races still claim or exercise leadership. How Rhodes began to apply the principle to "my North" is considered in the following article; in his centenary year it still supplies the crucial test by which the plans now being discussed for the creation of a united Rhodesia must stand or fall. It is equally applicable to the highly critical general election which is to be held next month in the Union of South Africa. That the Nationalist Party's policy of *apartheid* is in violent contradiction with Rhodes's teaching is self-evident; though the claims of the Nationalists that their large expenditure on native education and welfare extends greater "opportunities to become civilized" than are enjoyed by Africans in territories under direct imperial rule constitute a challenge which requires an answer. The United Party have still to show during the election campaign that the hope held out to Africans of political and social emancipation as they advance in civilization has not been buried in the grave of J. H. Hofmeyr. Not otherwise can they cite the tradition of Rhodes against their opponents, or answer the argument of the new non-European resistance movement in the Union, which, as one of its sympathizers shows on another page,\* is now beginning to quote Rhodes's dictum against both European parties alike.

Farther afield, in the East African lands to which Rhodes's vision also extended, the immediate problem of restoring the authority of law and the security of life must take precedence of all else. But in Kenya also, when the murderous conspiracy of Mau Mau has been suppressed, it will be necessary to inquire closely into the circumstances of its origin, in order to judge whether there is evidence that the policy of enabling all men to become civilized has been inadequately pursued by the European settlers, before replanning the constitutional future so as to ensure to all the rights that civilization should bring. Using different constitutional methods from those which the British Empire has pursued, the French Union is in harmony with the principles of Rhodes when it offers to all the colonial subjects of the Republic (at a cost in blood and treasure that may be judged from an article in this issue†) the prospect of becoming joint heirs to the luminous culture of France. Imperialism—in the proper sense of the word, which malice or misunderstanding has gone so far to obscure—is still one of the great liberating forces of the world; but only to the extent that it retains its missionary fervour.

\* See "Satyagraha in South Africa", p. 135.

† See "France and the French Union", p. 145.

# RHODES AND RHODESIA

## A GREAT ANNIVERSARY

RHODESIA will be celebrating the centenary of her Founder's birth on July 5 this year. It is a year of critical decision for her peoples, and there is no certainty at this time how that decision will go; yet, for all who are familiar with Cecil Rhodes's ideas and ideals, there can be little doubt how he, if still living, would wish it to go. From his first pronouncements on African affairs in 1880, when he was first elected to the Cape Parliament, to his death twenty-two years later, his eyes were fixed unwaveringly upon the North. "My North" he called it, from the time when the famous charter was granted to the British South Africa Company in 1889; and his North it truly was, since he won it for the British Commonwealth in conflict with principalities and powers which would have daunted and defeated any lesser man. While, then, the destiny of Rhodesia hangs in the balance and as the hundredth anniversary of its Founder's birth draws nigh, it is right to consider what is owed to him, both in the past and for the future, by the country which bears his name.

It is recorded in Sir Percy FitzPatrick's *South African Memories* that Rhodes's closest friend, Sir Starr Jameson, once asked him how long he expected to be remembered, and that "without a pause or a smile he answered, 'I give myself four thousand years' ". It will be well with Dark Africa if he is, for no single man in the course of its curiously retarded development ever did more for its welfare south of the Mediterranean fringe. Both the scale and speed of his achievement are indeed astounding in view of the odds which confronted him and the shortness of his life. A few dates will be enough to show with what concentrated purpose, in that brief lifetime, he used his outstanding gifts.

Born in 1853 in an English rectory at Bishop's Stortford, which had managed to send two elder brothers to Eton and Winchester respectively, he was sent to the local grammar school for reasons both of health and finance, but left it on account of illness at the age of sixteen. His father wished him to be a parson, and he himself gave some consideration to that idea; but even home life in England and easy tuition under his father's eye failed to make him well. So at seventeen he was sent out to a brother who was farming in Natal. There he grew stronger at once and farmed with zeal, but decided a year later to seek his fortune in the just discovered diamond-fields in Griqualand West, a trek by ox-wagon of about 500 miles. Seven years later, in 1880, he had founded the De Beers Mining Company and within another seven had obtained control of the whole diamond industry. Thereupon he turned his mind to the newly discovered Witwatersrand, founded the Gold Fields of South Africa, and proceeded to master that industry as completely as he had already mastered the diamond one. By the age of little over thirty he had won a personal fortune which gave him an income of over a million sterling a

year, and had also established an extraordinary personal control over companies and amalgamations owning many millions more.

The combination of financial genius and personal magnetism by which all this was done remains a mystery; for he not only created wealth by concentrating production in the most skilful hands, but so dominated his financial partners that they gave him freedom to spend their combined resources on his own vast colonizing aims. But we need not seek to plumb that mystery here, since in this year's anniversary Rhodesia will be celebrating not Rhodes's wealth but his immense political achievement and the outstanding political genius out of which it was born. For Rhodes was a political pioneer, who sowed new thought on a prodigious scale and permanently reshaped the destinies of a continent by the swiftness of his action and the force of his ideas. It is due to him alone that the sovereignty over Bechuanaland, Southern and Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland is British at the present time. Thinly inhabited though it then was (and still, comparatively speaking, is), that is a stretch of territory roughly equal to Europe west of the Elbe. His settlers and those who followed them now hold the future of South, Central and East Africa in their hands, and it is no exaggeration to say that the issue between racial peace and war in all that vast tract of Africa will turn upon their fidelity to Rhodes's ideals.

To illustrate this it is enough to take a bird's-eye view of the two decades, 1880 to 1899, in which he dominated South African history, marking wherein he succeeded and also wherein he failed.

His problems were of two kinds, part African and part international, but constantly reacting upon each other in unexpected ways. His principal enemies were, in the first place, Afrikaner nationalism and republicanism, entrenched in a primitive, intolerant but deeply religious cast of mind, resembling that of Brigham Young and his Latter Day Saints, as it still resembles them today; in the second place, German colonial ambitions, which drew much strength from Downing Street's dislike of new responsibilities and complete absorption in the European aspect of world affairs; and in the third place, Portugal—not a major Power but one whose rights and claims substantially influenced the shaping of international boundaries in Africa south of the Great Lakes. Fourthly, alas, it is necessary to include Downing Street, which is never absent from Rhodes's story, though (despite Livingstone and Stanley) it thought little of Africa until Rhodes had made all England and much of Europe ring with his exploits and with fabulous ideas of diamonds and gold.

#### Rhodes and the Dutch

**R**HODES'S great political originality and intelligence were shown from the outset in his relations with his Dutch fellow-countrymen. No Englishman before him had been able to work in any measure of close understanding with the Cape Dutch; Rhodes succeeded in doing so from the first. Being fond of loneliness himself and very simple in his tastes, he had a natural liking for the primitive, pastoral Boer, who felt crowded if all the land about him to the encircling horizon were not exclusively his own. The

invincible faith and courage which distinguished the Voortrekkers have been recently described in a brilliant book by one of their descendants; and history records no finer struggle by a small people against great odds than theirs in the Boer War. Rhodes knew their strength and tenacity, and in his first public speech, as in his last, declared that Briton and Boer must work together if European civilization in Africa was to be made secure. It is noteworthy that, when seeking election to the Cape Parliament, he did not choose to stand for Kimberley, where diamond-diggers prevailed, but for the neighbouring rural constituency of Barkly West, where the Boer farmer's vote was supreme. He won it and, despite the Raid, held it till he died.

He was also in complete accord with the Boer view that Africa could not be wisely or efficiently governed from Westminster, and earned much misunderstanding in England by declaring at the outset of his political career and maintaining to the end that what he called "the Imperial factor" must be excluded from the normal conduct of African affairs.

All this sprung partly from a sagacity in reading men which was natural to him; but his political instinct was undoubtedly sharpened by an experience which befell him at a very impressionable age. This was an eight months' trek up Bechuanaland and through the Transvaal in the course of which he wandered by ox-wagon from Kimberley via Mafeking and Pretoria to Middelburg and thence more southerly backwards along the River Vaal. The date was 1872, and Rhodes, when he started, was not yet nineteen. He had already realized that the produce of the diamond mines at Kimberley would transform South African life in many vital directions; with such wealth to stimulate its agriculture and its commerce, the old Cape Colony stood on the verge of great development, if the North were open to her trade. He saw that the trade routes to the North ran up west of the Transvaal through Bechuanaland; and he knew from hunters and prospectors that north of the Transvaal lay a land of almost infinite promise stretching from the Limpopo to the Great Lakes, to the conversion and colonization of which Livingstone himself had uttered a resounding call. But gold had not yet been found upon the Rand; so he wandered at fifteen or twenty miles a day through a pastoral emptiness in which Johannesburg was still open veld and Uitlanders unknown. It was not new to him, for he had already trekked to the diamond-fields from Natal through Bloemfontein. But it made an indelible impression upon his imaginative mind.

His instinct that change and development were inevitable and imminent was sound; but the idyllic pastoral communities which then inhabited the two republics north and south of the Vaal had no sign of menace till fourteen years later, when, in 1886, the gold-rush to the Transvaal began. It is difficult to see how, from that moment, stark conflict could have been avoided between Boer conservatism and the advancing world. Rhodes was not in any case a man who could have come to terms with Krugerism, for his own mind was cast in an utterly different mould. The remarkable thing is that, throughout his long struggle with Kruger and the Transvaal, he kept behind him the loyal support of the Cape Dutch. They never lost faith in him, in fact, until well after the first settlement of Rhodesia when all his political influence



foundered in the shipwreck of the Jameson Raid. In retrospect that influence is all the more astonishing because no one was ever more intensely British than Rhodes became in the next stage of his career.

### Rhodes's own Creed

THIS new adventure followed immediately on his trek through the Transvaal. Restored to health by those eight months of ox-paced wandering, a nineteen-year-old adolescent with little education of the usual kind, half frontiersman but also still half schoolboy, and already magically in sight of a fortune such as no other man ever conquered at undergraduate age, he sailed home to Oxford in the same year, 1873, and matriculated with some difficulty at Oriel, University College, his first choice, having (as it turned out, improvidently) rejected him. An extraordinary step, this pilgrimage in search of tuition in an ancient shrine of learning, to be taken on his own initiative by an almost uneducated stripling who had left school at sixteen and spent the intervening four years mainly in the untutored company of a mining-camp, rude enough in itself and planted on the borders of a still completely barbarous world! The geographical gap between the crazy diamond mine-pits and the dreaming spires was wide enough, the mental and spiritual one immensely wider. Few young men of nineteen have power to rise above their surroundings as Rhodes did at that age. It was, by chance, the year in which Livingstone, his only great predecessor in the centre of the Dark Continent, died; and Europe was just about to wake to the vast potentiality of the regions which Livingstone and others had explored.

Conscious of dim but powerful stirrings within himself—diamonds and wealth, pioneering into the unknown, making homes in wide new lands for crowded and urbanized thousands at home, above all new scope for the British genius for colonization, and work for the daemon in his own soul—Rhodes went to Oxford, as he said, to “better himself” and give some reasoned shape to his ideas. The result was a remarkable compound unlike any philosophy that Oxford had fathered before, but it was not unworthy of Oxford in that it formed a powerfully reasoned and fiercely held scheme of living, though much of it was never more than dream. For Rhodes was from first to last a dreamer of dreams; all his intimates testify to his habit throughout life of falling into brown studies in which, rapt from his surroundings, he gave himself to dreams and to plans for making truth of those dreams. Like all men who educate themselves Rhodes looked where he could for foundation to his instincts and ideas. The main substance in that foundation came from Aristotle’s *Ethics*, Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall*, Darwin’s *Origin of Species*, and a less august book called *The Martyrdom of Man*. This had been written by a religious enthusiast, one Winwood Reade, who had travelled widely in Central Africa, studied the native, and found much virtue in Islam. Reade’s conclusion, fervently delivered, was that man could find salvation only by vigorous exercise of his faculties and energies in this world without expecting help from supernatural powers. Marcus Aurelius also helped to form Rhodes’s mind; a heavily scored copy of his *Reflections* still exists at Groote Schuur.

But the coping was taken from Ruskin, whose inaugural lecture as Slade Professor was still a leading theme in Oxford when Rhodes arrived and which formed—as he himself said—one of his most valued possessions throughout his days. Ruskin, the political visionary with vaguely Socialist ideals, had all Oxford in his grip at that time. Well-matured dons would go out every afternoon at his behest, take off their coats, roll up their sleeves, and work at road-making for the moral and material betterment (Heaven knows how) of a quiet country-side. (Ruskin might not have liked Lord Nuffield's subsequent developments, but they have done more for transport than Ruskin ever did!) Rhodes, for his part, was not interested in road-making at Hinksey, but he thrilled to the thought of road-making (and rail-making) from the Cape Peninsula to the Great Lakes and beyond. "This", said the great Ruskin Inaugural, "is what England must either do or perish:"

She must found Colonies as fast and far as she is able; seizing every piece of fruitful waste ground she can set her foot on, and there teaching her colonists that their chief virtue is to be fidelity to their country, and that their first aim is to be to advance the power of England by land and sea. . . . If we can get men, for little pay, to cast themselves against cannon-mouths for England, we may find men who will reap and sow for her, who will behave kindly and righteously for her, and who will bring up children to love her, and who will gladden themselves in the brightness of her glory, more than in all the light of tropical skies.

Kruger, if he had read it, would not have liked the Ruskin Inaugural. Rhodes did. It is to be hoped that Ruskin College in present-day Oxford has not entirely forgotten it.

Its effect upon Rhodes may be read in his first Will, written four years before 1881, the year in which, as one of the Queen's public servants in Cape Colony, he kept his last term at Oxford and at last took his B.A. degree. The Will was a Long Vacation exercise and it outdistanced Ruskin's vision; for it financed (with a still unconquered fortune) a Secret Society which was to bring the whole English-speaking world together again and to colonize "the entire continent of Africa, the Holy Land, the Valley of the Euphrates, the islands of Cyprus and Candia, the whole of South America, the islands of the Pacific not heretofore possessed by Great Britain, the whole of the Malay Archipelago, the sea-board of China and Japan" and so on. The testator certainly had an eye, young as he was, for the great productive areas and strategic centres of the world. But most of this was for the next generation, which would have use of the enormous wealth he intended to bequeath to it. His own aims were more limited; they were the British colonization of Africa. But for his own life and for those who inherited his ideas his broad ideal was the same—"the foundation of so great a Power as to hereafter render wars impossible and promote the best interests of humanity". Even Ruskin might have gasped, though he would not, in his then temper, have disapproved. Disraeli must have got wind of the project, for he acquired Cyprus a year later, 1878, when he brought back "peace with honour" from Berlin.

It will be seen from this that conflict between Rhodes and Kruger, the

Englishman and the Boer, dedicated with equal fervour to utterly incompatible ideals, must sooner or later have come to a head, even if they two alone had been concerned with what happened to Africa. Livingstone and Stanley had by then, however, called the whole world's attention to the still unknown potentialities of what had always been, south of the Sahara, "the Dark Continent". What historians have since called the scramble for Africa was in fact just beginning, and in the forefront of it was Germany. The rulers of Germany have since made two World Wars. These were in essence wars to destroy the British Empire, and they initiated that seventy-year-long campaign by fomenting war in Africa.

### The Corridor to the North

NOT that Germany was first in the field when the scramble began; she was, on the contrary, a comparatively late starter. Britain had, of course, long been concerned with South Africa; but both Conservative and Liberal governments were at that time intensely chary of the expense of South African responsibilities. It is true that Griqualand West, which contained the diamond mines, was annexed in 1871 after an arbitration in which the Transvaal's claims were non-suited; but that was under violent pressure from the Cape Government, and it was handed over a few years later to the Cape Colony. By contrast, King Leopold of Belgium was stretching out a competent and far from scrupulous hand towards the wealth of the Congo. France, represented by de Brazza, soon made sure for herself of a slice in the same region, and proceeded to establish her rule in other extensive regions between the Sudan and the Atlantic Ocean. Italy was looking no farther than Tripoli and the Red Sea littoral; but Portugal, long indifferent to the acquisitions of her navigators, suddenly renewed her interest and reasserted herself with energy both in Angola and on the east coast between the Zambesi and Lourenço Marques. Thereafter all East and Central Africa began to swarm with private concessionaires and government emissaries; but the real conflict, as the pace grew hot, lay between Britain and Germany, and it was a struggle for Rhodesia.

The first engagement in that conflict was over Bechuanaland, the "Suez Canal to the North", as Rhodes had christened it. Between that narrow funnel and the Atlantic lay two territories long coveted by the Cape Colony, Damaraland and Namaqualand, soon to be known as German South-West Africa. Nothing would persuade the Gladstone Government of the day to do more there than establish a small post at Walfisch Bay, its best harbour. Bismarck had watched with interest the development of the controversy between the Cape and Downing Street, but he awaited his opportunity. This came only three years later with the disaster to British arms at Majuba and the policy of surrender following it. He then sent a gunboat to hoist the German flag at Angra Pequena, south of Walfisch Bay, and shortly afterwards declared a German Protectorate over both territories which, in 1884, Lord Granville recognized.

Rhodes, already the outstanding figure in South Africa, took alarm im-



mediately. The corridor to his North, Bechuanaland, was now enclosed between two menacing figures, Bismarck and Kruger; and the latter had further narrowed it by conniving at the settlement of two small Boer republics, Stellaland and Goshen, just south of Mafeking. There followed some months of confusion in which a missionary named Mackenzie and a British expedition led by Sir Charles Warren played a prominent but not altogether happy part. In the end, however, Southern Bechuanaland was declared a British Colony and later annexed to the Cape, while the rest of Bechuanaland became what it is still, a British Protectorate. Kruger's settlers had meanwhile been persuaded to withdraw from Stellaland and Goshen, and with almost miraculous speed Mafeking was linked to Kimberley by Rhodes's railway. The then British Governor at the Cape, Sir Hercules Robinson, deserves much credit for this happy outcome; he had to be, and was, extremely tough with his own Government. But the main part in the complicated quadrangular situation—Bismarck in the offing, Kruger on the spot, the Cape Government driving, and Downing Street (under Gladstone) being most unwillingly driven—was played by Rhodes. He incurred great odium at home by his denunciation of "the Imperial factor"; but Bechuanaland, the key to the North, would not have come under British sovereignty without this offensive on his part, for it massed the whole of Cape Colony, Boer and British alike, against Kruger and behind Rhodes. Six years later a Dutch majority made him Prime Minister.

### The Settlement of Rhodesia

THE settlement and pacification, not only of the two Rhodesias but also of Nyasaland, which followed the acquisition of the Bechuanaland corridor, is a complex epic; but it can, like the *Iliad*, be simplified into a few great exploits, the high-lights of a struggle which lasted eight years.

The first of these was the acquisition of the Lobengula concession, covering Matabeleland and Mashonaland. In this Rhodes acted initially through the Governor at the Cape, Sir Hercules Robinson, and a missionary named Moffatt, who was related to Livingstone by marriage and had won Lobengula's confidence. By the Moffatt Treaty, Lobengula in February 1888 put himself under the protection of Her Majesty's Government and undertook to make no concessions to other Powers. This was a beginning, but not enough for Rhodes, who wanted the right to bring in settlers and dig for minerals. Another single emissary having failed, Rhodes sent up in the same year a more imposing mission of which the two most important members were his old partner, Rudd, and Rochfort Maguire. It thus came about that Rhodes's first communication to Lobengula was drafted by a Fellow of All Souls.

There followed many ups and downs; but at last, on October 30, 1888, Rudd left the King's Kraal at Buluwayo with a concession granting "exclusive power over all metals and minerals situated and contained in his kingdoms, principalities and dominions" together with the right to win the same and enjoy all profits therefrom. As this document bore Lobengula's

elephant seal, it was authoritative, but it nearly failed to reach Rhodes. Rudd started back across the Kalahari desert with a single Kaffir driver, but found the water-holes he had counted on all dry. Resigning himself to death, he hid his momentous document in an ant-bear hole. Providentially, however, he was picked up by a Bechuana patrol, recovered the document, and made his way to Kimberley. It seems, therefore, that an ant-bear should figure among the emblems of Rhodesia as well as the Zimbabwe bird.

The next step was to convert the Rudd concession into a charter from the British Government. The negotiations to this end occupied a year, during which Rhodes spent very large sums in buying out or absorbing rival companies. It also took him some months of personal effort and argument to win over the Queen's Ministers, some of whom, for different reasons, made protracted difficulties for him. Joseph Chamberlain, for instance, observed to Rhodes's friend, Lord Grey, "I know only three things about Rhodes and they all put me against him: he has made an enormous fortune very rapidly; he is an Afrikaner" (and therefore, in Chamberlain's view, no Imperialist); "and he gave £10,000 to Parnell". Lord Salisbury, fortunately, was broader-minded, hesitating only because he thought the powers demanded in the charter too wide to be entrusted to a private company. He agreed with Rhodes, however, that Lobengula's dominions must be held for the Crown and ultimately approved the charter because he found that the House of Commons would not vote the money necessary for running a Protectorate. Rhodes's Chartered Company was accordingly given power to perform all the duties and exercise all the rights of a government in a vast territory with settled boundaries on the east, south, and west, but with no boundary at all to the north, the British Government retaining only certain supervisory powers in the native interest and the right to revoke the charter at any time if dissatisfied with the company's discharge of its responsibilities. This charter was signed by Queen Victoria on October 29, 1889.

Armed with these enormous powers, Rhodes then gave his mind to the pacification of the territory and to settlement. For this latter he chose Mashonaland rather than Matabeleland because the Mashonas were an unwarlike people who would welcome protection against Matabele raids. The first estimate of a force strong enough to cross Matabeleland and reach Mount Hampden, the chosen goal, intact proving too much even for Rhodes's resources, he lit upon a young leader ready to guarantee success with less than a tenth of the force which the Army proposed, and also on a guide who undertook to take the column by an uncharted route south of the Matoppos, well out of Lobengula's way. This latter was none other than the famous hunter, Selous. The pioneer column was only 187 strong with five small troops of the Chartered Company's new police and two hundred of Khama's Bechuanas acting as road-cutters and scouts. It started on June 27, 1890, and, despite many alarms and formidable obstacles, reached what is now Salisbury without a casualty on September 11.

Rhodes had not gone with it, much against his will. He was on the point of becoming Prime Minister of the Cape, and Sir Henry Loch, the new Governor, was obdurate. But he paid Salisbury a lightning visit between

September and November of the following year, covering hundreds of miles by the primitive means of transport then existing and spreading hope and confidence where they were urgently required. Pouring out his own money in addition to that of the company and lifting all eyes to the hills of promise as he could magically do, he made sure of his settlers, whatever might betide. The Matabele, however, proved less amenable, and resumed their raids into Mashonaland the following year.

Queen Victoria had sent the three tallest of her Life Guards and a military band, headed by Jameson, to announce the grant of the charter to Lobengula and commend the company to his goodwill; and he had accordingly "opened the road" to the pioneers. But he changed his mind when he found white men establishing themselves in large numbers and receiving wide grants of land. It became clear to him that at this rate, as he complained to Queen Victoria, he would cease to be master in his own realm. Hence the first Matabele war. It was soon over, because against field-guns and maxims the *impis* had little chance; but the campaign (in which Rhodes himself took part) was dignified by the famous stand of Alan Wilson's column on the Shangani River. Lobengula's capital, Bulawayo, was occupied on November 4, 1893. He himself fled and died shortly afterwards.

The rivalry of Portugal in Rhodesia was modest by comparison with that of Germany, and it ended happily in a friendship which has proved enduring. But there was a moment in 1890 when the British Government very nearly surrendered to Portugal all the territory which now forms Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. To Rhodes this was a breach of the charter conferred upon the British South Africa Company two years previously, and his intervention saved the situation. He also preserved Umtali for Rhodesia by an armed but not sanguinary scrap with Portuguese forces, which the Chartered Company financed; and for some years he spent himself and his money without stint on efforts to secure Lourenço Marques and Beira for the British flag. After much argument and an arbitration, he lost Lourenço Marques, which accordingly became Kruger's chief harbour for the importation of German arms. But he secured Rhodesia's access to the sea by arranging for Portugal to build the railway which links Beira and Salisbury.

As for Nyasaland, which now places so much more confidence in Downing Street than in British leaders in Africa itself, it would not in fact be a British Protectorate today if Rhodes's Chartered Company had not purchased the business of the African Lakes Company and undertaken to subscribe £10,000 annually towards the cost of its administration for the first five years. In these proceedings Rhodes was first prompted by Captain (afterwards Lord) Lugard, who found himself unable to suppress the slave trade with the means furnished by the Lakes Company. Rhodes, however, subscribed £10,000 from his own pocket for a campaign against the worst of the raiders, and thus at last the trade in all that region was stamped out. Livingstone, the first discoverer of Lake Nyasa, had prayed that Christian rule and settlement might be established there; and it was Rhodes who, twenty-six years later, established them. To make sure, he paid for a gunboat by which the lake was patrolled.

It was thus only nine years after his first election to the Cape Parliament and six years after his first speech on Bechuanaland that the three Central African territories which it is now proposed to federate were brought from utter barbarism into civilized progress under the British Crown; and Rhodes throughout was the commanding figure in that achievement, to whom all eyes in both England and Africa were turned. It is no wonder that his contemporaries were staggered by the stature which he had attained—he who had gone out to Africa less than twenty years before as a sickly stripling with scarce a shilling to his name; to whom, but three years later, a doctor in Oxford had given only six months to live; whose lungs and heart were always too weak for the strains to which he subjected them; and who was a spent and dying man well before reaching his fiftieth year!

### Rhodes the Man

IN retrospect now, half a century after his death, it would seem that the secret of his power, apart from the political and financial talent which he shared with many others of his period, was his intense simplicity and singleness of aim. He had made up his mind before the age of twenty to found a new British realm under federal institutions from the Cape at least as far as the Great Lakes, and never looked aside from that clear purpose till he died. Whatever arguments might rage around him, he listened only to a voice within. This vaster project of federation is still in the melting-pot, for he himself raised a barrier against it by the reckless impatience and disloyalty to Dutch colleagues which produced the Jameson Raid and so embittered the Dutch in the Cape that Kruger was fatally encouraged in the anti-British policy which produced the South African War. But the northern part of the great design was firmly initiated long before his own end, and his successors have made of it a still nobler monument to his name.

Simplicity and single-mindedness were not more typical of his age than of our own, and he therefore stands out, like Livingstone, amongst the explorers and colonizers of the time. It is true that enterprise of the sort which absorbed him was then active in many quarters; and that chartered companies in particular were popular everywhere. To name only the newest British ones, the British North Borneo Company had been formed in 1881, the Royal Niger Company in 1886, and the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1887. Rhodes's Charter of 1889 was therefore in the mode of the period; but none of the other companies had the exceptional powers or resources or—most vital of all—the massive strength of purpose with which his was established, so that all were comparatively short-lived, resigning their activities to the Crown at an early stage of their existence. Rhodes made his Chartered Company in his own image, so that, twenty years after his death, Southern Rhodesia held a white population of over 30,000 and passed straight from company administration to responsible government.

This was indeed the vision of Ruskin's Inaugural translated into life, but not by a character in any way typical of Ruskin's age. Rhodes was no Victorian but rather an Elizabethan born out of due time, rapt in dreams like Raleigh, reckless in action as Drake, and differing from them only in that

their El Dorado was the Spanish Main whereas his was Dark Africa. He knew this of himself and believed it to be justified by the crudity of African conditions in his day, as he declared in his last speech at Oriel after his University had conferred an honorary degree upon him:

Sometimes [he said then] in pursuing my object, the enlargement of the British Empire, and with it the cause of peace, industry and freedom, I have adopted means in removing opposition which were the rough-and-ready way and not the highest way to attain that object. . . . If I have once or twice done things which savoured rather of violence than of protest or peaceful striving, yet you must look back to far-off times in English history for a parallel to the state of things in South Africa. I believe my neighbour, the Regius Professor of History, could tell you that in those past times there have been not a few men who have done good service to the State, but some of whose actions have partaken of the violence of their age, which are hard to justify in a peaceful and more law-abiding age. It is among those men that my own life and actions must be weighed and measured, and I trust to the justice of my countrymen.

In this recklessness of his the elements were mixed—part sheer boyishness, part rank intolerance of opposition, and part also a courage and carelessness for his own life in no way short of heroism; and each of these traits can be vividly illustrated from famous incidents in his story.

Boyish, for instance, was the deception to which he resorted in the final delimitation of the frontier between Rhodesia, Nyasaland and German East Africa. Lord Salisbury had achieved this in 1890 by means of a comprehensive treaty which also dealt with Heligoland. Unfortunately he had failed to consult Rhodes about the Rhodesian boundary, and this was found in consequence to have been badly drawn, since Livingstone's tomb and the road between Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika would lie in German territory. Protests regarding the road and the tomb having proved unavailing, Rhodes took characteristic action by announcing that two important forts were also being surrendered. (He had in fact built these almost overnight and christened them Forts Fife and Abercorn.) Downing Street was duly impressed; and as the forts lay providentially north-east of the road and the tomb, the realignment of the frontier upon which Lord Salisbury then insisted saved all four together. Rubbing his hands with glee at this settlement, Rhodes chuckled to an intimate, "I knew Lord Salisbury could not abandon a fort named after one of the Queen's relations!"

From *opéra bouffe* a truthful record must turn, alas, to tragedy. It is certain that Rhodes did not order the Jameson Raid and that, too late, he did his utmost to stop it; nor can it be denied that in the circumstances precautions were warranted. The tragedy lay in his manner of taking them, and this was doubtless the fault which dwelt in his mind when, four years later, he made the speech already quoted at Oriel. It all stemmed from the fear which had obsessed him since his first encounter with Kruger and Germany over Bechuanaland—the fear of a German Empire in Africa running from east to west and thus shattering his lifelong dream of a British federation from Lake Tanganyika or even farther north to Simon's Bay. Despite the "final" delimitation of the British and German spheres in Africa to which she had



agreed in 1890, Germany had in fact never ceased intriguing with the Transvaal to this end; but Rhodes took no action until the winter of 1894-5 when Kruger sent his State Secretary, Leyds, to Germany. The results of that visit were proclaimed without delay in veiled but significant language by the Boer President. Addressing the German Club in Pretoria, shortly after Leyds's return, he said that he felt certain that "when the time comes for the Republic to wear larger clothes, you Germans will have done much to bring it about. . . . The time is coming for our friendship to be more firmly established than ever".

Rhodes's reactions to this speech were momentous, for they produced the Jameson Raid, and on that it is hard to say more than he himself said a year afterwards at a private dinner given in Cape Town by his parliamentary friends:

I do not so much regret joining in an attempt to force President Kruger into a juster and more reasonable policy. . . . What has been a burden to me is that I was Prime Minister at the time and had given my promise that I would not do anything incompatible with the joint position I held as Director of the Chartered Company and Premier of the Cape Colony. . . . I can only say that I will do my best to make atonement for my error by untiring devotion to the best interests of South Africa.

Full atonement was unhappily impossible. The Raid broke up the collaboration of Dutch and British which was (and still is) essential to the peace of South and Central Africa. It therefore fostered conditions which tempted Kruger into risking war; and the Union of the South African Colonies subsequently achieved has not disposed of its evil consequences.

Rhodes was in London facing the parliamentary inquiry into the Raid when the Matabele, debarred from raiding and short of food, took to arms against the company a second time and brought about the most heroic of all his feats. The trouble began in March 1896, and by September things looked grave, since the tribesmen, wise now to modern arms, had broken into raiding bands which could not easily be rounded up in the hills. Hastening back to Africa, Rhodes saw that, famine apart, there was only one way of making peace—to go out amongst them himself unarmed and to use his immense personal prestige to bring them into conference. All his companions regarded this project as rank foolhardiness and did their utmost to dissuade him; but he was adamant. The first *indaba* in the Matoppos Hills was precarious—one false move, and the little group of four, unarmed amongst a horde of angry savages, would have been massacred. But hour after hour the conference went on, Rhodes repeating again and again with endless patience that if the Matabele people would trust him, he would supply them with food immediately and assure them of peace, sufficient land, and (what they insistently demanded) a ruler to whom they could bring their differences. "Are the eyes white?", he asked towards evenfall. "The eyes are white", came the reply; and thereafter, day by day for nearly two months, chief after chief came into his camp.

Thus was a lasting peace with the Matabele made. In the course of the parleys Rhodes proved his trust by having Lady Grey and her daughter to

stay with him without armed protection of any kind; and at the end of them he fulfilled his word by having a million bags of mealies brought up for distribution to the tribe. From that time on the Matabele gave him unbroken affection and reverence; and when, six years later, he was borne to his tomb in those granite hills, Faku, one of the chiefs whom he had won over by fearlessness and patient understanding, spoke the last word:\*

I am an old man on the brink of the grave. I was content to die knowing that my people would be safe in the hands of Mr. Rhodes, who was at once my father and my mother. That hope has been taken from me, and I feel that the sun has indeed set.

The coffin was lowered into the rock, and Faku's tribesmen gave him the salute *Bayete*, never given before to a white man but only to the Matabele Kings.

### Present and Future

IT is impossible to conclude these brief glimpses into a mighty past without speculating for a moment on what Rhodes would have thought of the present situation in South Africa and "his" North, had he lived to celebrate his own hundredth birthday in the fine city which, only sixty years ago, was Lobengula's Kraal. In particular, what would he have said upon such crucial questions as federation, *apartheid* or inter-racial partnership, and the spreading cry of "Africa for the Africans"?

Although Rhodes, who was to a most unusual extent a "self-made" man, was no believer in undeserved power or unearned privilege, he was an aristocrat in all his thought about Dark Africa, holding without reserve or doubt that, in the interests of its backward peoples no less than those of the outside world, it should be governed by "the best" available. Nor did he ever swerve by a hair's breadth from the conviction that "the best" available were British colonists, assuming that they rose above racial exclusiveness and welcomed partnership with "the best" not only among their white but also among their black and coloured fellow-countrymen. This was the doctrine which he epitomized in the famous phrase "equal rights for all civilized men". As the value of this principle has been said to depend upon the meaning given to the term "civilized", it may be well to add that there can be no question whatever as to the meaning which Rhodes gave to it.

His views on government, economic development, racial relations and peace in Africa had been formed by hard thought and equally hard experience. A visionary in the scope and ambit of his plans, he was a realist in execution; and nothing observable in their progress during the last half-century would have persuaded him that the African tribes whom he knew so well in his day have since acquired the coherence and capacity to develop the resources necessary for their own advancement or even to keep the peace amongst themselves and defend their country against external foes. In the balance of power which existed in his time, he held that if Central Africa were not governed by the British Empire, it would be governed by the German; and he would assuredly have seen with equal clearness today that the vast

\* From *Cecil Rhodes*, by Basil Williams, third impression, 1926, p. 326.

potentialities of Central Africa must pass under Eastern control in some form or other, if the West should prove unable or unwilling to maintain control of them. He would also have realized that in the next critical half-century African resources may very well be decisive in the struggle between Christian and Communist ideals; and as the child of a parsonage, with Ruskin's Inaugural always ringing in his ears, he would have prayed with all his soul that his own people should have the faith in themselves to hold fast to their mission of civilization in Africa and the moral fibre to make its future secure.

"Africa for the Africans" should then in Rhodes's concept mean "government of Africa by those of its inhabitants who, without distinction of race, are capable of developing its resources and keeping its peace". Never would he have dreamt of surrendering its defence and guidance to its present-day black inhabitants as having a superior moral claim to their white compatriots; but he would have condemned with equal force the claim to innate racial superiority on which the white trade unions in South Africa and Northern Rhodesia are now basing their claim to an exclusive industrial colour bar.

On the question of federation, also, there is little ground for doubt what Rhodes would have said. In one way at least the present situation would have disappointed him, since he always thought of Rhodesia as the extension of a great South African realm towards the central lakes. It has been argued that he would have regretted on this ground the decision of his settlers not to become a province of the Union in 1923. But there can be no doubt that he would have insisted on a condition which neither Smuts, the then Prime Minister of the Union, nor any South African leader since 1906 could have given him. Rhodes's foremost purpose in founding Rhodesia was British settlement—and the contrast between British immigration into Rhodesia and South Africa respectively since Milner's policy of settlement was stopped dead by the grant of self-government to the Transvaal is proof enough that Rhodes's foremost purpose would have been frustrated, had Rhodesia placed herself at the mercy of her great southern neighbour when Rhodes's Company surrendered its administrative powers.

Nor would this have been his only objection to the absorption of Rhodesia at that time. He, who had graduated into politics at the Cape and knew how deeply and rightly the Cape and Natal differed from the two interior Colonies, would in the nature of things have disliked the constitutional perfectionism which pressed the four Colonies, with their very different histories and traditions, two of them liberal in essence and two illiberal, into the rigid mould of union instead of joining them in a federation where their differences would have had more play. He was always for local self-government to the utmost extent compatible with economic collaboration and security, as he showed by his much-abused subscription to Parnell; and for all his insistence on the need for co-operation between British and Dutch, he would have regarded such co-operation as incompatible with the spirit and doctrine of the old Transvaal *Grondwet* which have steadily gathered strength in the Union ever since it was first formed. In pleading for a renewal of Anglo-Dutch co-operation in his last speech at Cape Town before the end of the South African War,



he said: "The Dutch are not beaten; what is beaten is Krugerism . . . no more Dutch in essence than English." There spoke the Cape Colonist; but in the Union, alas, it is not the spirit of Cape Colony that has prevailed.

Rhodes, then, would assuredly have favoured the independence of Rhodesia as essential to the preservation of those British principles of government in which he whole-heartedly believed; and in that context he would have urged acceptance in this country for yet another principle which lay deep amongst his fundamental convictions. Like Livingstone, he held that British civilization in Africa could not be effectively maintained or directed from Whitehall and Westminster; it must depend on colonists rooted in the new soil but faithful to the Christian and liberal code of their original home. Significant of that basic element in his creed was the interest he showed in the Imperial East Africa Company and the promise of the Kenya highlands by sending his brother there, backing the construction of a railway from the Indian Ocean to Lake Victoria, and prevailing with the Liberal Government of the day to declare a protectorate over Uganda and the sources of the Nile. By contrast he never gave a thought to the fortunes of the Royal Niger Company or to any part of Africa where British settlement was unlikely to thrive. Nothing indeed could demonstrate more clearly his conviction that civilization could not endure as an exported commodity dependent on travellers paid to come and ultimately to go, but must be acclimatized and made secure by the settlement of colonists who would make the new country their home.

He had realized furthermore from sad experience that Downing Street was not only very often ignorant and remote but also niggardly; and no one knew better that those who pay the piper must at some stage in the evening also call the tune. In other words, those who developed the country and found the greater part of its revenue, whether black or white, must ultimately take the government of the country into their hands. If he denounced "the Imperial factor" in Africa, as he did from beginning to end of his political life, it was for those well-founded reasons and also because he had seen to what extent the relations of black and white in Africa had been embittered by well-meant interference from overseas. He would have pointed proudly to the significant fact that those relations are happier under British local self-government in Southern Rhodesia than in any High Commission Territory, Crown Colony, or Protectorate; and he would have said to his fellow countrymen in England: "If you trust your fellow-countrymen in Africa, you—and their black African compatriots—need have no fear about the future of Central Africa."

# ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH

THE LONDON CONFERENCE, COUNCIL OF EUROPE  
AND O.E.E.C. /

FEW advances in recent thought are more interesting and more promising in beneficial results than the modern attitude towards the less developed territories. It is, of course, a long tradition that Great Britain and other European countries linked constitutionally with oversea countries should devote large amounts of capital to their economic and social progress. Asia and Africa provide abundant examples of the work done by British capital and experts in such fields as social progress, communications and irrigation. The Colonial Development Acts testify to the importance attached in Britain to such tasks, which have gone on continuously despite the difficulties surviving from the war. French enterprise has transformed the face of North Africa, which is now more closely akin economically to Europe than to the bordering deserts with which it is geographically united. The achievements of the Netherlands in Indonesia and the Belgians in the Congo all belong to the same pattern.

But today there has been throughout the world a marked change in the attitude to these time-honoured policies. It is now felt that the pace must be quickened and that inhabitants of less developed areas have a claim on the resources of metropolitan countries to speed up development economically and culturally. A twofold force is at work in this sphere. There has been a great increase in the consciousness of Asians and Africans regarding their backwardness in the fields of housing, education and hygiene and a demand, based largely on political awakening, that grave defects should be remedied. The validity of this demand is appreciated by metropolitan countries, which, faced as they are today with the division of the world into Communist and free, recognize the danger that peoples with legitimate discontents may become the prey of mischievous propaganda directed not so much to the uplift of the needy as to the discomfiture of the free world.

It is not necessary here to analyse Europe's former efforts to promote advance among Asian and African peoples. These efforts paid handsome dividends in both economic and social fields, but with every stage of uplift the demand for greater speed was natural. It may, of course, be agreed that two great wars inevitably retarded the process and at the same time intensified the desire for more rapid progress. With the perversity of historical events the demand for rapid progress has come to fruition when Europe is still weak from the losses of the war and when the capital resources required for strengthening her own economy are grossly inadequate. This is one of the great problems of the Colombo plan, laying particular stress on agriculture, transport, communications and the social services.

On the other hand, one can fortunately bring into the picture the American recognition of the need to develop oversea territories, still backward economically, and the welcome fact that, if Europe is temporarily short of capital, the United States has abundant and growing resources. All this is concentrated in Mr. Truman's Point Four, which may yet prove, when other things are forgotten, to be an enduring memorial of his Presidency.

In these days most problems of British economy focus in the balance of payments. Solvency, broken by the inevitable sacrifices of war and by post-war mistakes, is now being slowly re-established. Until this has been achieved the defence programme, as the Prime Minister has more than once reminded Parliament, must be adjusted to the conditions of economic convalescence. But the execution of the programme is essential to national existence and the heavy demand it makes on available resources has to be accepted. Capital investment must be controlled, and this places limits on what can be attempted at home and in the oversea territories if inflation is to be brought to an end. When this has been accomplished and sterling ceases to lose purchasing power, savings will rise and external investment in oversea territories can be increased. In the meantime Britain's first need—and it is the need of the whole sterling area—is to cope with the dollar gap and to keep its accounts in balance with the outside world, American and European. At the same time the task of developing British oversea territories with British and local resources must go on to the fullest degree possible. A similar difficulty faces other European countries, such as France and Belgium, constitutionally linked with oversea territories which urgently need capital resources for development. Europe—and there are sixteen European countries joined in the European Payments Union—is everywhere involved in the problem of the dollar gap, and all are confronted with the problems of speeding up progress in African colonies or dependencies at the same time as they tackle the vast expense of rearmament and social welfare at home.

The task facing Great Britain and European metropolitan countries is in essential respects the same. They are all faced with an inability to earn from their exports a sufficiency of dollars to cover requirements that can today be met in adequate volume only from the other side of the Atlantic. Their oversea territories all clamour for development, involving capital resources beyond the capacity of Europe to supply. The international reserves of gold and dollars are insufficient for those European countries that were weakened by their participation in the war to move towards the much desired currency convertibility. Here Switzerland, which was a neutral in the last war, is an exception. Her economy is strong, but she is a small country and though her capital resources for external investment can make only a modest contribution to the need, everything helps. Further, the economy of West European countries has in the post-war period been liberally buttressed by different phases of American subvention, loans, gifts and Marshall Aid. But the time has come when the United States is feeling that Europe should, apart from a few special cases, be able to stand on its own feet; and while military assistance towards rearmament, which is on a different footing and betokens the collective interest in security, is likely to continue, Europe itself has no desire to

remain an American pensioner. "Trade not aid" has become the motto of the time.

### The Strasbourg Plan

IT was, therefore, a happy move on the part of the Council of Europe when in the course of its session of September 1951 it decided to call for "a study of methods for achieving a closer co-ordination between the economies of Member States of the Council of Europe and those of the overseas countries having constituted links with them". The study was duly made by a working party which brought together the secretariat and a number of outside specialists from the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and Western Germany. Their report came before the Council of Europe at its meeting of September 1952 when the general line of approach to the wider range of problems discussed was unanimously accepted. The Assembly accordingly directed its committee on economic questions to submit to the Ministers of the Commonwealth who met in conference in London before Christmas, such of the recommendations as concern economic relations with the Commonwealth countries. The intention was that after the conference the Economic Committee of the Council should meet again and report on the results.

Now the Strasbourg plan, as it was christened at the Council of Europe by Lord Layton, is of special significance to the Commonwealth, though it is equally concerned with the overseas territories linked with all European metropolitan countries. The wide spread of the Commonwealth over the world gives it a role of exceptional importance in the development of international trade. Again, the great variety of the products derived and capable of being derived in increased volume from the Commonwealth emphasizes the part it may play in strengthening the economy of western Europe and in enabling metropolitan Europe with its overseas territories to match in some way the present productive supremacy of the United States. This serves to bring out the point that overseas development was linked at Strasbourg with the problem of "the dollar gap", which has been fastened on Europe since the war and would have been even more violently intrusive in the European economy if generous help from the dollar area, that is the United States and Canada, which may also take just pride in its contribution, had not masked at times Europe's continuing lack of economic balance. If the embarrassing disequilibrium should now call forth more vigorous and closely integrated plans for expanding overseas production of the right kind, a double gain will result. First, the welfare of the overseas areas will be promoted and steps will have been taken to meet the aspirations of the less developed parts of the Commonwealth in Asia and Africa. On the other hand, the achievement of a better economic balance with the United States will bring the day nearer when sterling, delivered from the crisis atmosphere of recent years, will be re-established as a free and convertible international currency with all that this signifies for the prosperity of the sterling area as well as of countries outside the area, whose economic fortunes are associated in one way or another with the course of sterling.

It cannot be emphasized too often that a policy of all-round uplift depends

on expanding trade on a multilateral basis and on developing the resources of the Commonwealth with ever-increasing intensity. In the greatest possible production and exchange of wealth must be found the key to raising the standard of living both at home and in the oversea territories. Unfortunately, when the exchange crisis of 1951 broke upon the sterling area and with special violence on the United Kingdom, which had the great responsibility of holding and controlling the international reserves of the Commonwealth, it was necessary, as a measure of immediate relief, to restrict imports into Great Britain with the object of reducing the demand for foreign exchange to pay for them. The "cuts" were heavy and far-reaching. It is estimated that they had the effect of bringing the percentage of trade liberalization under the O.E.E.C. liberalization code down from 90 to 46 per cent. The foreign travel allowance was reduced in November 1951 to £25 a year—a reduction of greater significance as a warning of the gravity of the situation than for the actual amount of foreign currency saved. (As evidence that the trouble though relieved is not yet cured, the allowance has lately been fixed at £25 for the current year also, though it is to be hoped that some relief may soon be possible.) France too, struck in 1951 by an acute exchange crisis, was forced to apply similar measures of restriction. Both the British and French Governments, which were then not only in dollar deficit but also in deficit with the European Payments Union, regretted deeply the action which they felt obliged to take. But they were faced with a crisis of confidence in the national currency and it was imperative to meet the challenge decisively and at once. It was fully realized that one country's imports are another country's exports and that a policy of import restriction was bound to check the growth of world trade, with reactions on production and employment that might be serious but did not allow of precise estimation. On all hands it was recognized that the import restrictions should be cancelled as soon as the position allowed and by as rapid stages as possible. A permanent cure of Europe's economic weakness is only to be found through an expansion of world trade based on the increased exploitation of natural resources and the enlargement of the field of commercial production and exchanges. As Mr. L. S. Amery, whose record as an imperial statesman is second to none, recently expressed the point in a letter to *The Times*—

For that approach the resolution of the Strasbourg Assembly points the way. Europe and the Commonwealth each constitute an area large enough to encourage production on liberal lines, that is, with no more interference with trade than is involved in moderate tariff and preferential arrangements. By mutual co-operation between the two groups they could speed up production still further and accelerate the return of convertibility. There lies the road to the widest freedom of trade over the widest area that world conditions permit.

Now since the meeting of the Council of Europe the Imperial Economic Conference, which was representative of the whole Commonwealth, has met and issued a full statement of the conclusions reached. The Organization for European Economic Co-operation has also issued its report for the year, reviewing the position of the countries embraced by the organization and indicating the needs of the future. It is a satisfactory feature that the views of



these different authorities should on a wide front all embody broadly the same outlook and turn in broadly the same direction for remedies. Such differences as there are arise mainly from the fact that the task before the three bodies, the Commonwealth Economic Conference, the Council of Europe and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, had a different emphasis. The last two bodies, as their names show, have a specifically European slant, though as the whole sterling area, which covers the Commonwealth (minus Canada in the dollar zone), settles its accounts through the European Payments Union, the child of O.E.E.C., no report on European co-operation can ignore the essential part that the non-European members of the Commonwealth have to play in rectifying the unbalance between Europe and America. Similarly, while at the London Economic Conference the hand was being played in partnership by the United Kingdom and its Commonwealth guests, the shadow figures of Europe and the United States, though absent from the table, were never far from the minds of the active players.

### Report of the Commonwealth Economic Conference

FOR two reasons the report of the conclusions of the Commonwealth Economic Conference provides the best text for study in this article. First, this was a conference of Prime Ministers and leading representatives of Commonwealth Governments, who are in a position to take in their respective countries the action required to give effect to the policies agreed upon by the Conference. Secondly, the Conference emphasized the vital part that Commonwealth countries must play if the development of production and exchanges of commodities in increasing volume is to enable the free world to emerge from restriction into the freer climate of expansion, carrying the promise of higher standards of living for all the partners. Here the conference had the advantage of bringing together the spokesmen of the more developed countries of the Commonwealth and the representatives of those countries in Asia and Africa which are economically far less advanced, and which can only hope to carry out their ambitious plans if they are able to obtain abundant supplies of capital from outside their own borders. It must, again, be emphasized that the scarcity of available capital is a menace to all countries, except a favoured few such as the U.S.A. and Switzerland. The United Kingdom itself, the traditional home of capital for imperial investment, is today a victim of the penury of savings. It is not to be forgotten that the large amounts of capital used for external development in the Commonwealth since the war have only been found as a consequence of the liberal grants and loans received since the war from the dollar area. These indeed, when added together, are not less in total than the sums made available in one form or other for external investment since the war.

Taking the *communiqué* of the Commonwealth Economic Conference as the text we may study and comment on the programme of expanding trade and the development of the Commonwealth under five heads.

1. Promotion of monetary stability with the objective of establishing again the convertibility of the pound.

2. The reliberalization of imports, implying the relief of restrictions imposed for balance of payment reasons.
3. The increase of production in the Commonwealth, especially of those commodities which would help the equilibrium of the balance of payments.
4. The question of finding the capital necessary for Commonwealth development.
5. The participation of Europe and the United States in the programme.

Though it is convenient for present purposes to consider the conference's plan under these five main heads, it should not be thought that these are isolated ideas. Given the objective of Commonwealth development, they form essential factors of an integrated plan. Failure under any head will jeopardize the attainment of the ultimate goal.

#### 1. *The promotion of monetary stability*

"All Commonwealth Governments have agreed to persevere in their efforts to curb inflation." The O.E.E.C. report also insists that European countries should apply appropriate internal policies to resist inflation.

It is clear that so long as redundant purchasing power is finding a vent in raising prices, which implies no commensurate increase of goods, there is no solid foundation on which economic advance in the Commonwealth can be based. The continuance of inflation, with its effect on internal prices, encourages excess of imports while at the same time it discourages exports. Thus it exerts a baleful influence on the balance of payments. The essential connexion between the health of the internal economy and external equilibrium is now fully recognized. In this regard there has been a marked and welcome change of direction by the present Government as compared with that of their Socialist predecessors who, in their whole period of office, including the two crises of 1947 and 1949, neglected to apply the well-established techniques of monetary policy. This failure jeopardized internal economic stability in the early post-war period up to 1951, when money was losing value and wages were chasing prices in a hopeless attempt to reach equilibrium. The 4 per cent bank rate, which has been in force since the budget, and the other measures taken to check inflation and to introduce more freedom into the foreign exchange market have not only been beneficial in themselves but have had a strong psychological effect in spreading confidence throughout the world that the Government are firmly convinced of the necessity of carrying their policy for the rehabilitation of sterling to a successful conclusion. The favourable trend in the terms of trade, that is the relation between export and import prices, has also exerted a most beneficial influence. "The Conference agreed that it is important not only for the United Kingdom and the sterling area but also for the world that sterling should resume its full role as a medium of world trade and exchange." This should mean at least the restoration of convertibility for current transactions even if full convertibility on the old-time model remains a distant dream. While these pronouncements on the objectives are unexceptionable, the question of action remains not

only for the United Kingdom but for the countries of the Commonwealth which are masters of their own economic house.

The United Kingdom as the largest trading partner in the Commonwealth and the custodian of the reserves of the whole sterling area has the responsibility of taking the lead. But it is essential that the whole sterling area should keep a harmonious rhythm, so that the entire strength of the Commonwealth can be developed in the effort to arrive, with the co-operation of Europe, at a balance with the dollar world and that the effort may not be weakened by disharmonies within the sterling area itself. This involves the continuance of parallel anti-inflation policies throughout the Commonwealth. Though in some respects there is a case for stronger measures, the situation has immensely improved during the past twelve months. The Commonwealth Conference has been able to assert "that the sterling area would achieve balance with the rest of the world in the second half of this year" (1952). The gradual rise of the reserves is a happy contrast with the position a year ago. Of course the conference has not given any concrete expression to the measures required to complete the fight against inflation. The effect of dearer money on damping down expenditure must be allowed to go on in the United Kingdom. While it is operative in the private sector, it has not been fully extended to the very important public sector, where borrowing for house-construction still enjoys a privileged position as regards terms. Further, the attack on public expenditure calls, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has recognized, for rigorous measures of economy, if savings are to be generated and funds are to be made available in increased measure for capital investment at home and in the Commonwealth. It will be necessary to see how these difficult issues are tackled in the budgets of the Commonwealth, which should give effect to the doctrines enunciated in general terms by the recent conference.

The achievement of a stable internal economy is the essential foundation for the reliberalization and expansion of trade. The reports of O.E.E.C. and of the Council of Europe lay emphasis on these objectives.

## 2. *The relief of restrictions on imports*

The Commonwealth Conference agreed that "restrictions imposed because of balance of payments problems should be relaxed as the external financial position of countries improved". Obviously such action is a vital factor in the expansion of trade. It had been hoped that by 1952 post-war restrictions on trade would have been abated, and from that year countries feeling themselves obliged to maintain discriminatory trade restrictions were required to consult with other countries party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.). Though considerable progress had been made by the United Kingdom and the Dominions to liberate trade with western Europe, hopes were disappointed when the monetary crisis of 1951 compelled a reversal of the policy. Australia, which had imposed restrictions on imports including those from the United Kingdom as a crisis measure, has already made some relaxations; and it is worth noting that when the sterling Dominions imposed restrictions at the end of 1951 they often treated member



countries of the European Payments Union no more hardly than members of the sterling area and the "cuts" were less severe than in the case of imports from other countries. No details were to be expected from the Economic Conference regarding the speed with which or stages by which the restrictions of 1951 could be relieved. This must depend on the progress made by each sterling country and by the area as a whole to reach an adequate balance with the non-sterling world. But before leaving this subject, on which there is agreement in principle, there are two points that should be noted. Some of the underdeveloped countries, such as India, may feel that in the interest of capital development the curtailment of domestic consumption by import restriction may to some extent have to be subordinated to the conservation of internal resources for the furtherance of long-range capital plans. As the question of the supply of outside resources for such purposes, for example the Colombo plan, is one of the most difficult problems to be overcome, efforts to reduce the demand for external capital by curtailing domestic consumption may in the circumstances be accepted. The problem of each Government is to harmonize this with the most desirable object of broadening international trade, which itself generates increased incomes and profits, capable of being called upon to aid in the financing of development.

The second point is, that as matters stand it will not be possible to liberalize trade without discrimination, for the reserves of the sterling area are insufficient to stand the strain. Indeed it is difficult to see how in present conditions, if convertibility is to be approached, this can be done without special action to limit dollar imports. This is part of the vast problem of trade relations between the dollar and non-dollar world, to which reference will be made later.

We may now pass to the third of the main subjects enumerated on page 123.

### 3. *The increase of production in the Commonwealth*

Here one enters on a field of great possibilities and also of great complexities. There is the question of reconciling internal demands for social (mostly not immediately productive) expenditure and the external requirement of strengthening the economy of the country itself as well as of the sterling area. Having regard to the fundamental purpose of the recent conference, it was only natural and proper that "the Conference agreed that in sterling area countries development should be concentrated on projects which directly or indirectly contribute to the improvement of the area's balance of payments with the rest of the world". This would be achieved either by the increased output of commodities, such as minerals or engineering products capable of export into the non-sterling world and especially the dollar area, or by the increased output of such goods and raw materials as would meet the needs of the sterling area and reduce the demand for imports, especially from the dollar area. Examples of such raw materials would be foodstuffs and tobacco. It is well known that the great depression of the 'thirties promoted a tendency among many countries producing primary raw materials, of which prices had fallen to unremunerative levels, to turn to the creation and development of secondary industries. This tendency was to

the detriment of increase of agricultural products, of which the growing populations in many countries, including some in the sterling area, are desperately in need. Unless action can be taken to increase food production within the Commonwealth, there is a real danger that various areas that were formerly exporters of cereals will become habitual importers—and owing to scarcities elsewhere habitual importers of cereals on a substantial scale from the dollar area. The recent agreement with Argentina illustrates the importance of increasing meat supplies within the Commonwealth.

There were some interesting suggestions from Strasbourg on the possible fields of commodity development for the saving of dollars by the European community. In the matter of wheat Europe is largely dependent on imports from the dollar area; and this dependence is made greater by reason of the low export rate from eastern Europe. Still there is something to be done by intensifying the efforts of western Europe and the oversea territories such as Australia to grow more cereals and at any rate to prevent European dependence on the dollar area from increasing. Tobacco is an example of a commodity in regard to which dependence on supplies from the United States has been reduced by the development of tobacco growing in the tropical areas of the Commonwealth. Before the war half the U.S. exports of 200,000 tons were taken by the United Kingdom as compared with about one-third in 1949. This process of promoting dollar independence is capable of further development. The United States is the world's leader in the production of cotton, a commodity for which technical details such as length of staple and grading are of cardinal importance. Since the war production outside the United States has risen, but in view of rising demand it is doubtful how far increased production outside the United States can mitigate the demand for American cotton. But the effort is well worth making. While it is not possible to deal in summary fashion with the various commodities in which dollar saving by the United Kingdom and Europe is possible, it is proper to mention such essential fields as copper, petroleum, edible oils and fats in which oversea areas should in time offer increased help in combating dependence on products requiring payment in dollars. In some respects the oversea territories enjoy most valuable assets such as tin, rubber and wool; and though the expansion of production is beset by technical problems and substantial development demands time and capital, there is no need to take a discouraging view of longer-term prospects. Meanwhile the best that can be done is to push ahead as rapidly as may be so that worthwhile results may be attained at the earliest possible date.

Before leaving this branch of the subject a few remarks should be made regarding the organization for attacking the issues involved and the provision of capital. The Commonwealth Conference referred to the proposed formation in London of "a company to further development in other countries of the Commonwealth and the Colonial Empire". It has recently been announced that a certain volume of sterling—perhaps up to £60 million over six years—is to be made available through the International Bank for loans to Commonwealth countries in the sterling area. It should, however, not be forgotten that if the maximum benefit is to be derived from fresh initiatives it

is important that European countries with overseas associates should work out their plans together. Many of their African colonies with similar climatic and other conditions produce similar products. For this reason it was proposed at Strasbourg that member countries of the Council of Europe should concert plans with the overseas territories, possibly through O.E.E.C., for the increased production of commodities. If mistakes in production policy are to be avoided, some action of this kind seems indispensable.

This leads immediately to

#### 4. *The question of finding the capital necessary for Commonwealth development*

This is likely to prove the very crux of the situation. No doubt the United Kingdom will continue to discharge to the maximum of its capacity its traditional role as the purveyor of capital to overseas territories. But it is faced with unprecedented difficulties. On the one hand is the dearth of savings, which along with excessive taxation impedes British manufacturing concerns in their task of finding adequate capital for modernizing their own plant. On the other hand, there are the claims on the national income for keeping up the rearmament programme and all the demands of the Welfare State. Savings cannot be expected to increase unless the public can feel reasonably assured that the purchasing power of their savings will cease to wilt as it has done in the post-war years. Funds for capital development on an adequate scale cannot be produced, unless the demands of the State on current production can be cut. Consumption has somehow to be brought down below production, so that savings may be available in increasing volume for investment. The Commonwealth Conference recognized the "special effort" that would be required from the United Kingdom Government to find the additional resources needed for Commonwealth development. The United Kingdom representatives also laid stress on the point that the overseas territory concerned shall itself devote "an adequate part of its resources to investment designed to improve the sterling area's balance of payments". Self-help is an essential ingredient in the solution of the problem. Thus each Commonwealth Government, including that of the United Kingdom, has a part to play in unburdening its domestic economy. It will be for Governments to show in their budgets for 1953 how they propose to give effect to these precepts and to meet the political difficulties this must entail. Meanwhile it is proper to recall the view of the Assembly of the Council of Europe that the resources of all member States (which would include some without territorial associates of their own) should be able to co-operate in the development of overseas countries, which introduces us conveniently to the fifth point mentioned on page 123.

#### 5. *The participation of Europe and the United States in the programme*

Of the countries in western Europe, excluding for the moment the United Kingdom, some, for example France and Belgium, have overseas associates of their own, all demanding capital for development. France, moreover, is saddled with the burden of an exhausting campaign in Indo-China. But there are others, for example Switzerland (which has already extended a credit to

South Africa) and Western Germany, which, though having no external associates of their own, may be able to make some contribution to the strengthening of the position of Europe by taking a hand in advancing the economy of the undeveloped territories in Asia and Africa. This would presuppose that adequate provision is made for the safeguarding of resources invested overseas and for the transferability of income and repayment of capital at due date. This raises a number of problems of mutual interest, appropriate for consideration and negotiation through the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. But even assuming—and it is a large assumption—that everything possible is done to exploit the capital resources of Europe and overseas territories, there will still remain a wide gap to be filled. The demands of overseas territories are virtually insatiable, and time is required to carry schemes of development to economic fruition, so that they may contribute by increased production to bring the economies of the sterling, European and overseas areas into balance with that of the dollar area.

The predominance of the United States today is such that no major issue, whether of defence, trade or finance, is capable of solution without the goodwill and active co-operation of America. The problem of overseas development falls into this category. It is impossible to exaggerate the contribution that the United States has made since the war to restoring the balance of Europe and to rebuilding a system of security. Here one thinks not only of their armed contribution in Korea, and of their outstanding part in financing the post-war international organizations but also of their direct aid by way of loans, grants, Marshall aid and help towards rearmament. At the same time there is one field in which the outside world, eager to shed the drawbacks of discrimination and to expand trade on a multilateral basis, still has an unsatisfied demand. This is that the United States should in its general economic policy apply the principles proper to the position of the outstanding world creditor country. The Commonwealth Economic Conference made the point with diplomatic discretion when they indicated that the restoration of effective multilateral trade, with the convertibility of sterling, depended among other conditions on "the prospect that trading nations will adopt trade policies which are conducive to the expansion of world trade". It is not possible to elaborate here the far-reaching implications of this somewhat cryptic phrase. In broad terms it means that ways should be found by the modification of her tariff and customs procedure by which the United States will admit a larger volume of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, which are Europe's main products, and will also render available for expanding world production a larger share of the capital resources that America commands. There are many signs that these considerations are appreciated in prominent quarters in America. The problem is their translation into accepted policy. The United States at present imports only 10 per cent of the raw materials which it consumes. It is thought that by reason of increasing population and higher standards of living this proportion may rise over twenty-five years to 25 per cent. But the outside world cannot wait. The need is now. Steps must be taken to raise production not only of manufactured goods but also, as the O.E.E.C. report points out, of the raw materials pro-

duced in oversea territories so that they may be ready to meet the demands of growing populations today and in the future. In his first State of the Union message President Eisenhower appropriately emphasized the importance of removing administrative obstacles to international trade and of encouraging the flow of private American investment abroad. These and other economic questions arising out of the Commonwealth Conference will figure in the discussions between the British and American financial authorities that are to be held in March. The establishment of a satisfactory programme for developing commercial monetary relations between the sterling and dollar areas on the basis of expanding trade would coincide with the interests of Europe as a whole, and it is perhaps permissible to hope that after due preparation an international conference may be convened, which will seek to lay down policies on a co-operative basis, directed to solving the outstanding problems of world economy.



# SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA

## THE NON-EUROPEAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

N.B. The Editor has received the following contribution from an independent correspondent. While he believes that it will be of interest to readers to have the principles of the resistance movement explained by one of its sympathizers, it should be observed that the editorial opinion of THE ROUND TABLE is to be deduced, not from this article, but from the series of quarterly commentaries on South African affairs by the Round Table Group in the Union, of which one appears on p. 190.

**SATYAGRAHA**, or "truth-firmness", which was born in South Africa on September 11, 1906, returned here on June 26, 1952. In 1906 this new, untried, form of political expression was evolved by the Indian community of the Transvaal under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi in protest against Mr. Lionel Curtis's draft Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance. In 1952, as a well-known and tested idea, usually known as passive resistance, it was introduced by the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress as a protest against the whole discriminatory fabric of the South African State. In the interval between those two years it had been practised on a great scale in the struggle in India for *swaraj*.

A distinction should be made between "passive resistance" and *satyagraha* if only because to Gandhi this distinction was of the highest importance. "In passive resistance there is always present an idea of harassing the other party . . . while in *Satyagraha* there is not the remotest idea of injuring the opponent. *Satyagraha* postulates the conquest of the adversary by suffering in one's own person."\* Several of the highest leaders in the present South African campaign are insistent that this campaign is not *satyagraha*, but it is here submitted that nothing that has been said or done by leaders or volunteers is in any important way inconsistent with the Mahatma's teaching.

From its foundation in 1913 up till 1948, the year of the victory of Dr. Malan's National Party, the African National Congress was a relatively little-known and ineffective body, relying on appeals to the government of the day and to the white conscience, neither of which activities had led to much in the way of achievement. In the early 'forties, however, a Congress Youth League was formed under the leadership of Mr. Nelson Mandela and others. This body was extremist, anti-communist, anti-white, and nationalist. It succeeded in inspiring a desire for action, and from the 1949 annual meeting onwards has largely set the pace of Congress itself. In that year the Youth League debated at length what sort of action the rising African political movement should take, and rejected the idea of force as being useless by an unarmed population against the heavily armed and militarily prepared whites. At the time force was rejected on practical and not on doctrinal grounds. The

\* *Satyagraha in South Africa*, by M. K. Gandhi, 2nd ed., p. 114.

ideas of passive resistance and strikes were favoured, but no decision was made to take any immediate action.

The Durban riots, in which Africans killed Indians, were still so fresh in the memories of both parties that there was in 1949 no question of co-operation between Africans and Indians for any joint action.

The 1949 meeting, then, while expressing the universal desire for action in place of words, gave no guidance to the rank-and-file of the movement on the sort of action that should be taken. The policies of the Government in 1950 and 1951 increased the desire for action.

In April 1951 Mr. Manilal Gandhi, a younger son of the Mahatma, who has succeeded his father in the management of the settlement that he founded at Phoenix, near Durban, and in the editorship of the weekly *Indian Opinion*, began a fast to purify himself, and told reporters that after his fast "he would in the name of God defy the Government's *apartheid* policy by committing a breach of an *apartheid* law and submit without protest to the penalty". No one had before then used the word "defy" in a political context, an unsuitable word that has been given to the 1952 campaign. After the fast Mr. Gandhi sat on benches on railway stations reserved for whites, entered Durban municipal library, and did all he could to court arrest, alone, and with his wife and daughter, but without success. In December 1951 he courageously entered the Orange Free State to attend the annual conference of the African National Congress. Fewer than ten Indians live in that province, which has prided itself, since republican days, on being *koelievry* (free of coolies). He felt sure of being arrested for entering without a permit, but still failed. He attended the conference, and received from the members an ovation which showed how warmly they regarded action in place of words.

During 1951 a body known as the "Joint Planning Council" had been set up by the Indian and African congresses to submit a plan of action, and its recommendations were available to the conference of December 1951. It recommended a "Plan of Action for the Defiance of Unjust Laws". The laws mentioned were: the Group Areas Act, which gives the Minister of the Interior power to decide where the various racial groups shall live, and to force members of groups for whom an area has not been proclaimed to sell or be expropriated; the Separate Representation of Voters Act, which aimed at electoral *apartheid* for the Cape Coloured and which has since been upset by the courts; the Suppression of Communism Act, which has been accurately described as the Suppression of Liberalism Act; the Pass Laws; the laws enabling the Government to cull the cattle of reserve Africans; and the new, back-to-tribalism Bantu Authorities Act.

The African National Congress adopted this plan, as did the annual meeting of the Indian Congress which was held on January 25, 1952. The stage was set for a joint move.

### Campaign of the Congresses

A LETTER was sent by each of the congresses to Dr. Malan referring to these laws and calling for their repeal. If they were not repealed by February 29, protest meetings would be held on April 6 (the tercentenary of

Van Riebeeck's landing) and the plan for the defiance of unjust laws would be put into effect. The Prime Minister replied, pointing out that the laws were aimed at protecting the interests of the Bantu, and that the Government had no intention of repealing any of them. He warned them that any infringement of the law would be dealt with, and hoped that wiser councils would prevail.

It would appear from this that the campaign was to be limited to an attack on the six laws mentioned above, but in reality it is aimed at changing the fundamental segregation policies of this country. In August Mr. Mandela wrote:

I would like to emphasize the aims of our campaign over again. We are not in opposition to any government or class of people. We are opposing a system which has for years kept a vast section of the non-European people in bondage. Though it takes us years, we are prepared to continue the campaign until the six unjust laws we have chosen for the present phase are done away with. Even then we shall not stop. The struggle for the freedom and national independence of the non-European peoples shall continue as the National Planning Council sees fit.

There is some confusion of ideas here, but the intent is clear—that *satyagraha* is to be used in order to change the nature of South African society. Other statements by leaders have claimed that the campaign is aiming at "equality", but this word caused embarrassment, and was defined by the Orange Free State conference of the African National Congress in October as "the peaceful settlement of all racial groups in South Africa". A few days later the Transvaal branch of the congress showed a readiness to call off the campaign if the United Party won the election, and if it showed a more conciliatory spirit than it had shown in opposition. The aim, then, has lacked precision, and the campaign has perhaps lost something because of this.

February 29 came and went, and none of the laws had been repealed. Meetings were held all over the country on April 6 in a spirit of restraint, and the strike which had been feared was not called. On that day the plan against the unjust laws was revealed. As announced in Johannesburg by the Joint Planning Council it was:

- (1) to select volunteers in the larger cities of the Union who would be willing to defy certain laws;
- (2) to expand defiance by having more volunteers in the remaining cities and towns of the country;
- (3) mass defiance against unjust laws.

It was announced that the campaign would begin on June 26.

The meetings held on April 6 were generally large, but there was a relative failure in Natal. The provincial head of the African National Congress, Chief Luthuli, addressed less than 100 at the Durban Bantu Social Centre, and no one turned up at another meeting which had been called at Chesterville. Most of the Africans in Durban are Zulus, and two weeks earlier, under persuasion from the Government, the Paramount Chief of the Zulus had warned his people to take part in no demonstrations. These meetings compare with a great religious service at Port Elizabeth, at which 10,000 people were present, and mass meetings in other towns.



On June 1 a meeting was held at Port Elizabeth at which 3,000 Africans pledged themselves to "exert all our mental, physical, and financial powers to attain our objective, which is the freedom of the oppressed peoples of South Africa. We shall not rest until our objective, which is freedom in our lifetime, is attained." The pledge was taken by their raising their right hands and repeating the words after a speaker. History was repeating itself: on September 11, 1906, 3,000 Indians had also unanimously taken an oath, with God as witness, not to submit to the "Black Act" if it became law. They, too, had sworn with their hands upraised.

Dr. Moroka addressed the Port Elizabeth meeting and said: "The Congress struggle is not levelled against any particular group or party. We do not hate the Dutch or the English but we hate the oppressive laws under which we are compelled to live."

At the same time the Minister of Justice, Mr. C. R. Swart, acting under the Suppression of Communism Act, served notices on five of the leaders of the congresses ordering them to resign from their organizations. They announced their decision early in June not to obey this order, and have never since then obeyed it.

The campaign opened on June 26. At Boksburg a distinguished group under the leadership of Mr. Nana Sita, who participated in the earlier campaigns with the Mahatma, went to the location and sought to enter without permits. The gates were closed to prevent them from entering, and the African and Indian volunteers waited for two hours. Then the African volunteers were arrested for not having passes and, the gates being opened, the Indian volunteers entered peacefully and were arrested. Many of the leaders were in that group.

At Port Elizabeth a typical act opened the campaign. Thirty volunteers entered a railway station, using the entrance reserved for whites. As they reached the platform they were met by a party of railway police all armed with revolvers. The group parleyed with the police and, while they were doing so, African passengers in a train near by sang *Mayibuye e Afrika* ("May Africa return"), the favourite campaign song, which is sung to the tune of "Oh, my darling Clementine". The passengers saluted the volunteers with the salute of the campaign, which is the familiar "thumbs-up" of the British working man, and with the now familiar cry of "Africa". The strength of the campaign has from the beginning lain in its ability to attract the participation of the crowds, people who often have never before had any interest in politics.

The vitality of this movement is partly shown by the number of songs that the African volunteers have composed. All through the campaign demonstrations have been marked by the singing of these songs and hymns and by prayers.

The campaign has no newspapers of its own. It has been served by three newspapers. Two very left-wing papers, *Spark* and *Advance*—the latter with 30,000–40,000 circulation, have given it a great deal of space, as has the more conservative *Indian Opinion*. The main English-language newspapers have given the campaign good publicity from the beginning, and have been criticized by the Government for so doing and "encouraging the campaign".

No principal newspaper has lent the campaign any editorial support, although letters have appeared in the correspondence columns supporting and encouraging the campaign.

According to information which the Joint Planning Council has made available the total number of *satyagraha* imprisonments in India, from the beginning of the struggle to the end, was about 60,000. When this campaign opened here the Council announced that they aimed to get 10,000 volunteers. After one month, at the end of July, only 800 had been arrested, and the feeling became fairly general that this movement, like so many earlier African efforts, would come to nothing, and that it would soon peter out. This feeling vanished during August, when the movement gathered momentum rapidly, and by the end of that month 3,198 arrests had been made. By October 6 the total had risen to 5,264, and to 6,880 by the 22nd of the month. By the end of the year, according to figures issued by the Joint Action Committee (apparently the same as the Joint Planning Council), 8,065 people had been arrested. Groups arrested together have varied in size from 1 to 279.

### 'Statutory Communism'

THE Government has clearly been worried by the campaign, and Ministers have referred to it on several occasions. In September the Prime Minister said that there was a secret alliance between the United Democratic Front (the United Party, the Labour Party, and the Torch Commando) and the passive resisters. This was strongly denied by the Torch Commando. Mr. Swart, the Minister of Justice, said: "If the laws are bad it is up to the people to elect a new Parliament and change the laws." If Mr. Swart was addressing his remarks to the volunteers, they would no doubt have been justified in asking him to make it easier for them to "elect a new Parliament". Mr. Schoeman, the Minister of Labour, suggested at the end of September that existing laws were not drastic enough to enable the Government to "get at" the instigators of the campaign and bring them to book. Mr. Swart also publicly authorized the police to exceed their powers in dealing with the campaign. He said: "If policemen go slightly beyond the limits of their powers in isolated cases, they should not be condemned in view of their difficult task." He has at other times said that he will not blame them if they shoot first and ask questions afterwards.

Government attempted in August to stop the campaign by prosecuting twenty leaders under the Suppression of Communism Act. Under this Act it is an offence, *inter alia*, to do acts aimed at bringing about a change in the industrial and social structure of the country through unconstitutional and disorderly means. They were eventually tried before the Transvaal Supreme Court and were all found guilty by Mr. Justice Rumpff of a technical breach of the law. The judge made it clear that his judgment did not mean that the accused were Communists in the ordinary meaning of the word, but merely that they were guilty of "statutory communism", a term he hit upon in questioning the prosecutor. An appeal has been noted.

Another approach was tried at Durban and at Cape Town. It was to ignore the volunteers, as Mr. Manilal Gandhi had been ignored in 1951. It was not

persisted in, perhaps through a realization that a public refusal by a government to enforce its own laws could hardly impress the public with respect for those laws. A more typical reaction has been that of many magistrates who order corporal punishment for young people who volunteer.

The campaign has already had a profound effect on the non-whites. It has also affected white opinion, though probably to a less degree. The principal reaction to it so far is that of the Liberal groups in Johannesburg, Kimberley and Pietermaritzburg, who late in September issued statements referring to the campaign, and calling for equal rights for all civilized people, and equal opportunities for all men and women to become civilized. Among the signatories were a former judge, four white senators and members of Parliament representing Africans, and a bishop of the Anglican Church.

Late in November the Government produced the first instalment of its promised legislation to bring the instigators to book. A proclamation was issued by the Governor General and by the Minister for Native Affairs, Dr. Verwoerd, making it an offence for anyone to incite an African to break any law, and for anyone to hold a meeting of Africans. The maximum penalty under the proclamation is a fine of £300 or three years in prison. Up to date only one case—that of the white volunteers—has been brought under the proclamation, and as it has not yet been heard the matter is still *sub judice*. Part of the defence in that case will be that the proclamation is *ultra vires*.\*

Even this proclamation has not satisfied the Government, and it has just been announced that time will be found in the coming session for two Bills, one to empower Government to declare martial law in any area, and one to make it an offence for anyone to participate in any way in a civil disobedience campaign. The coming session will hardly last more than a month to enable the general election campaign to be fought, so the place given to these Bills shows the anxiety of the Government to bring the campaign to a close, and also probably their determination to make party-political capital out of its suppression.

Shortly after the proclamation was promulgated a dozen white volunteers joined the campaign and, as this goes to press, the first Chinese volunteer has been arrested, thus ensuring that the campaign shall not come to a close before South Africans of all races have participated. There have been Coloured volunteers, but on the whole the Coloured community has dissociated itself from the campaign.

In November serious rioting took place in Port Elizabeth, East London, Kimberley and the Rand. Mr. Swart was quick to blame the riots on the campaign, but the riots dismayed the leaders as much as anyone, and Dr. Moroka, the then President General of the African National Congress, strongly condemned the riots, which he said "can only serve to prejudice the cause of the Natives at home and abroad". At the time there was a partial and voluntary self-censorship of the press, and greatly exaggerated rumours went

\* Since the above was written the court of first instance at Johannesburg has imposed substantial fines on a number of defendants, including Mr. Manilal Gandhi, who is mentioned in the article, and Mr. Patrick Duncan, eldest son of the late Sir Patrick Duncan, Governor General of the Union. An appeal is pending.—*Editor*.

round the country. One had it that 200 Africans had been killed in Port Elizabeth. Liberals and the United Party, together with leaders of Congress, pressed for a judicial enquiry, but Mr. Swart refused to hold one.

From the beginning of the campaign its character has been almost uniformly non-violent, and except on the Rand there has been a strongly religious side to it. There have been a few exceptions. For instance, at Cradock in October some Africans rode on a merry-go-round reserved for whites and were told to leave in order to avoid the need for the police to be called. A scuffle ensued, and stones were thrown. Unfortunately this very un-Gandhian act was accompanied by the campaign's cry of "Africa". In August a crowd, among which were nine members of the African National Congress, stoned the police at Port Elizabeth and tried to release Africans who had been arrested by the police. There was no evidence that this was in any way an act connected with the campaign, and in any case it would be difficult to find a crowd in that area in which there were not a large number of members. It is the one area in which a mass movement has already been created. On the other side it was reported that all meetings in the Orange Free State had been accompanied by religious fervour, by prayers and by hymns, and before the beginning of the campaign, at Port Elizabeth, there was a two-hour open-air service at which 2,000 Africans prayed for the volunteers. There have been prayer-meetings on the Rand, and in August there was an interdenominational prayer-meeting held in the Western Native Township of Johannesburg. Most processions there, too, have sung hymns, but the atmosphere on the Rand is more secular, more like any typical political movement.

A question that is uppermost in anyone's mind is how far the movement is dominated by Communists. It is admitted that among the leadership and among the rank-and-file there are members who, before the dissolution of the Communist Party of South Africa, were members of that body. But it is also clear that the form that the campaign has taken owes far more to Gandhi than it does to Marx. *Satyagraha* is not a conception that fits anywhere in dialectical materialism. A most important factor is this: the effect of this campaign has been to increase enormously the political enthusiasm of the working class. Now the vast mass of the working class here is by and large to be found in the African community, not in the Indian. The African National Congress has a strong tradition of opposition to Communism, and the Communists among the leaders tend to be Indians. The Communists are thus in a way acting as recruiting agents for a body that is in no way Communist, and that, judging by the latest presidential election, is moving a little farther, if possible, to the Right. It is safe to say that the movement is today in no way dominated either by the Communist idea or by Communists.

#### Decisions in the Courts

THERE have been some interesting decisions of the courts. With people deliberately seeking to infringe *apartheid* regulations, it now appears that at least in the Post Office and in the railways notices saying "Europeans Only" are of no legal effect unless the facilities for other races are equal. This is a

decision of far-reaching importance, for in no case, except perhaps in the G.P.O. at Cape Town, are the facilities equal. It is possible that Parliament may pass a special law enabling these two departments to provide separate but unequal accommodation. As there is nothing in our constitution that forbids this (in the United States there is), this solution may be adopted in preference to spending the millions of pounds that the building of equal facilities would demand. It was only in 1950 that the doctrine was clearly enunciated by the courts, that unless Parliament had clearly authorized racial discrimination, it was not competent for a statutory body to provide unequal treatment for the various races (*Rex v. Abdurrahman*). This principle was applied in the recent case of *Regina v. Lusu*, when the defence succeeded in eliciting an admission from the station-master at Cape Town that the accommodation provided for different races was not equal.

What of the future? Since the middle of December there has been a pause in the campaign, but the Action Committee has announced that the pause is now over and that the campaign will go forward. If it does go forward, there can be little doubt that the Government will use against it the drastic powers for which it will ask Parliament when the session opens. And if this government is re-elected in April there can be little doubt that the strongest measures will be taken against the whole non-white political movement. It is already rumoured that one or more war-time internment camps are being refurbished in readiness for this. The effect of such repression can only in the long run mean terrorism such as Ireland, Palestine and Kenya have seen. In this scattered land it will not be difficult for terrorists to produce effects of even greater barbarity than what we are now seeing in Kenya. Terrorism can only have one result—the destruction of at least one generation's work in this country, probably far more.

If, on the other hand, the United Party succeeds, although in stated policy it differs hardly at all from the Nationalists, one can reasonably hope that totalitarian methods will not be used. If white South Africa shows a genuine desire to reverse the present trend toward oppression, it need have no fear that a reasonable and peaceful solution will not be reached. There are, of course, the dangers inherent in any nationalist movement, but there is no sign at present of any significant excesses. Along this road there is daylight, although it runs near perilous crevasses. It is difficult to see even daylight along any other road.



## GENTLEMEN AND PLAYERS AT WASHINGTON

### AMATEUR ADMINISTRATION *v.* PROFESSIONAL CONGRESS

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S administration is off in a baptism of fire, instead of a rosy honeymoon. Its first weeks in office plainly indicate that unless its relations with Congress are speedily clarified, unless the President vigorously exercises the qualities of leadership and conciliation which he undeniably possesses, we are going to have a very rough time of it.

Thus, during his earliest week in office, the new President found himself in a series of potentially awkward misunderstandings with the legislative branch. But his State of the Union Message offered an opportunity to clear away many of the difficulties, and President Eisenhower rose to the occasion vigorously. He outlined a foreign policy based on broader and more carefully qualified elements than Secretary of State Dulles's speech a few days before. His domestic proposals heartily agreed with majority views in the Congress. In short, after a shaky start, it was generally agreed that with this Message the new President had got his Administration well off the ground.

And yet the problem of continuing relations with the Congress remains. The basic difficulty goes back to fundamental elements of American politics and the U.S. Constitution. President Eisenhower was elected last November by the largest number of voters who ever cast their ballots for an American President. The present Congress is controlled by a Republican majority that barely squeaked in with the skin of its teeth. But Congress calls the legislative tune. And the individual legislators were each elected in separate districts, often on the basis of local issues which had little to do with the national campaign. Unless controlled either by the lofty Eisenhower prestige or by an effective patronage system that has not yet been organized, these legislators are going to go their own sweet way.

In addition, most of the Republican legislative leaders were fervent opponents of President Eisenhower before his nomination last July. They preferred Senator Taft. Most of them have been either ignored or treated rather perfunctorily in the appointments to high office which have been made up to now. They have had little or no patronage. They were impressed by the Eisenhower electoral majority and they respect the President's appealing and impressive personal leadership. But they seem to have devoted themselves to the task of cutting the White House back to size. Most of them remember poignantly the past twenty years of strong presidential domination. They wish to increase the legislative role. They are anxious to prevent President Eisenhower from becoming a 'strong man', in the sense of seriously subordinating congressional authority. They are gleefully giving him and his crowd of initially confident assistants in the White House a strenuous initiation in the facts of American political life.

This phase may bode good or ill. The Eisenhower strategists, led by the

President himself, may adjust themselves speedily to married life in a conjugal democracy. They may lose their over-confidence, they may gain new respect for the arts of government, and—chastened and sober—may avoid really serious defeats later on. They have been deprived of the customary American political honeymoon. But who is to say the marriage cannot be all the better for it? The problems which were bound to come up sooner or later have come up right at the start. It will probably be much easier to solve them now than it would six months hence.

Such optimism is tenable and even reasonable. But it is not the inevitable outcome. Conflict between the President and Congress could, no doubt, get worse instead of better. And in that case, we could have a deadlocked and frustrating period. But President Eisenhower is not the frustrated type. He ought to be able to find a way out, since the problem is primarily one of tact, adjustment, and mediation.

Moreover, the business leaders and millionaires whom the new President appointed to high office speedily discovered that their counting-house prestige meant little in the Halls of Congress. The classic case, of course, was that of Charles E. Wilson, who finally had to sell \$2,500,000 worth of General Motors stock and arrange to pay a capital-gains tax of some \$600,000 in order to qualify for office under long-existing laws.

Mr. Wilson's extensive battery of lawyers in General Motors, and the new Attorney General, Herbert Brownell—a New York lawyer who also attended to patronage—committed the egregious blunder of ignoring familiar statutory barriers against office-holders with financial interests that might be affected by official decisions. Mr. Brownell is a close henchman of Governor Dewey, and as much as anybody else he manipulated the strategy which foiled Senator Taft's forces at the Chicago Convention. It therefore gave the Taft Republicans an exquisite pleasure to expose Mr. Brownell and to pin down Mr. Wilson, who also gave decisive support to the Eisenhower nomination at Chicago, through General Motors' great influence in Michigan.

Mr. Wilson meantime had picked, and President Eisenhower had approved, three other business leaders to be Secretaries of Army, Air, and Navy. The nominee for Secretary of the Navy, Robert B. Anderson, manager of ranch and oil interests in Texas, was found to have no personal interests that might conflict with his official decisions. But Robert T. Stevens, selected for Secretary of the Army, and Harold E. Talbott, for Secretary of the Air Force, held substantial business interests which were found by the Senatorial committee to be in possible conflict. So the Senators refused to confirm either man's appointment until they had divested themselves of stock ownership and any other financial interest.

The issue was important and salutary. It helped the Eisenhower Administration, which had campaigned on the basis of civic incorruptibility, to avoid at least the appearance of evil. It also confirmed a pattern by which business leaders can do their part in government: a pattern which requires them to rid themselves of any possible conflict of financial interest. The pattern has generally been followed in the past, and the surprising thing about the present episode was that these particular business men imagined

that they could hold office with their heavy financial stake in companies doing business with their very governmental department. A kind of honest *naïveté* seems to have entered the situation: the business men were so confident of their own realism, understanding, and integrity that they considered themselves above suspicion. They were soon disillusioned by the press and the Senate.

The experience was very costly to them. Each will make a substantial capital gain on the sale of his stock, and each will have to pay a capital gain tax of 25 per cent. Probably this financial penalty should be removed for future cases. It could be done, for example, by a statute suspending the payment of the capital-gains tax until such time as the appointees leave governmental service. If they then re-purchase their stock, and no capital gain is shown on the total transaction, they would not have to pay a tax.

A real problem manifestly arises over the whole issue of business men in government. Even after such men as Messrs. Wilson, Stevens, and Talbott have sold their stock the question of their relationship with their old companies, to which some day they might return, will surely arise. It is most valuable to have men of such experience and competence in government. The Department of Defense is, in a real sense, a huge business operation. It needs men capable of running such enterprises. But their divorcement from personal ties and interests can really only be measured in terms of character and integrity, rather than by statutes and rules.

### Learning the Business

IT was the political amateurs who won President Eisenhower's nomination in Chicago; it is the political professionals who are giving them some lessons now in Washington. But unless the situation grows much worse, and the Congress reduces and contains the authority of the President to a remarkable degree, the outcome will probably be tolerable.

There are wry aspects to the situation. For instance, Mr. Wilson in December called on Robert A. Lovett, his predecessor as Secretary of Defense. As head of the biggest corporation in the world, as a justly famous production expert, as the President-elect's chosen travelling companion to Korea, Mr. Wilson was understandably feeling no pain. He said to Mr. Lovett, with what sounds like condescension, that he supposed the Defense job was "ninety-five per cent production". Mr. Lovett—who is a cool and competent investment banker with varied government experience for ten years—replied that it once was 5 per cent production but that the figure had dropped lately. Mr. Lovett remarked in another context that he and the late James Forrestal had calculated it would take a business man about two years to learn his way about in government.

Another educational episode came when former Governor Sherman Adams of New Hampshire, who is expected to have great power as assistant to the President, was being shown round the White House. He asked a veteran clerk how many papers had to cross the President's desk each day, and was told "about 300". "Well," replied Mr. Adams, "we'll soon change that! I'll take care of most of them myself, and we'll give the President a batch about once a week." To which the grizzled and ink-stained clerk answered:

"You'll have to change a number of laws if you expect to do that, Governor." Which episode reveals not only the newcomer's inexperience, but the tremendous routine personal burden of the Presidency—which doubtless ought to be simplified.

An important source of change-over difficulty in American government arises from its difference from the British system. The American civil service does not rise high in the departmental echelons. Not only do the Cabinet Minister and his Deputy change, but all the assistant secretaries and a very large number of key men at lesser levels. Before many weeks will have passed, there will be a wholesale house-cleaning. Many Ambassadors are replaced almost automatically, as well as mission chiefs of MSA and other offices. It is a real and sweeping change of personnel. We have no "permanent under-secretaries".

The change in the State Department, which might be expected to make the most difficulty, is mitigated by Mr. John Foster Dulles's long experience in the Department itself. It is too early to test his associates. And it would be premature to assume that Mr. Dulles is really going to change Truman-Acheson policies very materially. He has used some language which indicates a more aggressive pressure on the Soviet Union through weak spots in the satellites. But it isn't clear that Mr. Dulles was really enunciating policy in these references. His first official speech was blunt, indeed, in its warnings to Western Europe to press forward in rearmament and unification. But such bluntness was undoubtedly expressive of the general sense of American public opinion. Perhaps the nation does not adequately understand the serious difficulties which have hampered agreement on the rearmament of Germany or the strengthening of European Defense Community forces generally. Perhaps when Mr. Dulles and Mr. Stassen return from their trip to Europe, which began only ten days after they came into office, they will more effectively bridge misunderstanding in both directions across the Atlantic.

We have thus had three major foreign-policy pronouncements at the outset: the President's inaugural address, his State of the Union Message and Mr. Dulles's speech. They were interrelated. The President took the United States definitively out of any serious isolationist resurgence. His inaugural address, concentrated almost wholly on world problems, presented the American Government as gravely aware of its international responsibilities, and conscious that its effectiveness as a great Power depends on repudiation of any possible American imperialism or improper attitude toward any other government.

Mr. Dulles, on the contrary, told our Allies what we regard as essential attitudes of co-operation. His words were undiplomatic. His speech was couched in homely and general terms. It was not a polished diplomatic address. It was imprecise. It hinted at policies and changes which were not spelled out. It will be difficult for the embassies in Washington to interpret his remarks as they write their eagerly awaited dispatches to their capitals. Perhaps this was all intentional. Mr. Dulles is a skilled international lawyer with long experience in international negotiation. He knows his first need is to gain the confidence of the American people. He must take the State

Department off the target area on which it has uneasily operated for so long. He must stop as much of the sniping against the Department as possible. Toward this objective he has made an excellent beginning. If world capitals can understand his purposes, perhaps they will see that American policy will be much more stable and effective if the State Department can be rescued from the imprisonment of its domestic critics. Once Mr. Dulles has secured his position at home, he can begin the precise and constructive development of policies abroad.

### Living Down a Legend

PROBABLY American public opinion has made the mistake of expecting too much of the Eisenhower administration all at once. For years, moreover, the Eisenhower "hero-myth" has been built up in the American consciousness. President Eisenhower would be the first, modestly and realistically, to reject any such picture. But the expedients of the electoral campaign did not help things: his references to the war in Korea, his pledge to visit the scene, the implication that he—somehow—would be able to end the war (an implication which Secretary Dulles was venturesome enough to repeat in his speech on January 27). Therefore people expected—and expect—far more from the new Administration than it can possibly achieve.

Moreover, they were not prepared for the little blunders and confusions. These were the result of general inexperience: there are relatively few case-hardened politicians or old-time governmental officials in the new top team. In the end, the new men may well exceed their predecessors in capacity and performance. But at the outset they are handicapped and have been prone to lapses of liaison and preparation. The lofty expectations which still surround the new President make the blunders all the more glaring.

In fact, the new team is an imposing array of private professional experience. Whether—as Mr. Lovett said—it will take such men two years to learn the high art of governmental service, is perhaps to be doubted. They should come along much faster, and they can associate themselves with more experienced persons in assistant capacities. The ultimate shape of the American Government may be one of the most capable and statesmanlike that we have had for a long time; or it may not. We simply cannot tell now. And all the old-timers in Congress, back in office after twenty years in the wilderness, are enjoying themselves no end.

### The Note of Leadership

CONTRASTED with the petty difficulties involved in the confirmation of the Eisenhower team, and the initial adjustments with a restive and confident Congress, was the overwhelming success of the President's policy outline contained in his State of the Union Message. The tone of leadership was unmistakable. It was not a challenging message, but a middle-of-the-road message. The "middle way" laid down by the President may well be the keynote of his Administration. Instead of the "New Deal" of Roosevelt and the "Fair Deal" of Truman we can expect the "Middle Way" of Eisenhower. If the new President succeeds in carrying forward a consistent policy of



mediation he may well expect reasonable harmony with Congress and with the great majority of public opinion.

Whether the Eisenhower way seems one of mediation to the foreign offices of Europe and Asia is less likely. And yet it is possible to read too much into the new foreign policy declarations. President Eisenhower's redefinition of the role of the Seventh Fleet in the Far East may seem much more sensational than it is. Stripped to its realistic base, the new orders remove an anomaly. There is no reason today for the U.S. Navy to guarantee the defense of Communist China against Nationalist attack. There was such a reason in 1950. But the new policy does not commit the United States to any offensive action.

The President hints at no action in Korea itself which goes beyond the agreed terms of United Nations action. It may be noted also that in the field of domestic policy he proposes ending emergency economic controls. If he were contemplating policies that might lead to a major extension of warlike operations, he would scarcely propose freeing the national economy.

In short, Mr. Eisenhower has begun a new phase of psychological warfare. Perhaps our allies have not been adequately prepared for this operation, for their own first reactions—in some instances—seem to be more alarmed and uncertain than the Communists'. Soon, however, they should see the feasibility of introducing "new and positive" elements into American policy. As the President said, "the free world cannot indefinitely remain in a posture of paralysed tension, leaving for ever to the aggressor the choice of time and place and means to cause greatest hurt to us at least cost to himself".

We are leaving the policy of containment—in slogans and in attitude, at least. Just how much more we shall be able to do remains to be seen. The new policy is based just as firmly on the necessity of trusting allies, and warm international understanding between the United Nations, as the old ever was. President Eisenhower is no arrogant nationalist, no truculent sabre-rattler. But it is of overwhelming importance that American foreign policy should regain its dynamism. The first step is to unite American opinion firmly behind it. The second—which cannot wait—is to be sure that the policy is understood and in basic terms supported by the other governments and peoples on which its success equally depends.

As for domestic affairs, it is entirely possible that the American economy will become more strong and stable under the new Administration. If it does, the whole free world benefits. The President has asked for extension of the reciprocal trade agreement authority, and for removal of needless obstacles to foreign trade. His support for more off-shore procurement, for greater private investment abroad, for more purchase abroad of raw materials, are all helpful attitudes to the strengthening of the domestic and world economy alike.

The freeing of the American economy from any except the most essential and inevitable governmental controls ought likewise to strengthen productivity and dynamics. His proposals in the fields of monetary and fiscal policy have yet to be tried as inflation controls. But Mr. Eisenhower finds great national support for seeking to balance the budget before proceeding to reduction of taxes, for curbing the enormous short-term debt of the nation,

and for coordinating and applying all possible indirect elements which may mitigate inflation.

In labor policy, in civil rights, and in social programs, the President's policies all cleave to the middle way—but are in no sense reactionary or conservative. On the contrary, they all represent the commitment to forward movement which dominates at least part of the Republican party. The clock is not being set back. Our obligation to social justice remains a valid debt, and the new Administration seeks to keep up the payments.

There will naturally be many testing times ahead, when the general directions of the President's message must be carried out in terms of concrete policies. Selfish interests will be just as active to protect themselves as they have always been. The middle way is not an easy way. Sometimes—indeed, quite often—it involves displeasing both sides. It will be much more possible to say, six months from now, just what the net purport of Eisenhower policies has become. Merely to be elected and installed as President, merely to draw together a group of governmentally inexperienced but business-wise men, does not endow an Administration with capacity or authority to settle the grave problems that crowd around the White House door.

But it can be said, after ample and vivid warning that things are not going to be all lavender and roses, that the Eisenhower Administration has made a firm start.

United States of America,  
February 1953.

# FRANCE AND THE FRENCH UNION

## A NEW WORLD COMES TO BIRTH

WHAT are the political, judicial and economic ties which unite metropolitan France and her oversea territories? What is the weight of the financial and military burden imposed on France by the war in Indochina? What is the real gravity of the disturbances in North Africa? What is to be the future of this apparently rather ill-matched association? Such are the questions which the public opinion of the world asks; and receives no certain answer. Yet there is no mystery or ambiguity, no *arrière-pensée* in the relations between France and her oversea possessions.

### From Empire to French Union

FRANCE has always had a somewhat individual conception of the proper relations between a suzerain Power and its oversea territories. It springs from the liberal philosophy which dominates her political institutions, from a temperament responsive to generous ideas, and from her economic and military needs.

In the nineteenth century soldiers and explorers, moved by a love of excitement and adventure, and missionaries, led on by the ardour of their faith, planted the tricolour in vast African and Asiatic lands where anarchy, misery and superstition prevailed. The French for the most part were a contentedly stay-at-home people, who felt no urge for colonization. It was not until the younger and more active nations—the United States, Russia, Germany and Japan—had begun to outstrip France in strength and population that French public opinion almost instinctively tried to absorb the wide expanse of the oversea territories, with their human resources of all races, into the home country in order to restore the shaken equilibrium.

M. Georges Mandel's saying: "A France of 100 million inhabitants" hit the mark, nor was it a mere propagandist vision. The words had a real meaning. The home country and the oversea territories were fused in a closely knit union of which the nerve centre was, quite naturally, Paris: one political system, one economy, one currency, and one and the same army to guard all the frontiers—the French Army which shaped in one mould the best elements of northern Africa, negro Africa and Indochina, to spill their blood in two world wars on the battlefields of the Somme, at Verdun and elsewhere with a self-sacrifice, patriotism and fidelity which have never been questioned.

The war of 1939 loosened the bonds between the various parts of the old empire; but it may be doubted whether the revolution goes so deep as some would have us believe. It is undeniable that there have been some outward changes. In some cases France has taken the initiative and in others changes have been imposed upon her by circumstances. At the Franco-African

Conference held at Brazzaville from January 30 to February 8, 1944—that is, before the liberation of metropolitan France—General de Gaulle said:

In French Africa as in other countries where men live under our flag there can be no progress that does not bring spiritual and material profit to the people who are native to the soil, and unless they can gradually raise themselves to a level where they will be capable of taking part in their own countries in the management of their own affairs. It is the duty of France to bring this to pass.

Others, moved by nationalist or Communist ideas, had already prepared the way for dissident movements which they calculated had good prospects of being carried to completion after the end of the war, when France, lacerated and partly ruined, would show herself, as they thought, no longer able to guarantee the protection of such wide and far-flung territories.

### What is the French Union?

UNDER this twofold pressure both from within and from without, the French political parties redoubled their attention to oversea problems. At the tribune of the two Constituent Assemblies divergent and often contradictory doctrines were seen to confront one another in the quest of a solution to the dilemma of maintaining the ties between the home country and her African and Asiatic territories, without ceasing to respect the wishes of the autochthonous peoples for emancipation.

The Constitution approved by the referendum of October 13, 1946, was designed to create a French Union formed on the one side by the French Republic and on the other by her Territories and Associated States who were "to pool, according to the terms of the law, their entire means for guaranteeing the defence of the whole Union".

The French republic comprises metropolitan France, the *départements d'outremer* (the three departments of Algiers with the Southern territories, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion and Guiana); and the *territoires d'outremer* of French East Africa, French Equatorial Africa, St. Pierre and Miquelon, the Comoro Islands, Madagascar and its dependencies, the French Somali Coast, French India and New Caledonia and its dependencies and the French islands in Oceania.

The Territories and Associated States are bound to the French Republic by bonds of international law. At present the kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos and the State of Vietnam are included among the Associated States.

The protectorates of Morocco and Tunis, bound to France by special treaties, remain outside the French Union.\*

This organization, complicated as it is, springs from the ethnological, geographic, economic, social and political differences between the territories, and in fact has a logical justification.

France, by the law of March 19, 1945, promoted the four old colonies, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guiana and Réunion, to the status of *départements*,

\* In addition France shares in the administration of the condominium of the New Hebrides and the International Zone of Tangier.

because their inhabitants, whether African or European in origin, have been steeped in French culture for more than three centuries. The other territories of the Republic have a civilization too alien and in some cases too backward to be fully assimilated in law to metropolitan France.

But the most original idea in the Constitution of 1946 is not here. Article 80 says: "All persons whose country of origin is in the oversea territories have the status of citizen by the same title as French nationals of metropolitan France or the oversea territories." Accordingly all the peoples who make up the French Republic have but one common French nationality without distinction of local origin or race. The populations of the departments and the oversea territories elect their representatives to the French political assemblies (the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic, not to mention the Assembly of the French Union, of which one half is composed of members representing the home country and the other half of members representing the departments and the oversea territories). The oversea territories dependent on the French Republic have local elected assemblies endowed with considerable financial and economic powers. This principle was applied generally after the war, though previously it was only applied to Senegal (since 1879) and to Togo (since 1924). French policy regarding territories abroad followed two different and seemingly contrary trends of thought and action. One was the idea of centralization and unity which France inherited from the Jacobins and Napoleon; the other an idea of decentralization and diversity, which was imposed by distance, geographical situation and the rupture of communications with the mother country during the Second World War. To the extent that these two ideas can be harmonized the balance between autochthonous and metropolitan interests is maintained. France decentralizes everything which concerns the internal affairs of the territories; she tries to extend the responsibilities of the native peoples in order to educate them and accustom them to the exercise of power; she respects their civilizations, some of which are more ancient than her own, she has protected native religions even in times when secularism was an almost sacrosanct dogma of home politics. This was what the celebrated writer Louis Bertrand meant when he said, apropos of Islam: "That which France denies to Catholics, Protestants and Jews she grants deliberately, spontaneously and without even being asked, to Moslems who are not even French." At the same time she labours, as Governor Paul Bert said, to enlist the peoples in the control of their own destiny by giving them a direct and important share not only in their own affairs but also in those of the mother country; for she remains convinced that problems of mutual concern must be brought to Paris for solution.

It is possible—indeed it is easy—to criticize the conception of the French Union. It has been accused even in France of superficiality, and the reproach is based on the way in which the French Parliament has tried to apply its liberal ideas without counting all the political consequences and before the native peoples were ready to exercise the rights and duties of citizens of the mother country.

From the platform of the United Nations nationalist and Communist



factions have accused France of "imperialism" and have sought to base their charges on her administration of the Far East and North Africa. This point deserves consideration. The war in Indochina, unrest in Morocco and in Tunisia, present real and serious problems, and it would be wrong to attribute them to a common cause.

### The War in Indochina

THE war in Indochina causes genuine concern to the French. Whether it is a tragedy of misunderstanding or whether blame can be placed on any party no one will ever know; but one thing is certain, and that is that before 1939 no one could have foreseen this civil war, which has now degenerated into an international war. The loyalty of the people and army of Indochina to France was absolute. Even in 1945, after the beginning of hostilities, the immense majority of the native peoples never dreamed of severing themselves from the mother country. What then has happened? The Japanese during their occupation never missed an opportunity of preparing a way for a rising of the yellow against the white peoples. They proclaimed the birth of a Greater Asia under the aegis of Tokyo. They dwelt on the defeat suffered by France at the hands of Germany, in order to demonstrate to the people of Indochina that France would never again be able to protect them. When her own defeat seemed to be inevitable Japan fomented revolution and formed armed bands who set up a demand for independence. France assembled an expeditionary force for the Far East but lacked means of transport to send them into action. The United States would not lend help for what appeared to them to be a renewal of colonialism. Nationalist China hoped that at some time or other she would be able to profit by the revolutionary movement. Only Great Britain, conscious of the implications of the crisis for the Western community, came loyally to the help of France. On August 24, 1945, the three Great Powers, in the absence of France and without consulting her, concluded an agreement by which nationalist China should occupy the northern part of the country as far as the 16th parallel (the latitude of Turane), while the British army should occupy the south. When the French authorities arrived Great Britain immediately withdrew her troops, but the Chinese made much greater difficulties and only withdrew under threats. Ho Chi Minh seized power and tried to identify the movement for independence with himself.

On March 6, 1946, the French Government signed an agreement with Ho Chi Minh in which the outstanding feature was the recognition of the republic of Vietnam as a free State with her own government, army and finance within the framework of the nascent French Union. In return, Ho Chi Minh undertook to receive the French troops when they should relieve the Chinese army. The *coup de force* attempted by Ho Chi Minh against Hanoi, the massacre and the burning of the Institut Pasteur, proved conclusively that he had only signed the agreement with France in order to rid himself of the Chinese nationalist troops and to lay the foundations of Communism.

Yet France still refrained from any attempt to solve the problem by force. She found a new intervener in the person of His Majesty Bao-Dai, Emperor

of Annam until 1945, when he had been forced to abdicate by Ho Chi Minh. On January 14, 1948, Laos and Cambodia joined the French Union as Associated States. On May 23, 1948, Bao-Dai formed a provisional central government of Vietnam, which was officially recognized by France and on the following June 5 duly received the title of Associated State. The Franco-Vietnam Agreement of March 8, 1949, other local conventions and the Conference of Pau (June–November 1950) gave formal sanction to the unity of Vietnam (Tonkin Annam and Cochin China), its independence and its national army, on equal terms with Cambodia and Laos. It was empowered to appoint its own ambassadors to foreign countries and to receive their ambassadors; and it was to form a financial and customs union with the other Associated States of Indochina.

Unfortunately Ho Chi Minh, supported by the U.S.S.R. and by Communist China, did not submit, and independence could not be merely proclaimed but had to be won by force. Up to 1950 the French troops were almost alone in confronting the armies and guerrilla bands of Vietminh; they found but feeble support from the local population, who were cowed by the threats of Ho Chi Minh. The situation improved when the people realized that H.M. Bao-Dai was at the head of a real national government; and the presence of Marshal de Lattre galvanized them into action. He established a chain of fortifications in the Tonkin delta to arrest the infiltration of Vietminh into the interior of the other zones. He organized self-defence with the support of the people, and elsewhere mobile detachments in liaison with the Vietnam garrisons were charged with the task of fighting the partisans. The support which the United States had begun to give to France and Vietnam in 1951 fortified their courage and raised their hopes of victory. Vietnam has steadily organized its national army. The plan formulated at the beginning of 1952 aimed at raising the number of Vietnam divisions from four to eight by January 1, 1955. In spite of the increasing part which the Vietnam forces are taking in the fight, the effectives of the French Far East Expeditionary Force have been constantly increasing in recent years: from 40,000 men in 1945 to 97,000 in 1946, to 120,000 in 1947, to 123,000 in 1948, to 141,000 in 1949, to 165,000 in 1950 and to 190,000 in 1951. At the end of 1952, according to the official returns of the French Government to N.A.T.O., the effectives reached 175,000 rank and file, 8,000 officers and 33,000 non-commissioned officers—a total of 216,000 men. With the national armies of the Associated States (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) there is an effective total of more than 400,000 men engaged on the Indochinese front.

From 1945 until the end of 1952 France has spent 1,547 milliard francs to cover the expenses of the struggle against Vietminh; and in 1952 alone the Indochinese War cost 459 milliards, about one-third of which was financed by American aid. French losses amounted on January 1, 1953, to 57,000 killed, wounded or missing.

The Indochinese War is a heavy burden to the home country. It drains away some of the flower of French manhood, it unbalances public finance, immobilizes an important part of her military forces, and prevents France from strengthening her national defences in Europe.

Although the national armies take an increasingly active part in the struggle, France knows that she must continually guarantee the relief of her units and supply officers so long as the Associated States are unable to provide officers and non-commissioned officers in sufficient numbers. She knows, too, that since she has given independence to her dominions she no longer fights for herself alone. Nevertheless the great bulk of French opinion is at one in determination to yield nothing, for today Indochina is the only possible bulwark against the Communist penetration of south-east Asia; without this line of defence Siam would be half encircled, the Malacca peninsula and Singapore seriously threatened, and Burma, already undermined from within, could only with difficulty resist an attack from without. Through her ports and her aerodromes Indochina controls the South China Sea, Indonesia, the Philippines and a part of the Pacific. It is therefore one of the chief barriers to Communist expansion in the Pacific, especially in the American sphere of interest.

### Unrest in North Africa

THE agitation in Morocco and Tunisia is the outcome of inflamed nationalism, in so far as one can speak of nationalism where there is no nation.

This agitation in the two protectorates is of relatively recent origin; it is a part of different movements which with the passage of time have tended to become assimilated both in purpose and in method. The Moroccan nationalists trace back to the establishment of the protectorate activities which were only sporadic until 1934, when the National Moroccan Movement was formed to protest against a *dahir* who, they maintained, aimed at seducing the Berber population from the law of the Koran which had been in force for centuries. The movement seized upon this pretext to demand the suppression of the protectorate, which no longer functioned, according to them, in the terms laid down by Lyautey: "the conception of a protectorate is that of a country preserving its institutions and its government and administering itself under the mere supervision of a European power."

After that the National Movement split and its effectiveness became very relative if not non-existent. With the Istiqlal or Independence party the movement rose from its ashes on January 11, 1944. In the Rabat manifesto the party affirmed by way of preamble that Morocco had always been a free sovereign State and that it had maintained its independence for thirteen centuries, up to the time when, in unprecedented circumstances, the protectorate régime had been imposed. They forgot that it was the Sultan who took the initiative in calling upon France to establish order. They said that the protectorate treaty had been violated in the letter and the spirit, that French policy favoured European interests and impeded the evolution of the Moroccan elements. In conclusion, the Istiqlal demands independence, unity, the territorial inviolability of Morocco and the establishment of a democratic régime comparable to that of the Muslim countries of the East, guaranteeing the rights of all elements of Moroccan society. It is therefore opposed to the policy of reform declared by France.

In Tunisia the Young Turkish nationalist movement began to develop

between 1907 and 1914. In 1919 they presented a petition to President Wilson demanding a Tunisian constitution. In 1920 the nationalists founded the Tunisian Liberal Constitutional party in Paris which demanded a Tunisian Parliament composed of Tunisians and a government responsible to that Parliament alone. The constitutional party (Destour) split in 1932 and in 1934 there arose the Neo-Destour (New Constitution) which fought for the abolition of direct administration by France. On August 25, 1946, in its manifesto of self-justification, the Neo-Destour represented the protectorate as a martyr country, saying that before 1880 it enjoyed prosperity and liberty.

Since the end of the Second World War nationalism and Communism have been active in the two protectorates, never missing an opportunity to threaten or provoke murder and pillage in order to impose themselves upon the natives and to undermine the authority of France. France did not allow herself to be affected by this agitation, which she knew to be artificial.

As Marshal Juin reminded the world in January 1953, the vast majority of the population of Morocco and Tunisia remained loyal to France. Nationalism is only a pretext for some ambitious people to practise intrigue, to satisfy their rancour and to try, under the guise of democracy, to establish their domination over the ignorant masses. The legend of a free Morocco and a prosperous Tunis before establishment of the protectorate will not bear scrutiny. France makes no pretence that the work which she has accomplished in these territories is complete; she intends to continue it with political, economic and social reforms and progressively to lead the native populations to liberty and independence. But she refuses to be involved in a movement which in practice must lead towards dictatorship and anarchy. As guardian at Casablanca and Tunis of strategic key positions in the Western world, France is determined to maintain a control the loss of which would be equivalent to handing over Africa to a potential enemy.

### France Undefeated

DO the affairs of Indochina and North Africa indicate that France is seeking a way to Utopia, or do they more simply show her animated by a generosity for which she will get nothing in return? This is the question which embraces all the others and which it is for the public opinion of the world to judge. The discussion of these questions might go on for ever, for a relevant answer requires foreknowledge of the future. In the present state of affairs there is no evidence that French policy towards the oversea territories has suffered a set-back. There is no danger of breaking up, no disaffection, no nationalist movement worthy of notice in the oversea territories and the member departments of the French Republic. The peoples maintain an absolute loyalty. The effort at assimilation has borne fruit, and if unrest exists in Indochina and the protectorates it is because the constitutional situation in these territories expressly precludes the application of the assimilation policy there. The peoples of Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco have not made enough progress to rule themselves and still need guidance. France is the only nation capable of playing the part and the natives have never succumbed to the attractions of any other Power, European or Asiatic; they

have never tried to attach themselves to the United States, to the U.S.S.R., to Great Britain or to Japan; and France would never consent to handing them over to U.N., for that would be tantamount to indirectly admitting the Communist wolf to the Western fold. She considers herself to be the only State which in agreement with its native peoples is qualified to pursue the policy of emancipation and economic prosperity which she has conducted for many years. She will find satisfactory solutions for all problems so long as extreme pressure does not encourage subversive movements.

Is that to say that she bars her doors and considers her relations with her Territories, her Associated States and her Protectorates as internal affairs? Not at all: the defence of her oversea territories, especially Indochina and North Africa, is, and will be more and more, the common task of all the Western democracies. The United States and Great Britain have today more interests involved in the Indochinese war than France herself, and the strategic importance of Morocco, Tunis, Madagascar and French West Africa concerns as much the American and British naval commands as the French. It is only by the union of the Western forces and their solidarity in action that these vast territories will remain in the democratic camp and be saved from Russian imperialism.

France does not wish to deny the other Western Powers access to the riches of her oversea possessions. Negro Africa is a source of industrial and agricultural raw materials the exploitation of which calls for investments which France alone can provide, but she does not exclude the importation of private capital from abroad. She looks with favour on the principle of economic and financial co-operation in her territories, so that Europe may regain her former vitality and the United States obtain the strategic raw materials which her own soil does not provide, the means of accomplishing this remain to be defined.

Such, in rapid outline, are the factors of a policy for the French Union. French minds are slow to apprehend them, they do not become apparent with any such dazzling clarity as all must recognize, but in the end they will carry conviction, for they represent a middle course between a colonialism which is a thing of the past and a naked abandonment of responsibilities which would amount to a disaster for the West.



## UNITED KINGDOM ✓

### PARLIAMENT AND PROCEDURE ✓

MR. CHURCHILL has been known to remark that the parliamentary temperature is never constant; it is always either rising or falling. The truth of these words has been very clearly revealed by the parliamentary history of the past few months. Before Christmas the parliamentary temperature was as high as it had been at any time since March 1951; since Christmas it has fallen abruptly—but it may well rise again over Formosa.

The House of Commons "crises" of March 1951 and December 1952 had much in common. In each case the Opposition were already in an ill temper. In March 1951 the Conservatives felt that an electoral victory lay easily within their grasp, and that they were held back only by the thin red line of a Socialist majority which often fell below double figures. In December 1952 the Socialists had seen their hopes of an early return to power shattered by the result of a by-election at Wycombe, where the Conservatives held a critical seat with an increased majority; in addition it was becoming increasingly clear that they could no longer count, in the second session, on the same ineptitude in the handling of parliamentary business as the Government had shown in the first.

But in December 1952, as in March 1951, the explosion of tempers would not have been so violent but for a chapter of accidents. In March 1951 the fuse had been lit, first by the row over Mr. Rodgers's letter to the Vicar of Crockham Hill, and secondly by Mr. Boothby's celebrated "harrying" speech at Banstead. (Next to Mr. Walter Higgs's famous remark about "empty bellies", Mr. Boothby's Banstead speech probably did the Conservative party more harm than any other indiscretion committed during the years 1945-51.) Similarly, in December 1952, the parliamentary temperature would not have risen so fast had it not been for a series of events, some of them as accidental as Mr. Boothby's speech, which followed one another in quick succession at the critical period.

On Thursday, November 20, Mr. Crookshank, the Leader of the House of Commons, announced that the proceedings on the Transport Bill would be subjected to a stiff guillotine. It is unusual to impose a guillotine on a Bill before the Opposition have revealed their intention to obstruct its progress, but it is doubtful whether this decision really took many people by surprise, in view of the fact that the Socialists had been working up a nation-wide opposition to the Bill; although Mr. Crookshank's announcement had a stormy reception, the actual debate on the guillotine motion, which took place the following Monday, was very mild.

Then on the next day, Tuesday, November 25, there occurred an accident with far-reaching consequences. It had been announced that the 25th and 26th were to be devoted to the Second Reading of the Steel Bill. But before the proceedings on this Bill opened, Mr. James Griffiths obtained permission

from the Speaker to adjourn the House at 7 p.m. under the celebrated Standing Order No. 9—which allows the Speaker to grant such a motion on a definite matter of urgent public importance—to discuss the recent disturbances in Kenya. Conservative Members, who had expected a day with no divisions, were urgently summoned for 10 p.m. In the event Mr. Griffiths did not carry his motion to a division, and the debate on the Steel Bill was then resumed for a further three hours. Virtually every Conservative Member left the building, except those who wished actually to take part in the Steel debate; and the result was that a Labour Member was able to count the House out shortly after midnight.

The procedure of the House requires that, in the case of a two-day debate, a Government Whip, at the end of the first day, must announce the Government's intention to resume the debate on the following day in order to keep the motion (in this case for the Second Reading of the Bill) on the Order Paper. But when the House is counted out, this procedure cannot be followed—unless a Government Whip has the almost superhuman presence of mind to hand the necessary motion to the Clerk of the Table while the count is actually being called. Inevitably the debate on the Steel Bill could not be resumed until Thursday, November 27, and the Opposition were jubilant that they had caused the Government to lose a day.

But the Government were able to take their revenge. On Friday, which was a Private Members' day, a Labour back-bencher wished to move the Second Reading of a Bill for the establishment of a Press Council, which was strongly supported by many members of his Front Bench. The Government, therefore, elected to take the business originally put down for Thursday during the early hours of Friday morning, confident that Labour Members would not wish to prolong the discussion of this business so as to prevent their own colleague from moving the Second Reading of his Bill. The Government entirely succeeded in their intentions, and they gained a further tactical success on the following Tuesday, December 2, when they frustrated the attempts of the Opposition to prolong the debate on the Schedule of the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill, through obtaining the permission of the Chairman of Ways and Means to move the closure on the "main question"—that is to say, on the Schedule itself.

By this time the temperature had risen very high indeed. The Opposition not merely announced that there would be no pairing during the Committee Stage of the Transport Bill, but in addition they actually revoked the pairs already registered for the business taken on the night of November 27–28. On December 4 they moved a vote of censure against the Government, complaining of their incompetent handling of parliamentary business; and on Monday, December 8, they moved a further vote of censure against the Chairman of Ways and Means for his decision to grant the closure the previous Tuesday.

But this debate proved to be the turning-point. During the last week, tension seemed to be easing and everyone was relieved when, on the day the House adjourned for the Christmas recess, Mr. Crookshank was able to announce that the two Front Benches had come to an agreement as to the

amount of time to be allocated to the discussion on the Steel Bill. Since the House resumed after Christmas, the daily and weekly press have remarked on the mild demeanour of the House, and the proceedings on the Steel Bill have been placid to a degree.

We have dealt at some length with these details because many people have the impression that parliamentary storms are always the result, either of the perversity of Members, or of some radical fault in parliamentary procedure. The real truth is that parliamentary storms usually arise out of an unusual or unlucky series of events supervening on an already tense situation. Professor Butterfield, in his interesting book *History and Human Relations*, tells us how Professor H. V. Temperley always taught his pupils that the real purpose of reading the original material was in order to understand the day-to-day process which led up to some major event. Professor Temperley was thinking primarily of diplomatic history, but this is just as true for the student of parliamentary history as well.

These parliamentary storms die down as quickly as they rise for two reasons; first, because the majority of Members on both sides do not really like them, and secondly, because the Opposition—whatever their political colour—know very well that these upsets do not improve their position in the country. One of the most interesting features of British politics is the way that, no matter who is in power, public opinion always seems to rally towards the Government, and this is especially true when there has been a series of parliamentary scenes.

### The Routine of Parliament

AT the height of the December controversies, a number of Members of both parties tabled a motion calling for the appointment of a Select Committee

To enquire into the possibilities of improvement in the House's methods of conducting its Business.

The motion was debated in Private Members' time shortly after the House reassembled in January. Mr. Crookshank, the Leader of the House, explained that the Government thought no useful purpose would be served by appointing a Select Committee, and, rather surprisingly, only fifty Members voted in support of the motion. A number of interesting points arose in the course of the debate. Mr. Hynd, the mover of the motion, provoked much disagreement when he suggested that membership of Parliament should be regarded as a full-time job, and he also put forward the proposal that Parliament should never sit later than midnight. There can be no question that the ordinary elector greatly dislikes the idea of being represented by a "professional politician"; while it is equally certain that the present parliamentary situation is already discouraging many able men and women of all parties from wishing to embark on a political career. As to all-night sittings, these are a favourite butt of the semi-informed, but it really is absurd to suggest that they could be done away with altogether. Every now and then, for example during the Committee stage of the Finance Bill, the Government is perfectly entitled to

ask the House to sit very late in order to complete some business which would otherwise drag on indefinitely. It is, as a matter of fact, not true to say that the quality of debate always slumps after midnight, while in any case all-night sittings are not so frequent as members of the public sometimes suppose.

The seconder of the motion, Mr. Anthony Greenwood, made a very good point when he said that "The conventions of the House of Commons are just as important as the Rules and the Standing Orders". Indeed, nothing that was said in the debate proved that the Rules of the House needed substantial alteration, but the parliamentary history of the last two years has shown very clearly how important it is that Members on all sides should observe the conventions. One of the most valuable of these conventions is the tradition that arrangements made through the usual channels—that is to say, the small unofficial business committee, composed of representatives of both Front Benches—should be honoured on the floor of the House. If the usual channels become clogged, parliamentary life is bound to become disagreeable. This is the clear lesson of recent events, and there is some hope that the House will not again be subjected to the spectacle of a handful of the Opposition talking as long as possible on non-controversial legislation in order to delay the major measures of the Government. Both sides have been guilty of this kind of behaviour during the present Parliament and its predecessor; and its only result, as the Leader of the Liberal party rightly pointed out, is that the House of Commons devotes far more parliamentary time to the discussion of secondary matters than to major issues of real importance.

A number of Members suggested that the parliamentary time-table would be less overloaded if more Government Bills were sent upstairs for examination by a Standing Committee. It is, of course, perfectly true that the detailed examination of a Bill by a Committee of the whole House is very expensive in parliamentary time; that is why the present Government have allocated a smaller number of days to the examination of the Transport Bill than its complexity and importance undoubtedly warrant. Another disadvantage of examining major Bills on the floor of the House is that some 500 or so Members of Parliament have to remain in the building for hours at a stretch, waiting for divisions which may come at any time on a Bill of which they have no detailed knowledge. On the other hand, it is only fair to consider the arguments on the other side. There is real substance in the argument that a Bill of major national importance, such as the Transport Bill or the Steel Bill, should be discussed on the floor of the House, so that any Member who wishes to take even a small part in the proceedings has a chance to do so. Secondly, as the Rules of the House now stand, the Government's majority in a Standing Committee is exactly proportionate to their majority on the floor of the House, which means that the present Government can only command an absolute majority of one in a Committee upstairs. Even if the Rules of the House were altered so as to give the Government a slightly larger margin, Standing Committees would remain a source of considerable anxiety to the Whips, since it is far easier for a Member to defy the party line in the more intimate atmosphere of the Committee than it is for him to abstain—or to vote

with his opponents—on a division in which the whole House takes part, when his performance will certainly receive considerable publicity in the daily press. It is frequently suggested that the House of Commons should make more use of committee procedure rather on the lines of a large local authority, and there is something to be said for the view that more use should be made of Standing Committees, even when the balance of parties is so close. But it is only fair to look at this question from the standpoint of the Government as well as from that of irate Members of Parliament, unable to obtain "pairs" as a long and complicated Bill, in which they have no special interest, is scrutinized clause by clause.

One final word must be said. The House of Commons is not well served either by those Members who dwell too frequently on the inconveniences of parliamentary life, or by that section of the press which appears to report exclusively its more exciting scenes and untoward events. Many members of the public are quite surprised when they learn that there is another side to parliamentary life. The real parliamentary heroes are not those who take part in the shouting—and the booing—but those Members who, without any public recognition, have served for many years as diligent members of Select Committees, or who have contributed towards solving some of those many intractable problems with which successive Ministers and successive Governments have found themselves confronted.

### The Sunday Observance Bill

ON Friday, January 30, the House of Commons defeated the motion for the Second Reading of Mr. John Parker's Sunday Observance Bill by a majority of 281 to 57. Mr. Parker's Bill was wide in its scope, and it would have had the effect of legalizing commercialized sport on a Sunday while granting "local option" to the opening of Sunday theatres. It should be added, in fairness, that the Bill was so drafted as to exclude any possibility of theatrical workers' being employed for more than six days consecutively.

It was not expected that the Bill would be defeated quite so heavily, but the size of the majority probably reflected, more or less accurately, the feeling in the country. Most Members of Parliament received a large number of letters asking them to vote against the Bill, and many of them felt that this was an occasion when they should try, so far as possible, to interpret the wishes of their constituents. Indeed, the very fact that Mr. Parker's Bill was so wide in its scope was a recognition that there was little or no chance that the House would agree to a substantial amendment of the Sunday laws. He and his supporters seemed to feel that they might as well be hung for a sheep as for a lamb. It is a little difficult to account for the very strong feeling which this subject undoubtedly excites. Sir John Crowder, one of the senior Conservatives on the back benches, probably got to the heart of the matter when he said "If this Bill becomes Law it would be impossible to distinguish a Saturday from a Sunday." Many Members voted against the Second Reading, not because of any Sabbatarian prejudice, but because they really dreaded the prospect of cup-ties and speedway fixtures on a Sunday—and they knew



most of their constituents felt likewise. Major Sidney Markham expressed what was in many minds when he said

I am not speaking from deep religious conviction in this matter, but rather as one who believes that Sunday is a practical necessity in an age which is getting far more nervously noisy and more calculated to destroy what one might call the pleasant balance that one used to have before the present worship of noise.

An amendment to the Bill, supported by Members on both sides of the House, expressed the view that

the existing legislation with regard to Sunday Observance is archaic, anomalous, and out of accord with modern conditions; that for these reasons it is frequently disregarded, and its enforcement is often haphazard and capricious; and this House therefore urges the Government to appoint a commission to inquire in what respects the national welfare calls for a revision of the existing law in England and Wales on the subject.

This amendment had the support of the Bishop of London and many prominent Free Churchmen. Indeed, as the day for the debate on the Bill drew near, many Members, whose post-bag had formerly been full of letters against the Bill, found that Nonconformist ministers and others were urging them no less strongly to support this middle course. No doubt the Free Churches in Great Britain are worried lest they lose the support of the younger generation through being stigmatized as "old-fashioned". But in any case there is an extremely good argument for a thorough inquiry into the present state of the Sunday laws, and a good many existing anomalies and absurdities were mentioned during the course of the debate. For example, Mr. Parker himself pointed out that

Every year we have a town show on a Saturday and a Sunday during the summer, and we invite people with different hobbies to display their exhibits, and many attend to see the show. It was proposed to have on a Sunday an exhibition by amateur bee-keepers, of whom there happen to be six in the area. They were all asked to bring their hives so that the people could see them. But the Lord's Day Observance Society found out and wrote to the town clerk pointing out that an exhibition of bees on Sunday was a form of entertainment not permitted under the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932. Therefore, the town clerk had to recommend the council to drop that part of the programme.

There can be little doubt that public opinion as a whole would have welcomed such an inquiry, and it was highly regrettable that the Government spokesman, Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth, the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, should have devoted the whole of a half-hour's speech to persuading the House that such an inquiry would serve no useful purpose. The Under-Secretary contended that the law, in its existing state, was "relatively clear and easily ascertained", but his contention was hardly borne out by his somewhat unconvincing replies when challenged on particular points.

The amendment to appoint a Commission of inquiry was narrowly defeated by a majority of 8, but it is worth noting that no fewer than 27 members of the Government voted with the majority, including Mr.

Churchill and Mr. Eden, who are very seldom seen in the House of Commons on private Members' days. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Government were very anxious to secure the defeat of this amendment. No Government wants to appoint more commissions than are absolutely necessary, since it may well find itself faced with the task of framing awkward and controversial legislation when the commission has finally reported. But on this occasion it is possible to argue that the Government's attitude was short-sighted. Unless something is done in the fairly near future to remove some of the more obvious absurdities in the Sunday laws, there may very well be considerably more than fifty-seven Members in the Ayes lobby on the next occasion when this subject is raised.

### The East Coast Flood Disaster

THE east coast flood disaster during the last week-end of January was the first occasion since the fourteenth century on which Britain's sea-defences were seriously breached. The land was invaded at low-lying points all along the east coast from the Humber to the North Foreland, and on the Scottish coast also. Approximately 300 people lost their lives, while some 250,000 acres were flooded by sea-water, thousands were rendered homeless, and widespread damage was done both to buildings and to valuable timber plantations. The causes of this disaster, which affected the Netherlands even more seriously than Great Britain, and also caused bad floods in Belgium, were spring tides and northerly winds of gale force which drove the tides to unexpected heights.

Within a very few days the Prime Minister announced that the catastrophe would be treated as a national responsibility; the Lord Mayor of London opened a distress fund to which the Government undertook to contribute; her Majesty the Queen, the Duke of Edinburgh and the Queen Mother made personal tours of the worst affected areas; while a co-ordinating committee of eleven Ministers, under the chairmanship of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, the Home Secretary, was set up to meet at least daily. It was, indeed, remarkable how rapidly the nation rallied in the face of this emergency. The W.V.S. rendered notable assistance to local authorities in providing first-aid to those who had been rendered homeless. Of course there were occasional lapses, especially in cases where local authorities tried to cope unaided. At one rest centre, after a delay of four hours the first meal was served—cheese and sardine sandwiches! But the great exertions of the Services were rewarded by the news that, during the week-end beginning February 14, the next spring tides did virtually no damage.

It was unfortunate that both Mr. Morrison and Mr. Bevan should have suggested that the Government had weakened Britain's sea defences by a Ministry of Housing circular of June 1952 which had stated that, in view of the acute steel shortage, only urgent coast-protection work could be allowed to proceed. In actual fact, none of the recent floods were in places affected by this circular, while the expenditure on coast protection authorized to local authorities in 1952 was considerably in excess of that authorized in 1951. Mr. Bevan might have reflected that he, himself, had sent out a similar

circular in 1950; but in any case it is ridiculous to suggest that any Government can be blamed for not having anticipated a disaster which had not overtaken this country for some 600 years. This was a distressing incident, but it did not in any way detract from the remarkable patience and heroism exhibited by thousands of people, both those who suffered and those who rallied to their assistance.

Great Britain,

February 1953.

## NORTHERN IRELAND

IT is in the nature of things that this year's General Election will be contested, as always before, on the issue of the British connexion. The Unionist party, without showing its hand as to the probable date, put by others in the autumn, is already reminding the electorate that the choice is the simple and well-versed one of whether or not Northern Ireland is to stand part of the United Kingdom. Neither the Unionists nor their anti-Partition opposites can afford to admit the fact that the Constitution is more securely established than it has ever been. The Government, of course, is under the compulsion to demonstrate to the outside world that the faith of Unionism is unchanged, but at this stage in Northern Ireland's development as a political entity there are those who wish that at election time loyalties and affairs could be better segregated.

Thoughts like these are prompted by this month's return by the Ministry of Labour and National Insurance. It tells the hard truth of 10.9 per cent of the working population unemployed. In Great Britain this would be the equivalent of some 2,000,000 persons, a condition of slump that could hardly fail to be treated as a national emergency. Yet here abnormal unemployment has so long been the recurring consequence of economic unbalance that only the numerically small Northern Ireland Labour party seeks to place it in the centre of the electoral stage. It speaks both for the efficacy of the social services, especially National Assistance (now being paid to 1 in 18 of the population), and the minor scale of Communist intervention, that the province is able to endure such a burden without public unrest.

There is, however, a deepening feeling of disquiet. Even the many voters who have no alternative but to support the Government are anxious for the future of industry and trade and Ulster's ability to support the standard of living now seen in Great Britain. This has come with the realization that the prosperity of the post-war period has not solved the basic economic problems. Despite recent advances, and in the attraction of new industry these have been made, the area continues to have chronic under-employment and to be over-dependent upon the variable behaviour of the world's textile markets. Miscellaneous manufactures in this field, unfortunately, have formed an excessive part of recent industrial expansion, and these have added to the present difficulties. The linen trade, barely recovering from the recession which struck it a year ago, has been the subject of a blunt speech by the Attorney General, Mr. Edmond Warnock, Q.C., in which he cited in graver

terms than any public figure has hitherto dared to use the persistent decline in production since the heyday preceding 1914. Ireland then exported an average of 232,000,000 square yards of linen piecegoods annually: in 1952 the total was of the order of 36,000,000 square yards. At no time since 1946 has even the average of the depressed thirties been regained.

Agriculture, the largest employer of all, is also in the throes of change. As national policy swings back to a free farming economy, underpinned with marketing schemes, farmers here are again brought up against cross-Channel transport costs. Under the guaranteed price system these were equalized: now such marketing organization as may emerge will leave Northern Ireland with the task of choosing whether to retain local control and pay for its own transport, or to opt in with Great Britain and run the risk of receiving treatment less suited to local needs. In all, the province is urgently awaiting the outcome of the United Kingdom Government's current study both of the transport handicap as a whole and of the other weaknesses of the region. Not only unemployment but its attendant evils, a higher rate of sickness, lower average of earnings and a higher cost of living, combine to force on public attention the question whether Northern Ireland, notwithstanding the considerable benefits of self-government, might not be more developed if it were a direct charge on the Imperial administration. This inequality is the more conspicuous because of the many other happy relationships that have gone to make devolution a fair and practical proposition. Economically Ulster can put no hope in independence, yet one cannot ignore the significance of the thought that comes to many minds that the Union has so long failed to bring about even the Beveridge level of full employment, i.e. 3 per cent. In this age of central planning, at least in the present state of world trade, that objective should not be impossible of attainment.

The political scene has been tragically and momentarily changed by the loss of Major J. Maynard Sinclair in the sinking of the cross-Channel vessel *Princess Victoria* on January 31. He was not only an unusually far-seeing and able Minister of Finance, but had by far the strongest claim to follow Lord Brookeborough in the Premiership. By his death at the age of 56 the Unionist party has been left without a clear succession of leadership, an untimely circumstance that brings to pass the old fear of a weakening of the State through the growing reluctance of men of affairs to enter public life. In the disaster there would seem to be a warning of the need for the general election to infuse new blood into Parliament. Major Sinclair, himself a business man who put aside personal inclinations to take government office, will be remembered by Commonwealth delegations for his contributions to the economic conferences. At home, he stands as the prime-mover in Northern Ireland's post-war reconstruction, and as author of the parity principle which now governs its relations with the Imperial Treasury.

Northern Ireland,

February 1953.

## IRELAND

### RETURN OF MR. DE VALERA

THE New Year has opened well, for "Dev", as we affectionately call him, is back. On December 30 he returned from Utrecht, where he had been under treatment in an eye clinic for the last four months. The six operations to replace the left retina are said to have been successful, and it would appear that the total blindness with which he was threatened has been averted. His sight unfortunately is still extremely defective. His return has been welcomed not only by his own anxious adherents but by the whole people. In spite of his famous foibles, or perhaps even because of them, Mr. de Valera is our greatest citizen, occupying (on a necessarily smaller scale) very much the same position as Mr. Churchill in England. Like Mr. Churchill he is a person of strong and decided views, not always palatable to his opponents. A cynical rhymester has described his character in the following "clerihew":

Mr. de Valera  
Is not of this era;  
He believes that the Gael  
Still besieges Kinsale.\*

There is no doubt much truth in this summation. But in spite of his fierce and somewhat primitive nationalism he has a subtle mind combined with good manners and a personal charm uncommon in Irish politicians. No Irish leader has had so many devoted followers since Parnell died. Almost alone amongst our political leaders he has refrained from vulgar personal abuse and taken a long view. He would never, for instance, have committed the egregious blunder of Mr. Costello in proclaiming a Republic for twenty-six counties, thus destroying any chance whatever of ending Partition. Mr. de Valera is, indeed, our only representative figure—what our American friends would call "Mr. Ireland".

### The Political Scene

HIS services in this capacity will be certainly necessary next April when the inauguration of *Án Tóstal*, the national festival, takes place and we are to be "at home" not only to our exiles but, we trust, to many foreign visitors. It is certain that great pressure will be used by his party to persuade him to remain in office, at least for the term of this Parliament. He has returned to a political situation not very different from the one he left, and Mr. Lemass, the deputy Prime Minister, should be able to render a good account of his stewardship. The Government, it is true, still depends on the precarious votes of a few Independent deputies for its majority. These Mr. de Valera, true to his dislike of coalitions, apparently neither consults nor considers. A by-election in North-West Dublin, which took place in November,

\* Battle of Kinsale, December 24, 1601.



resulted in the return of Alderman T. Byrne, an Independent. Alderman Byrne, who is a son of the famous Alderman Alfred Byrne, T.D., succeeded his brother and defeated by a large majority the Lord Mayor of Dublin, Senator Clarkin, who was the Government candidate, as well as The O'Rahilly who was the nominee of Clann na Poblachta, Mr. Sean Mac Bride's moribund party. This result merely proves the personal popularity and power of "Alfie" Byrne, the only surviving member of the old Irish parliamentary party in the Dáil. Alderman Byrne is not only a Dublin character but an astute politician and has long controlled this constituency. The fact remains, however, that the Government, owing to increased taxation, the withdrawal of the food subsidies, and the consequent rise in the cost of living, has lost a good deal of support. It may be doubted if they would win a general election at present. But of this there is at the moment no sign, and if Mr. de Valera is himself able to carry on, his administration may last its full term. The Independent deputies are a fast-dwindling body. Deputies Dillon, Fagan and Flanagan have sought refuge in the ranks of Fine Gael, Deputy Flynn has returned to Fianna Fail and Deputy Finucane has joined Clann na Talmhan, the small Farmers' party. There remain only nine of the original fourteen Independents, and these like the "ten little nigger boys" are also likely to be absorbed one by one. The smaller parties also lack stability. There is for instance little difference, and certainly none that matters, between Labour and the Farmers' party, or between Fine Gael and Mr. Mac Bride's insignificant party of two. Mr. Mac Bride, naturally enough, suggests that we should consider the establishment of a form of representative government like the Swiss in which all parties would be represented in proportion to their strength. This, he claims, would be the logical form of government under our proportional system of voting and would ensure continuity of policy on major issues. There is something to be said for this solution if one could be certain that it would not stifle normal political criticism and merely result in a consolidation of incompetence and jobbery. Such a system could only work if defeat of the Government did not entail a general election.

### The President's Panacea

THE President, Mr. Sean T. O'Kelly, who is primarily a politician, has recently advocated publicly the re-unification of the warring factions who fought together against the British and were subsequently divided by the Civil War. The ordinary voter may well be sceptical as to the reasons for waving this olive-branch. The President declares that only by this means can we consolidate our prosperity and end Partition. In reality nothing would be more likely to harden feeling in the North. As regards prosperity it is important to note that this re-united galaxy of aged and embittered politicians does not represent the workers of Ireland and has no policy. In fact Mr. O'Kelly is living in a dream world, for the people are no longer concerned with the fortunes of faded heroes but with realities. They have observed that politicians invariably unite for their own ends and that the fact that we now call ourselves a republic has not stopped emigration or reduced taxation. For thirty-one years the leaders of the generation in whom Mr. O'Kelly sees our

only salvation have ruled this country and bedevilled its political life with their personal feuds. By their fruits you shall know them—Partition, crushing taxation and a fast dwindling rural population. Mr. O'Kelly, who is himself one of these leaders, had better think again. His political panacea is merely soothing syrup of which we have had enough.

### The Real Architects

THE real architects of the coming Ireland are not to be found in the Dáil. They are elsewhere, amongst the young farmers who are trying to organize and consolidate the social, economic and organic life of our rural communities, the technicians who are planning to increase and extend our supply of electricity from native sources of power, the railway executives who are trying to remodel our out-of-date transport system, and the labour leaders who are seeking to adjust the demands of their unions to economic realities. It is from the ranks of such men and not from our disillusionized political hierarchy that our future leaders will eventually come. They are not as yet conscious of their destiny, but the time is fast approaching when their voices will be heard in no uncertain manner. Worn-out *clichés* about Partition and the revival of the Irish language will then give place to a sober determination to face facts and achieve real national solidarity. The more intelligent politicians are beginning to realize this, as is proved by the declarations of several Ministers at the recent annual gathering of the Fianna Fail party. Reproving the childish demands of their followers, Mr. Lemass and Mr. Mac Entee pointed out with truth that Partition was a problem that called for long and prudent statesmanship and not for wild speeches and spectacular gestures. To bring the North and South together they must meet on common ground and work for common objects. They might have added with equal truth that the best thing to do about Partition is to forget it. Mr. Aiken, the Minister for External Affairs, who is Mr. de Valera's *alter ego*, could not, however, resist the temptation provided by the use in the Queen's new title of the words "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" to indulge in the usual stock recriminations. It was, he said, too bad that the British Government should be induced to link the British Crown and Royal Family so directly with the cruel wrong of Partition, which was the last remnant of British aggression in Ireland. One may wonder what purpose in life would be left to Mr. Aiken and his like were this last remnant removed.

### External Criticism

EXTERNAL criticisms of our economic and educational systems have recently given both our politicians and universities a series of nasty but well-deserved jolts. The first shock was administered by the American technical experts who made a survey of Irish industrial development under an E.C.A. scheme. Their report, published in November, pointed out that our main difficulties in promoting industrial development were due to the small size of the home market and our lack of fuel resources and basic raw materials. Industrial progress here in recent years was, they said, below the average for the European group, and its pace was not even sufficient to hold its present

relative position. Further progress depended upon the continuation of the present industrial trend and the establishment of a similar upward movement in agriculture. The report continues: "Among many paradoxes that may be found in Ireland is the circumstance that it is progressing best in the field where it carries the greatest handicap and least in the one in which it has seemingly the greater natural advantages." Industry, the report points out, produces twice as much a head as agriculture. In the present world situation Irish agriculture should be able to find an export market for an almost unlimited expansion of its production. Such increased production could, the report emphasizes, contribute to economic improvement not only by producing materials for industry but by direct export in raw or processed form. Increased capital investment in Irish industry and agriculture is essential, and there is need of an active domestic capital market to direct domestic earnings into productive use. These conclusions of the American experts were reinforced by the comments on Ireland's economy in the fourth annual report of O.E.E.C., recently issued. This states that Ireland's primary task lay in the greatest possible expansion of agricultural activity and in the encouragement of the present trend towards increased exports of livestock and livestock products. It points out that such an increase must be accompanied by a greater output of feeding-stuffs so that the dependence of Irish agriculture on imports may be diminished. It also suggests that in any expansion of industry care must be taken to avoid setting up uneconomic industries which would not increase export earnings. Twenty years ago criticism of this kind would have evoked howls of protest from our patriots, who would have dismissed it with scorn as another attempt to turn Ireland into an English dairy farm. Now, however, we have learnt more sense, and Mr. Lemass, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, speaking in Dublin on December 15 after the publication of these criticisms, actually said that the increase of our agricultural production was now of such overwhelming importance that it would not be an exaggeration to say it was the only thing that mattered. There is something almost comic in this change of tune. It remains to be seen whether it will be followed up by the only kind of action that matters, namely the formulation under expert advice of a national, as distinct from a party, agricultural policy. We need an agricultural "Monnet Plan", such as put the economy of France into proper shape after the war. We must try to realize that the export market is of prime importance and that so far as the production of livestock and livestock products are concerned we have got to produce for export or shut up shop. For twenty years the farmers have been held up to cheap ridicule by the jacks in office for holding these views. If they are still ignored, and no attempt is made to regulate the wholesale slaughter of our cattle in the canning factories which have sprung up like mushrooms overnight, our grandchildren will probably be making pilgrimages to the Dublin Zoo in order to see a cow!

#### Medical Education

ANOTHER dose of wholesome external criticism has been administered to our universities through the publication of a report on "medical education in the Republic of Ireland" issued by certain Irish medical graduates

practising in America. This document alleges that the American Medical Association has refused to recognize Irish medical graduates since 1950 because of the low standard of clinical education here, and that the British General Medical Council, for similar reasons, has the condition of Irish medical education under review. This report has aroused much indignation in university circles, but no clear answer has been made. Dr. Alfred O'Rahilly, the President of University College, Cork, has, however, publicly admitted that the situation as regards clinical education in that college is far from satisfactory. The truth seems to be that because of defective general education and slackness in the medical schools the quality, if not the quantity, of our medical graduates has declined in recent years. Should they be debarred from practising in Great Britain, where so many of our young doctors not only earn a livelihood but obtain essential experience, our medical schools might well put up their shutters. It is to be hoped that those responsible for medical education here will realize before it is too late that the slogan "Sure t'will do" cannot be exported with impunity.

### *L'Affaire Skeffington*

QUESTIONS of a serious moral nature have been raised by the recent interference in Dublin with the right of free speech. The facts concerning this peculiar affair are both interesting and disturbing. On October 31 Mr. O'Curry, the editor of a Catholic weekly journal, read a paper to the International Affairs Association entitled, "Yugo-Slavia: The Pattern of Persecution". During a discussion after the lecture Mr. Hubert Butler, who has resided in that country and is an acknowledged authority on its affairs, referred to the persecution of the Orthodox Church by the Catholics under the Pavilec régime. In speaking of this he referred to Archbishop Stepinac as "a kindly and gentle man who unfortunately had allowed himself to be used as the dupe of a gang". The Papal Nuncio, the Most Revd. Dr. O'Hara, who was present as an ordinary member of the audience, at this stage naturally enough rose and left the room. The Chairman, Mr. John O'Brien, then said that as a remark had been made which was offensive to His Excellency the Papal Nuncio he had no alternative but to close the meeting, and immediately did so. The Nuncio, who in fact made no protest whatever save to leave the meeting, has since maintained a dignified silence on the matter. It subsequently transpired that Mr. Butler had attended the meeting as the guest of Dr. Owen Sheehy Skeffington, a member of the Association, who is a lecturer at Trinity College and who holds somewhat unorthodox views on social and political questions. The unhappy sequel was not long delayed. Dr. Skeffington had been given in August, and had accepted, an invitation to speak at the inaugural meeting of the Technical Students Debating Society on November 29 on the appropriate subject of "Can the Individual Survive?". On November 18 he was informed by the Student Committee, acting under directions given to them by Mr. Gleeson, the Chief Executive Officer of the Dublin Vocational Committee, that he was *persona non grata*, and that his invitation to speak in the debate had therefore been cancelled. On demanding an explanation Dr. Skeffington was informed by Canon Fitzpatrick, Chair-

man of the Vocational Committee (*plus royaliste que le roi*), that "rightly or wrongly the citizens have associated your name with an incident at which the Papal Nuncio was forced to protest". The Vocational Committee were not in fact consulted at all, either before their Executive Officer gave the order to ban Dr. Skeffington or before the debate was held, although they held one of their regular meetings on November 20, two days after the ban was issued and nine days before the debate. At a meeting of the Committee which took place several weeks after the debate they unfortunately approved meekly of the ban on Dr. Skeffington without explanation or excuse. Subsequently Mr. Butler had to resign his position as honorary secretary of the Kilkenny Archaeological Society. The best comment on this unjust and intolerant procedure was made by Mr. C. Gore-Grimes, the honorary secretary of the Irish Association of Civil Liberties, who speaking at the debate in Dr. Skeffington's place said amidst applause that our lack of moral courage was responsible for this gross interference with the liberty of the individual. One may add that an incident of this kind, which is duly noted in Northern Ireland, does more to perpetuate Partition than all the antics of the politicians.

Ireland,

February 1953.



# INDIA

## THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

THE final draft of the Indian national five-year plan was released early in December, three large volumes of it running to several thousand pages with more to follow. At the popular level it is to be feared that this event fell rather flat, because the draft plan had been under discussion for well over a year and enterprising newspaper correspondents had been publishing pre-views of all major amendments to the draft for some months before, so that when the completed product was presented there was not much hard news left. Furthermore, the five-year period covered by the plan has already run almost two years of its course and the volumes mentioned did not contain any indication on how things are going to date; thus, when the plan says that the output of steel or rice is to be increased by so much per cent over the pre-plan figure, there is no way of knowing how near or far that objective is at this moment. The Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, did what he could to repair these faults of presentation, and in a number of excellent speeches and broadcasts he got across something of his famous enthusiasm to his audiences. The fact remained, however, that the plan did not get a good press and most editorial comment in responsible Indian newspapers took the line: this is all very well, but what about corruption in the administration, or the cost of living, or some other political grievance? If the leader writers had had the time to read through the massive tomes in which the full plan is set out they would have seen that all such contingencies are dealt with by the planning commission at length; but whether the nostrums therein prescribed are adequate is another matter. The plan is actually a brilliant achievement as a survey of Indian needs and resources, and in its suggestions on how the first can be met by the second it is a long way ahead of anything previously attempted in this country or perhaps in any democracy. The difficulty arises in trying to distinguish what the planners really believe will happen in India in the next few years from what they just hope will happen; what the Government is determined to bring about from what will only come to pass if the various admonitions and exhortations contained in the plan are taken to heart by those they are addressed to. The solid core of the plan is the great multi-purpose river valley development programme which is already familiar to the people and for the execution of which the Government is itself directly responsible. If these irrigation schemes, dams, and power-houses can be completed within reasonable time and at not much more than the estimated cost, the Congress Government will be able to claim at the next elections that the major part of the plan has been accomplished; whether the prophesied consequences for the cost and standard of living of the masses have also then been realized will depend on sundry other factors over which governments have relatively little control. Progress on this front does appear to be encouraging. In February this year Mr. Nehru opened the Tilaiya dam and the Bokharo power-house

which are two of the chief projects of the Damodar Valley Scheme, and work on the other important hydro-electric undertakings is going forward at reasonable speed, interrupted by periodical discoveries that costs have got out of control and periodical allegations of corruption and inefficiency.

But if the popular reaction to the plan was not so lively as might have been hoped, there has been no lack of discussion in the better class of newspapers and periodicals. Most of this has centred on the possibility of raising the capital required for the projected increment to the nation's assets without taking the risk of inflation. There has been much learned debate on the implications of deficit financing. The Government has announced its willingness to run budget deficits of up to Rs.290 *crores* if necessary, but critics have argued that much more than that will be needed, especially if foreign aid does not attain the proportions hoped for. Even if assistance from abroad is forthcoming on a grand scale, the period of the plan will inevitably see considerable inflation, with the familiar results for costs in general and for the cost of the plan in particular. The Finance Minister, Sir Chintaman Deshmukh, shows quiet confidence in the nation's ability to pull itself up by its bootstraps, but the economists do not agree. It can be forecast with assurance that if execution of the plan does threaten India with runaway inflation, the danger will be met by vigorous socialization of the whole economy in an attempt to tap more surpluses at the point of origin. That will mean that the Congress will move sharply to the left, perhaps even abandoning the ideal of a "mixed economy" to which in any case Mr. Nehru is not deeply attached.

#### Aid from America

THOUGHT of foreign financial help, on which the five-year plan will lean heavily, naturally turns Indian attention to relations with the United States, which must be the source of most development capital received over the next few years. The change of government in that country has raised considerable doubts in India about the future of these relations, which were already uneasy while the Democrats were in Washington. The Indian Government has of course refrained from expressing any of its fears, but there is no doubt that suspicion of Mr. Eisenhower and his Republican bankers, suspicion of American military policy in the Far East, and fear that financial aid to near-neutrals will be drastically reduced, have been current in Delhi since November. This cautious attitude appeared to be confirmed by the acceptance of the resignation of Mr. Chester Bowles, who had been U.S. Ambassador in India for about a year. Delhi is a key appointment for any American Government, so it is perhaps natural that a new President prefers to nominate his own man to the post; and in any event Mr. Bowles, through no fault of his own, had been involved in several unpleasant incidents such as might have been thought to warrant a change. But India was keen that he be retained in Delhi and is said to have hinted as much in Washington, whence it had, furthermore, been reported that the main reason Mr. Bowles was to be recalled was that he was regarded by some Republicans as a "do-gooder" of the Left who was too fond of advocating "hand-outs" to "Socialist Nehru". Mr. Eisenhower's decision to replace him was therefore taken as

an omen that American support was henceforward to be less often expressed in dollars.

Whether or not this is a correct reading of American thinking cannot be determined from India, but it can definitely be said that it would be quite mistaken of Americans to continue to see Mr. Nehru's Government as a collection of sitters on the fence whose allegiance to the "free world" was tempered by desire to flirt with Moscow and Peking. There has always been reason to believe that India's "neutrality" in the world struggle for power was a theoretical concept of Mr. Nehru's mind (especially while Sardar Patel was alive), for the inexorable facts of economic relations and historical traditions bound India to the West much more firmly than newly independent nationalists were ready to admit. It is of course true that India regretted the cleavage of the nations into power *blocks* and aspired to the role of mediator, or at least interpreter, between the two. But recent events have led to re-thinking on this question, the upshot of which has not yet been revealed but which will be of great importance to India's friends in the West. The immediate cause of this stock-taking was the treatment of India's resolution on Korea in the United Nations.

### The Korean Resolution

INDIAN opinion is still a little dazed from the vituperative abuse heaped by the Russians and Chinese on her efforts to mediate over Korea. Independent observers might think that the outcome of the whole incident was a near thing, for it was plain that the original Indian resolution was quite unacceptable to the State Department and when it had been modified the Communists could simply have said that they had to reject it because it had been tailored to meet American interests. In fact they said no such thing, but displayed the grotesque bad manners that other countries have encountered before, but which India had not. Mr. Chou En-lai, with that fondness for animal metaphors that characterizes Communist eloquence, called Mr. Nehru "the running dog of British imperialism" and Mr. Vyshinsky remarked: "At best you are dreamers and idealists. At worst you do not understand your own position and camouflage horrible American policy." Broadcasts from both countries embroidered this theme and the Chinese in particular indulged in much personal vilification of Mr. Nehru. There is no doubt that the Prime Minister was deeply shocked and offended, and official and unofficial opinion alike has been astounded at this return for several years of courageous espousal of Communist China's case by India in the United Nations and out. It has now been realized that India's ambition to be "a window on the Communist world" is limited by the Communist attitude that "who is not with us is against us". India is now pondering the thought that for Russia and China there are no neutrals and no non-Communist friends, and in this light there has been some reconsideration of the events in Asia since the new régime came to power in Peking—the changes in Tibet, the approach of Chinese troops to India's frontiers, the unrest in Nepal, the Chinese maps that show parts of Assam as Chinese, and so forth. It is not suggested that in a fit of pique India will abandon her neutrality and join the Western camp on all issues, but there will

certainly be more circumspection in dealing with the Communists in future and a clearer realization of where India's true friends are. The point has not been missed in India that China's reaction followed and was obviously dependent on Russia's; whatever be the precise significance of this, newly independent statesmen have a keen nose for signs of subservience between nations.

### Relations with Britain

IF India's relations with the United States and the Communist *bloc* are variable and uncertain, the connexion with Britain and with the Commonwealth in general is complex to a much greater degree. Above the solid deposit of trust, respect, and at times affection, there are waves of suspicion that can become tumultuous; the Indian press occasionally still has anti-British rashes. British reactions to South African race policy have been closely watched and symptoms of indifference harshly condemned. Colonial policy and developments in Kenya have been studied for relapses into old-style imperialism, and Indian views on East Africa might have been more vigorously expressed had not the brutality of the Mau Mau alienated Indians right from the beginning of the present unrest. The most scrupulous respect for Indian sovereignty is expected from London and two recent developments have recalled this; fortunately both ended to India's entire satisfaction. The recruitment of Gurkhas on Indian soil (for use in a "colonial war" in Malaya) was a standing embarrassment to Delhi and has been settled by the agreement to recruit soldiers in Nepal itself, India allowing transit facilities. Then the Opposition in the House of the People got hold of a German newspaper report that Mr. Nehru was to "swear fealty" to the Queen when he goes to London for the Coronation, and made as much as possible out of it until it was shown that the report had been mistranslated.

Most intricate of course are the triangular relations between India, Britain, and Pakistan. Apart from continued misunderstanding of British efforts to secure a settlement in Kashmir, the most notable development has been the sharp Indian reaction to reports that Pakistan's inclusion in a Middle East Defence Organization was being sought by Britain and the United States. Blank denials from London and Karachi did almost nothing to assuage Indian fears and Mr. Nehru expressed himself on the matter in the strongest terms. The violence of this reaction might appear puzzling in Europe where the true purpose of any such defence organization seems plain, but, as long as Indo-Pakistani relations are as frayed as they are now after several years of bitterness, any project to include Pakistan in a military alliance will be seen from India as a most unfriendly act. The Kashmir dispute drags on without sign of a solution, but every month that passes makes it more likely that the present stalemate will harden into a *de facto* settlement, an eventuality that would be largely acceptable in India. The passport system for travel between India and Pakistan is now in operation, though neither country was administratively equipped to set it going without considerable inconvenience; it now "works", in the sense that travel between the two countries has become difficult for ordinary folk and the refugee movement between the two Bengals has dried up. Trade continues to be conducted on the basis of a truncated

trade pact that excludes the principal commodities normally exchanged. Nowhere is the conflict of interests more acute than over jute, where the Indian mills cannot buy all they need at reasonable prices, while Pakistan cannot sell her large crops and must divert land to rice.

### Linguistic States

THE demand that the artificial administrative divisions of India introduced under the British raj be replaced by States delimited according to the language of their inhabitants dates from the early days of the freedom movement and was in fact popularly associated with independence itself. After the withdrawal of the British power it was seen that the time was not ripe to reorganize the administration wholesale; the emphasis was rather on preserving as much as possible of the old framework in order to meet the stresses and strains of partition, communal disorder, food shortages, and the incorporation of the princely States. The urgent task of national consolidation also brought it home that to divide India into units speaking exclusively their own language would be a powerful force tending toward provincialism and disunity. In any event the discussion attending a *de novo* delimitation of borders was bound to be acrimonious and would let loose passionate irredentism in several provinces. Accordingly the matter was postponed—some said burked. However, the Andhras, the Telegu-speaking inhabitants of the northern parts of Madras State, kept up the agitation for separation from the Tamil-speaking inhabitants of the southern parts, and this campaign reached a climax when a respected Andhra worthy went on a hunger strike late last year for the cause. No assurances being vouchsafed from Delhi to his satisfaction, he persisted in the fast and died; the instantaneous result was savage rioting in Andhra, in which it is estimated over £1 million worth of government property was destroyed. The Central Government thereupon agreed to the establishment of a separate Andhra State, but disagreement ensued among the Andhras themselves about its borders and its capital. (Madras city, which lies neither in the Tamil nor in the Telegu-speaking areas, is claimed by both.) At the annual session of the Congress party in January Mr. Nehru and others were careful to explain that this capitulation was not to be a precedent for extensive redrawing of the map of India and that in any further adjustment of State boundaries language alone would not be the criterion; adequate territory, population, and economic resources must also be considered. With whatever *post facto* qualifications the Andhra decision be set about, it is difficult to believe that the linguistic issue will not now be taken up in other parts of the country, notably among the Maharashtrians, and perhaps the Sikhs and Bengalis. One of the results of creating new States will be to upset the five-year plan, which breaks up expenditure according to the administrative units of the Union and does not allow for a sharp increase in bureaucratic overheads such as would be inseparable from the formation of new State Governments.

India,

February 1953.



# PAKISTAN

## THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY

AFTER a prolonged period of gestation Pakistan is in the throes of producing a constitution. The process is proving particularly painful because the Basic Principles Committee, the body of leading politicians appointed by the Constituent Assembly to draw up the outlines, has had to steer a middle course between the conflicting claims of East and West Pakistan, as well as attempting to satisfy the fanatical section of the population who will accept nothing less than a fully fledged Islamic State. The report of the Committee was presented by the Prime Minister on December 22. He claimed, in an eloquent speech, that it set out the principles of a democratic Islamic constitution safeguarding the interests of the non-Muslim minorities, and that by providing for parity of representation for the two wings of the country in the federal legislature it would serve to bring about a happy interdependence and the growth of feelings of unity. These hopes were immediately belied by the outbreak of an acute controversy, which revolved chiefly round the parity proposals.

The Committee recommended that the State should consist of a federation of the provinces and the acceding States on a republican model (with no suggestion as to whether it should remain in the Commonwealth or not). The federal legislature should consist of two Houses—the House of Units (i.e. provinces and States) with 120 members, and the House of the People with 400 members directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. In each House there should be parity between East and West Pakistan. The Head of the State (who must be a Muslim) should be elected at a joint sitting of both Houses. Each Unit should have a unicameral legislature.

So much—very briefly—for the structure of the State. The recommendations designed to ensure the Islamic character of the State were equally controversial and, taking the long view, of even more vital significance. Some of them found place in a set of “directive principles of State policy” which included the prohibition of drinking, gambling and prostitution, and the elimination of usury, and also the recommendation (which was naturally regarded as rather ominous by the spokesmen of the minorities) that steps should be taken to bring existing laws into conformity with Islamic principles and to codify such injunctions of the Koran and the Sunnah as could be given legislative effect. Even more pregnant with uncomfortable possibilities was a recommendation that at the Centre and in the Units boards of persons well versed in Islamic laws should be set up to advise the Governments regarding repugnancy of new laws to the Islamic scriptures.

The reactions of Pakistanis in almost all walks of life, except of course the *mullahs* themselves, to this last recommendation make it clear that it will have a poor chance of acceptance. It is widely condemned as un-Islamic, because it appears to give recognition to the existence of a priesthood, and undemocratic because it places in authority bodies of persons who are not elected by

the people and not responsible to them. Government spokesmen point out that the boards will have only advisory powers, but the intelligentsia remain unconvinced and regard this proposal as a surrender to the *mullahs* and to the forces of obscurantism. If Pakistan, they feel, is to retain its reputation as a modern and progressive State, a reputation which it deservedly gained under the leadership of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, the *mullahs* must be put in their place; and their place is not in the councils of Government.

The sharpest controversy, however, rages round the political proposals of the Basic Principles Committee. Provincialism has always been recognized as one of the main threats to the unity and stability of Pakistan, and it can hardly be denied that in the two years which have elapsed since the interim report of the Committee was issued provincial jealousies and rivalries have increased rather than diminished. They were indeed aggravated by the interim report itself; it gave rise to serious disturbances in East Pakistan, where the people were convinced that its proposals were designed to deprive their province of the majority in the federal legislature to which it was entitled on the basis of population, while West Pakistan was apprehensive that the Government of Khwaja Nazimuddin would be swayed by the agitation into making undue concessions to the Eastern wing. It was thus in a somewhat electric atmosphere that the final report saw the light of day. It attempted to produce an acceptable compromise by the parity formula. East Pakistan was to lose its majority in the lower House but to get equal representation with West Pakistan in the upper House, in respect of which the original proposal had been that each province, including even Baluchistan, would have an equal number of seats.

Whatever the other provinces may have thought of this compromise, it soon became clear that the Punjab would have none of it. The leaders of the province which Jinnah called "the heart of Pakistan" saw no logic in treating a single unit, East Pakistan, as of equal importance with all the other units put together, and regarded it as an affront to the dignity of West Pakistan; they preferred the original proposals, even though they gave the East the control of the lower and more important House. The press of Karachi and of the Punjab, with few exceptions, joined in a chorus of protest, freely accusing the Government of surrendering to pressure from East Pakistan and perpetuating the split between the two wings. In these circumstances the Prime Minister, accompanied by several of the most influential Cabinet Ministers, travelled to Lahore in the middle of January in the hope that personal discussions with the Punjabi leaders would serve to overcome the opposition. In this they were disappointed, and it seems that the discussion of the report at a full session of the Constituent Assembly will have to be further postponed while the Punjab and East Bengal are left to fight out the issue in a friendly way.

### The People's Food

KARACHI was in the grip of a serious outbreak of rioting for three days in the second week of January. This had nothing to do with the constitutional controversy, but originated with a procession of students who

wished to represent certain grievances personally to the Minister for Education. They had not obtained a licence to take out a procession and the police, taking the matter, as most people thought, unnecessarily seriously, decided to disperse them. This involved the use of tear gas, and a few students were roughly handled. Their indignation at this treatment knew no bounds and on the following day violent demonstrations took place in which the riff-raff of the capital joined with a will. The police were pelted with brick-bats, there was some arson and general hooliganism, and ultimately the army had to be called in to restore order. The authorities claimed to have evidence that the outbreak was inspired by the Communists, but the public refused to be convinced by this story. They felt that the students had genuine grievances (as indeed was tacitly admitted by the administration in conceding their demands) and that the lower orders had welcomed the opportunity to work off their resentment against the police and the Government. The soaring prices of foodstuffs were the prime cause of this feeling of discontent. There can be no doubt that during the past six months, for this and other reasons, the present administration has lost what popularity it possessed.

The scarcity of foodgrains, and consequent high prices, developed into a national disaster during the period under report. Government were somewhat unfairly blamed for allowing the situation to develop, and did not get enough credit for the rapidity with which they arranged for import of wheat in sufficient quantities to avert disaster. Perhaps they should have had the foresight to store a large reserve of wheat during the years of surplus instead of exporting it, but it is easy to be wise after the event and no one seems to have suggested this at the time. Apart from the hardships suffered by the poorer classes of the people from the high prices, the purchase of wheat from abroad contributed materially to the deterioration in the country's balance of payments. Government found themselves compelled to continue the process of restricting imports, so much so that by the end of the year the Open General Licence was completely cancelled and no goods, however essential, could be brought into the country without a specific licence. The flow of imports accordingly dwindled rapidly, and by this expedient Government succeeded in restoring equilibrium in the foreign exchange account by the end of the year. It is of course the unfortunate consumer who must pay for this; as goods become scarce stocks go underground, prices go sky-high and the hoarders and blackmarketeers reap a rich harvest. All this will certainly add to the unpopularity of the Government.

If the foreign exchange situation is, for the time being, somewhat more reassuring, the budgetary prospects must be causing the Government of Pakistan considerable anxiety. About 70 per cent of Central revenues are normally made up by customs duties and these have fallen sharply, both as a natural consequence of the fall in imports and because the export duties on jute, cotton and tea have had to be reduced or (in the case of tea) abolished altogether to enable these commodities to compete in the world markets, handicapped as they are by the artificially high external value of the Pakistani rupee. Income tax in its various forms and sales tax, the next most important sources of revenue, have also fallen off as a result of the general depression.

It is evident that a period of retrenchment is called for, though there has so far been no indication that the Government have felt compelled to abandon any of their development schemes on account of the financial stringency.

### On Two Frontiers

THE peaceful behaviour of the tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province has long been regarded as one of the most remarkable phenomena of Pakistan. In December, however, a fairly serious outbreak occurred. An Afridi *malik*, well supplied (according to the general belief) with funds from Afghanistan, organized a *lashkar* which made a two-pronged descent on the settled districts of the province; an attempt was made to cut the main Kohat road by a large body of Orakzai tribesmen from the Tirah valley, while another body of "hostiles" descended on the Khajuri plain where they were gallantly resisted by the Adam Khels. The Government of Pakistan showed themselves to be in no mood for trifling; the hostiles had expected some ponderous troop movements, with perhaps some innocuous bombing according to the careful ritual laid down during the British rule, but they got more than they bargained for; they were dispersed in no uncertain manner by the Royal Pakistan Air Force, who opened up on them with rocket-firing guns. Peace was rapidly restored. Generally speaking, there is no doubt that the Pathans of the tribal areas are learning the arts of citizenship, and are benefiting economically from the rapid development of the settled districts under the forceful guidance of the Chief Minister, Khan Abdul Qayyum, for whose claim that the N.W.F.P. is the model province of Pakistan there is considerable justification.

The Kashmir dispute drags on wearily, and Pakistanis are beginning to despair of ever getting justice from the Security Council—all they ask being that a plebiscite should be held under reasonably fair conditions. The Anglo-U.S. resolution, calling on both parties to continue negotiations on demilitarization under the guidance of Dr. Graham, was accepted by Pakistan (though regarded as mere playing for time) but rejected by India. In the course of the discussions Sir Zafrullah Khan made a dramatic offer, in an attempt to break through the deadlock and force the issue of a plebiscite. Taking his cue from Mrs. Pandit, the leader of the Indian delegation, herself, he stated that in order to cut short the argument about demilitarization Pakistan would agree to India's maintaining 28,000 troops in the State. This was the figure which the Government of India, "after careful examination and assessment by its experts", had fixed as the minimum required for the discharge of its responsibilities. The Pakistani offer was hurriedly rejected by the Government of India, not without some embarrassment, but, judging by their speeches, it seems to have made a favourable impression on the other members of the Security Council.

For this and other reasons relations between India and Pakistan remain strained, and there has even been fresh talk of war as the only solution to the problem.

Pakistan,

February 1953.

# CANADA

## DEFENCE ON THE DEFENSIVE

THE seventh session of the 21st Federal Parliament of Canada opened on November 20 and, since it is taken for granted that a general election will occur some time before next winter begins, preliminary manoeuvres for position in the contest bulk large in its proceedings. The Speech from the Throne outlined a very modest programme of legislation, mostly amending measures designed to improve existing statutes, and the debate on the Address occupied virtually the whole time of the House of Commons until the Christmas recess began on December 18.

In the absence of the Prime Minister and three of his chief colleagues in London and New York, Mr. Howe, who was leading the House, was quite content to let the debate drag on without attempting to make progress in any legislation. It had reached the wearisome stage when it was suddenly enlivened by Mr. Claxton, the Minister of National Defence, who tabled an exhaustive report upon the works services of the Canadian Army at a large military camp at Petawawa in the Ottawa Valley and elsewhere, where irregularities had been uncovered by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and had been made the subject of charges by the Opposition. For the investigation of them the Government had selected Mr. George S. Currie of Montreal, a prominent chartered accountant, who had a fine war record in the First World War and had served as Deputy Minister of National Defence in the second. The contents of his report were very disconcerting to the Government and were seized upon by the Opposition as confirmation of its oft-repeated charges about the mismanagement of the programme of defence. The gist of the report was in one of its opening paragraphs, which ran as follows:

The conclusion I have come to is that, while there has been a general breakdown in the system of administration, it was only at Petawawa that extensive irregularities over a prolonged period of time took place. The contents of this chapter are chiefly based upon my studies there, because of the existence there of a combination of factors: lax control, poor discipline and the presence of dishonest personnel. The combination proved disastrous.

The report also asserted that the chief auditor of the Department had performed his functions conscientiously but his reports about unsatisfactory conditions had not been acted upon, and, referring to the deterioration of morale responsible for them, it said:

If this spirit permeated the lower echelons of the Army it is more difficult to condone the same attitudes higher up. There a high degree both of intelligence and responsibility is essential. It was not always present in the degree required.

The embarrassment of the Government over the contents was increased when Mr. Stanley Knowles, a member of the C.C.F., informed the House that his leader, Mr. Coldwell, who was absent through illness, had in his



possession an original version of the Currie Report, which showed that it had been "doctored" before submission to Parliament. The Prime Minister had eventually to admit that before the report was submitted to Parliament the Deputy Minister of National Defence and General Simonds, the Army's Chief of Staff, had been made privy to its contents and had suggested certain alterations. All the three parties in opposition sunk their differences for a combined attack upon the Government and their spokesman gave details of cases of waste and mismanagement to sustain their thesis that the administration of the Department of National Defence under Mr. Claxton was both very incompetent and woefully extravagant.

When Parliament reopened on January 12 the publication of the annual report of the Auditor General provided fresh ammunition for the Opposition. It criticized severely what he regarded as improper expenditures or extravagances by the Department of National Defence and pointed out that the eight different systems of accounting which it had in operation made uniformity in administration impossible. Mr. Claxton, who had been absent in Europe when the Currie Report was tabled, made on January 13 an exhaustive defence of his Department and declared that he accepted full responsibility for the irregularities and would seek no scapegoats. The gist of his defence was that the Currie Report had disclosed no irregularities that had not previously been uncovered by the Department on its own initiative, that measures had been adopted to prevent their recurrence, that guilty parties had been punished, and that administrative reforms recommended by the report had been introduced. He said that no army was a Sunday school without a normal contingent of sinners, that the scale of thefts and frauds was no longer than the amount which every great commercial corporation had to reckon with every year, and that the total financial loss to the country was a fleabite by comparison with the huge total outlays of his Department.

But Mr. Claxton did not improve his position when he tabled correspondence, which revealed that on January 8 he had written to Mr. Coldwell demanding information about how he had obtained his copy of the original version of the Currie Report and, when it was refused, had ordered an investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. He was immediately arraigned for a contemptuous disregard of the rights and privileges of members of Parliament and had to listen to quotations from the severe strictures passed by Mr. Churchill, Mr. Attlee, Sir Archibald Sinclair and others upon the effort of the Chamberlain Ministry in 1938 to force Mr. Duncan Sandys, M.P., to disclose the sources of the information which he had made the basis for some parliamentary questions about the state of Britain's defences. Nor did Mr. St. Laurent fare any better when he suggested that Mr. Coldwell's possession of the document had made him a receiver of stolen goods, for he was promptly reminded that in 1946, when he was Minister of Justice, his Department had not hesitated to use in the famous spy trials documents purloined from the archives of the Russian Embassy at Ottawa by an absconding official. But the Prime Minister contended that the cases were not parallel because it was fully justifiable to use the documents stolen from the Russian Embassy in a trial for conspiracy against the State.

The debate was on a government motion to revive the select committee, which during the previous session had been examining all the expenditures and commitments of the Department of National Defence since the outbreak of the war in Korea in March 1950, and an amendment moved by Mr. Claxton instructing the committee to give initial priority to the irregularities in the Works Services of the Canadian Army as dealt with in the Currie Report. The Opposition took the line that it would be a waste of time to reinvestigate irregularities whose existence had been proved, and made no secret of their suspicions that, once the select committee started on this work, the Liberal majority, which would dominate it, would manage to make it stretch out so long that the end of the session would be reached before it was given an opportunity to investigate the other activities of the Department. An amendment moved by the C.C.F. urged that Mr. Currie be authorized to extend his investigation to the whole field of the operations of the Department of National Defence. This amendment secured the solid support of the Progressive Conservative and Social Credit parties and, very significantly, of the three independent members of the House, but the whole Liberal party obeyed the instructions of the Prime Minister to reject it and, after it had been defeated by 140 to 58, the Government secured authority for the establishment of the select committee by 136 to 57. But these divisions did not end the controversy, which was immediately renewed over a motion of the Prime Minister to appoint Mr. Campney, the Solicitor General, as an Associate Minister of National Defence, who will assist Mr. Claxton.

### Intervention of the High Command

THE high command of the armed forces has also intervened in the controversy in an unfortunate manner. First of all General Simonds, the Army's Chief of Staff, became the target of severe criticism in Parliament and the press when it was disclosed that he had submitted a critique of the Currie Report to the Prime Minister before it was tabled in Parliament. The *Montreal Gazette* took strong exception to his action in an editorial, part of which ran as follows:

If any attack was considered called for, it ought to have come from a member of the Cabinet, preferably from the Minister concerned with defence. It is no part of the duties of the Chief of the General Staff to enter into controversy with those whom he may conceive to be his critics—. . . If he feels that there are grounds to resent or refute any charges that have been made, it is his duty to present the matter to the member of the Cabinet under whom he serves. And it becomes the duty of that member of the Cabinet to bring his case to the attention of the House if he considers it sound. But it is not for General Simonds, or any other military officer, under our form of constitutional usage, to engage in controversy with any critic.

Then, when the authorities of the Department of National Defence issued an official reply called "Background Material" to the criticisms made by the Auditor General, the *Winnipeg Free Press* expressed its strong disapproval of

its attempt "to exalt the Chiefs of Staff" and "to revert to the Commander-in-Chief principle of military organization, which consistently and disastrously failed in Britain and was finally abandoned in the present century". And its editorial closed with the following verdict:

Army organization is not and should never be a party or political matter. It is not a case of votes or constituencies. The need is for efficiency in the armed services and "Background Material" indicates all too clearly that our Air Force, Army and Navy are organized upon lines which make efficiency unattainable.

Such an emphatic condemnation of the Department of National Defence by the most influential Liberal paper in Canada must cause the Government as much worry as the combined attack of the parties in opposition. So the Prime Minister has been forced to take cognizance of the widespread popular dissatisfaction with Mr. Claxton's management of the programme of defence. Mr. Claxton will retain his present post, but hereafter his duties will be concerned with the high policy of his Department and the international obligations about defence to which Canada is committed through her membership in the United Nations and NATO. But the day-to-day administration of his Department is being entrusted to Mr. Ralph Campney. The legislation necessary for this innovation has given the Opposition an opportunity to renew their attacks upon the Department, but the battle will soon be transferred to the sessions of the select committee. There have also been some interesting non-partisan debates on subjects like the conservation of natural resources and a plan for coping with the flood of trashy literature, mostly of American origin and some of it filthy, with which Canada is being inundated; and Mr. Knowles made another abortive attempt to free Parliament from any responsibility for divorce cases.

### Ottawa and Washington

THE Canadian people and their governments have a traditional preference for Democratic administrations at Washington, because the Democratic party has a record of a much more sympathetic attitude towards Canada in its tariff and other policies than its Republican rival possesses. However, the prestige and popularity of President Eisenhower is so great with all classes of the Canadian people that his election was favourably received in Canada. But the acquisition of control of both Houses of Congress by the Republican party aroused considerable apprehension at Ottawa. Under the Truman administration protectionist forces in Congress had been strong enough to impose, by the device of tacking a rider on to the Defence Production Act, quota restrictions upon imports of Canadian cheese; and, after the presidential election, they had followed up this success by securing similar barriers against other dairy products of Canada. But these moves were in clear contravention of provisions of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, to which the United States had subscribed, and, although the aggregate loss to Canada's export trade was comparatively small, the Canadian Government felt it necessary to make a protest against such breaches of an international

agreement. So the fear exists that, unless President Eisenhower applies a restraining hand, the protectionist forces at Washington, whose strength has been increased by the recent election, will move to whittle down further the concessions in the tariff duties of the United States, which have given in recent years such a stimulus to Canada's export trade.

On the other hand, the change of government at Washington has suddenly revived, after it had been abandoned, the hope of securing the co-operation of the United States for the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway. Last November the Canadian Government had formally notified Washington that it proposed to construct the Seaway as an all-Canadian enterprise and regarded as abrogated the agreement concluded in 1941 with the United States for the co-operation of the two countries in the project. But influential American politicians and business interests have suddenly become greatly concerned over the prospect that, if Canada builds the Seaway with her own resources, she will have complete control over the tolls and operating regulations on a very important artery of commerce and will frame them without any regard to American interests. One of the leading Republican advocates of the Seaway, Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, who now holds the key position of Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, has with the backing of sixteen other Senators introduced legislation to authorize American co-operation in the building of the Seaway, and he claims that both President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, have given it their blessing. Since Senator Taft, now Republican leader in the Senate, also favours the Seaway, this group of influential leaders may have better success than the Truman administration in overcoming the opposition of hostile elements in Congress.

The Canadian Government on its part does not regard lightly the huge financial commitments involved for the completion of an all-Canadian Seaway and would be glad to be relieved of part of them, but it is suspicious that the fresh overtures from Washington may be a subtle device to postpone the construction of the Seaway. So it has intimated in an official note that it is ready to consider new proposals, provided the negotiations are not unduly prolonged. Meanwhile, the path had been cleared for an early start with the projected power developments on the St. Lawrence. The private power interest which had been challenging the claims of the Power Authority of the State of New York to be designated as the American agency for co-operating in these developments with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario has withdrawn its application, and a decision of the Federal Power Commission of the United States in favour of the Power Authority of New York is expected in the near future.

### Prospects at the Polls

THE damage done to the prestige of the Government by the Currie Report and by the unpleasant impression left by the tactics employed by Ministers and the high command of the armed forces to discredit it has given a setback to the project of a general election before the Coronation, which an influential group of Liberals had been advocating. Their basic argument for it was that, since the abnormally good grain harvest of 1952 had brought the

farmers to a very cheerful mood, and since the maintenance of a high scale of industrial activity through the programme of defence had kept unemployment very small and raised wages to their peak point in the country's history, the voters would hesitate to eject from office a Ministry which could claim to be the architect of an unprecedented prosperity; and it would be unwise to risk a postponement of the election until the autumn, lest poor crops, a business recession in the United States or some other adverse factor might produce a less favourable economic situation, for which the Government would be blamed. Another calculation was that the forthcoming budget would be able to offer abatements of taxation, which would cause a temporary recovery of popularity for the Government. Furthermore, while the official campaign literature of the Liberal party would not mention the subject, the machinery of subtle propaganda might be employed to pose to the voters the question whether they preferred Mr. St. Laurent or Mr. Drew to be the chief representative of Canada at the coronation of Queen Elizabeth. In French Canada the response of the voters to such a question would be virtually unanimous in favour of Mr. St. Laurent, and elsewhere many voters might feel reluctant to debar a much respected national leader from crowning his creditable career in politics by representing his country at a great historic ceremony.

It is true that the budgetary surplus of 260 million dollars, which has been piled up for the first three-quarters of the current fiscal year ending December 31, is to some extent an electioneering liability, because it convinces many people that they have been overtaxed; but it will be pared down in the next two months by a lower intake of revenues and heavier outlays, and it is quite certain that the budget, which it is the intention of the Government to present early in March at the latest, will decree considerable reductions of taxation. If these are sufficiently large to evoke the gratitude of taxpayers, then the advocates of an early election may be able to persuade Mr. St. Laurent not to miss the chance of a successful appeal for a fresh mandate before the sense of gratitude wanes and recollection of the Government's errors revives to outweigh it.

The Liberals, moreover, are confident that even if Mr. Duplessis, the Premier of Quebec, who has lately declared war in belligerent speeches on the St. Laurent Ministry over the issue of the encroachments of Federal upon provincial authority, which he denounces as striking at the sacred autonomy of Quebec, were to emerge in the Federal election as the active ally of Mr. Drew, the hold of Mr. St. Laurent upon the affections of his racial compatriots is so great that they would not feel that their provincial rights would be safer if Mr. Drew replaced Mr. St. Laurent as Prime Minister at Ottawa. The Liberals are reconciled to the loss of a substantial number of their present seats in New Brunswick, Ontario and the Western provinces, but they believe that, if loyalty to Mr. St. Laurent can keep in the Liberal column the 80 seats now controlled by the French-Canadian vote, they can salvage enough other seats to secure a small working majority, which would be ample in view of the deep divergence in the philosophies and programmes of the three parties in opposition.

Canada, February 1953.



## AUSTRALIA ✓

### SIR WALTER MASSY-GREENE

SIR WALTER MASSY-GREENE, who died in his seventy-ninth year on November 16 last, was Chairman of the Melbourne Round Table Group from 1945 until, in 1950, his health would no longer admit of attendance at evening meetings. During those years it was the Melbourne Group that supplied the editorial committee, thus doubling its own responsibilities; and although unable to attend the committee's meetings, he kept in touch with its work and was invaluable in consultation. But his help was more invaluable still at the "round tabling" stage of the discussion of a draft article. He became a member of the group soon after making his permanent home in Melbourne in 1934, being peculiarly in the authentic tradition of the original Melbourne Group, whose distinguished members were brought together by Lionel Curtis in 1910; none of them now remains but Sir Frederic Eggleston, who is no longer an active member.

Sir Walter was born at Wimbledon, near London; but he came of what had been credibly described as "Empire building" stock, on both sides: Scottish and Irish respectively. The family migrated to Australia when he was seventeen years old; and thereafter, without initial material advantages, he battled his way up from the lowest rung of the economic ladder; first in the service of the Bank of New South Wales, then on the land.

Public service, and devotion to the British cause, were in his blood; and he entered the Commonwealth Parliament in 1913, as member for the N.S.W. constituency of Richmond. He rose rapidly in war-time politics, first as Whip of the Party, then of the Coalition Government, and held high ministerial office from 1918 to 1923. But, when shaping for the very highest political levels, he lost his seat, at the general election of 1922, through what seems to have been an electoral mishap. Thereafter, until his retirement from politics for health reasons in 1938, he was a N.S.W. Senator; and, in the capacity of Assistant Treasurer, worked with the Treasurer (Mr. Lyons himself) in the Lyons Ministry. He was knighted in 1932.

With all this experience of public life, and of widely ramifying business and financial interests, he was a great support to the work of THE ROUND TABLE. Characteristic was his uneasiness about the views of the economists when they seemed, to the man of affairs that he was, based on insufficient practical knowledge of all the relevant facts; and this went hand in hand with a consciousness of the limitations on the knowledge of anyone, however expert, when it was a matter of forecasting developments.

Invaluable also, in a different way, was the generosity of his hospitality in the entertainment of ROUND TABLE men from other States and from overseas; unforgettable the occasion, in September 1938, when at a full meeting in his home to confer with Curtis and Lothian and others, these British leaders had

emergency plans prepared for their departure by air the next morning, should the Munich negotiations of Neville Chamberlain with Hitler fail to "put off the evil day".

### MIGRATION AND ITS PROBLEMS ✓

THE war, and especially the débâcle of Singapore and the Japanese threat, convinced most Australians that the continent needed greater population. The reasons for this view were various. The majority were concerned about security, which had seemed so uncertain in 1942 before the battle of the Coral Sea. Another large group, having little or no knowledge of the problems of agricultural development, were convinced that the farming industries were immediately capable of great expansion. Some were more concerned with the lack of economic efficiency which is inescapable when attempts are made at providing community services and amenities for centres of population which are both small and widely scattered. To some, the idea of being members of a big nation has an appeal. Finally, in some minds a sense of responsibility suggested that Australia should be able to play a part in easing the population pressures of Europe. This combination of opinions, reinforced by a knowledge of the vast number of public works of various kinds waiting for labour, led to a ready acceptance of an enlarged migration policy by all sections of political opinion—except possibly the isolationists of the Left.

### Categories of Migrants, 1946-50 ✓

IN 1945 Australia set up a separate Department of Immigration with the first task of reintroducing the assisted migration scheme for people from Britain which had been in abeyance during the war. Soon afterwards the agreement with the International Refugee Organization led to the large movement of displaced persons. Most of these people had fled before the advancing armies on the Eastern front at various stages of the war or after it. Many were of the professional and business classes, relatively few were artisans or farmers. The first arrivals under this scheme reached Australia late in 1947. The original agreement was for 12,000 persons; later this was expanded, and the final total was over 170,000. They were brought to Australia free of charge to themselves, but on the understanding that their labour could be directed by the Government for two years, during which period they were to be paid at standard rates.

Although migration under the displaced persons' scheme was in some respects spectacular, in most years it has been numerically inferior to arrivals from Britain who migrated for various reasons. Undoubtedly, in the earlier years, some came because they felt life was insecure in the old country; others came to join friends who were able to offer them employment, and a considerable number were recruited as individuals or groups in Britain by representatives of Australian industries or government departments or instrumentalities. All persons of British stock have a right to enter Australia provided they are medically fit, can pay their fares, show they are not destitute, and are not undesirable. The chief obstacle to all such movement in these post-war years has been the lack of accommodation on ships. Such migrants came under

various categories. Returned servicemen and their families were brought out entirely at the expense of the two Governments. Others who had been nominated by an Australian Government, or by a business or private individual, had to pay only £10 of the passage money of each adult and £5 for each child. Others came out on their own behalf and at their own expense. Selected migrants from Malta were also brought under the scheme. Persons of other nationalities nominated by individuals in Australia could also apply for landing permits provided that their nominators were prepared to guarantee them accommodation and employment for a period.

### The Administrative Machinery

THE administrative machinery necessary for dealing with this mass movement of people was far-reaching. In Europe selecting teams of medical men and social workers interviewed each family unit at displaced persons' camps and other centres. Physical fitness, the number of dependants, the size of the family and their previous political history, were the main determinants. The administration had the difficult task of organizing the shipping for the long voyage. At the Australian end accommodation had to be prepared at various points, and steps taken to guide each worker to appropriate employment.

The nominated migrants presented little difficulty in Australia because accommodation was guaranteed by their sponsors. For these, therefore, there were small "Reception Depots" in or near each capital city. The displaced persons required much more consideration, and "Reception and Training Centres" were organized; these were usually hutted camps remaining from the war. To these the migrants were moved after arrival; here they were given instruction in things Australian and in the English language. From these centres they were moved to Workers' Hostels, many of which were newly constructed near centres of employment. In addition, there were a few Dependants' Holding Centres, at which the women and children of families were housed when the only accommodation near the work centre was for single men. The expectation was that the families would not be separated for long and that all would gradually move from hostels into normal civilian accommodation as soon as they could find it.

### The General Situation in Australia, 1946-50

UNFORTUNATELY the immense strain which the war had placed upon Australian resources of materials and man-power had led to a cessation of domestic building. Even before the war, there was no great supply of empty houses because the depression of the 1930's had made speculative building unprofitable. Consequently, and quite apart from migration, the pressure of the Australian public, with increased marriage and birth-rates, on the available housing accommodation in the post-war period was severe; so it was somewhat unrealistic to expect that the hostels would empty quickly. The construction of more hostels for migrant families became a serious item; especially in 1950 when it proved necessary to find such accommodation for government-nominated British migrants.

The need for more dwellings was paralleled by an equal need for the expansion of public works of all kinds and for the erection of many new factories which were being built by private firms with the encouragement of the Governments of the Commonwealth and the States. All this new construction put an immense strain on the resources of skill, man-power, and materials. This last shortage generated a "black market" in many items; it also led to an extremely inefficient use of labour, because many more structures were begun than the available supplies of labour and materials could complete. The standard of work was in many cases poor, but as most construction was on a "cost plus" basis, the final cost was often unduly high. Europe was searched for prefabricated houses and buildings and many thousands were imported. Some proved satisfactory, and all were very expensive.

### Capital Needs

THE capital required for all this new construction was considerable. The average amount required to provide the housing and social services for each migrant is debatable. The construction of the house is the main item, but behind this is part of the cost of developing the housing area with its roads, drains, lighting, gas and water supplies. These in turn mean enlargement of the water storage, the electric generating plant, the gas-works and the sewage disposal units. Every large Australian city and many of the smaller ones have had to make big new provision for these services since the war. In addition to these needs caused by population increase, schools, hospitals, shopping centres, and transport services have to be organized, quite apart from any facilities for entertainment or sport. Finally, there are the factories in which the breadwinners are to work, or the schemes of land clearing and farm development to which rural migrants may devote their energies. Leaving the last category out of consideration as being too difficult for effective estimation, it seems likely that not less than £1,500 of capital has to be provided for each migrant, unless he or she is prepared to live in a bag humpy without any standard—as apparently happens in some American countries. Some have suggested that the migrants would naturally take the poorer accommodation of lower value vacated by others of the general public. This view is fallacious because no spare accommodation exists and the minimum amount of capital required per head is not altered.

This need for capital for the effective equipment of each new person in the community, whether migrant or native born, is not generally recognized. It must be either saved by the Australian people, or borrowed overseas after the manner of nineteenth-century development, or provided by inflation. The alternative of creating an alien minority group with depressed standards of living is repugnant to Australian ideas.

### Immigration from 1950 till early 1952

IN 1950 the Labour Government had been ousted by the Liberals. The latter continued the policy and set out to enlarge the scheme, which was working well. The industrial value of the new man-power was being recognized; labour was still scarce; wool prices had soared and inflation was proceeding. In 1951 the displaced persons scheme was coming to an end, and it was

decided to seek migrants from other sources, especially since the shipping problem had been partly solved. The demand for skilled workers was especially strong, so the recruitment of effective tradesmen became the basis of the new scheme. These men were to be tested in their home country and then brought out as Commonwealth nominees. In addition, Dutch migrants from Indonesia and Holland were to be sought as agricultural labourers. Later, the possibility of obtaining men from camps in Western Germany was explored. These are largely peopled by *volksdeutsche* from central European countries, or by expelled and escaped Germans from the Eastern Zone. The target for the year 1951 was 200,000 immigrants in all, and it was hoped to maintain that level in succeeding years. In fact, the shipping position again became difficult during 1951 and the target was not hit, but plans were laid for reaching it in 1952.

The following table shows, in thousands, the numbers and origins of the migrants who actually arrived during the five years ending 1951:

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	Total
U.K. Free and Assisted . . .	5	16	38	39	44	142
Displaced Persons . . . .	1	10	75	70	12	168
Empire Servicemen, Maltese, &c. .	1	3	5	10	10	29
Dutch . . . . .	..	..	..	..	1	1
	7	29	118	119	67	340
Unassisted migrants . . . .	25	37	49	55	66	232
TOTAL . . . . .	32	66	167	174	133	572

In these five years migration brought 572,000 people to Australia, and in the same period about 103,000 "left permanently". The balance, 469,000, was 16 per cent of the Australian population in 1948. During the period the natural increase by excess of births over deaths was about 540,000.

### Economic Changes in 1952

LATE in 1951 and early last year the Government, determined to check inflation, and alarmed at the adverse oversea trade balance, began a series of new measures. These, by restricting credit and curtailing imports, restrained the expansion of industry and slowed down many programmes of development. Some unemployment developed, overtime was greatly reduced, labour disputes failed to occur on the coalfields and wharves, power and gas restrictions became rare, many shortages of materials disappeared because the pressure on supplies eased, and greater efficiency began to appear in industry. Naturally some migrants were among the first to be dismissed; prominent among these were groups of Italians who had come out as nominees of their countrymen already in Australia. Some workers in the hostels were also affected. There was some disturbance at Bonegilla, a reception and training centre where newly arrived Italians complained that they had been kept without work for weeks. Later, other Italians from a hostel near Sydney demonstrated and demanded that their Consul should secure their return to Italy, since, being now unemployed, they were able neither



to pay the charges at the hostel nor to send money to Italy to meet their obligations in that country. In November British migrants in family hostels near Melbourne refused to pay their rent and complained about the conditions and their treatment in general. These were outward manifestations of the changes in the situation from previous years when labour conditions were easy.

Early in 1952 the Government had recognized that the migration programme would need revision and had reduced it to 150,000 for 1952 and 80,000 for 1953. The latter number is to be composed of skilled workers for special trades, the families of single men already in Australia, and agricultural workers chiefly from Holland. This reduction is intended to be temporary, for the reason that the present "recession" in trade conditions is not officially expected to last long. Whether prospective migrants will be of that opinion is uncertain. It is now becoming generally recognized that the availability of capital is a key factor in the situation, and until this is certain the higher rate of migration will scarcely be attempted. Further, some doubt the capacity of Australian manufacturing industries to develop further at the present cost level; while, as will be seen later, the absorption of men into the farming industries will be slow. Short of a major development of mining, therefore, it is difficult to see how large numbers of new migrants can be placed.

### Social Repercussions

THE total numbers so far involved in this migration are small compared with the millions of uprooted people in Europe. However, they represent a very considerable effort by the Australian people, and as they arrived during a period of shortages of materials and accommodation, unfavourable comment might have been expected. In reality, the amount of public criticism of the migration plan has been small. Doubtless this was partly due to the favourable mental attitude when it began, but credit must also be given to the responsible authorities who did not neglect the social aspects of the matter. In every State, Church and other social organizations of all kinds were brought into a loose network of Good Neighbour Councils. In each district these did their best to smooth over the difficulties of migrants, and to arrange entertainment for them. In January of each year from 1950 the Commonwealth Ministry has held a Citizenship Convention at Canberra, at which the leaders of social organizations and other bodies interested in the migration scheme frankly discussed with officers of the department the various difficulties which had arisen. It is, however, undeniable that there is some feeling of uncertainty among sections of the population, particularly those who happen to live near districts where migrants of southern European origin have congregated and now almost dominate the locality.

### The Migrants' Viewpoint

IT is inevitable that many of the new-comers should, at times, feel dispirited and uncertain about the wisdom of the move they have made. Probably the most dissatisfied group were those who had technical qualifications in their own countries and who found that these did not qualify them for registration in their profession under Australian law. This matter is under

the jurisdiction of the States, which do not have uniform policies on the matter. The lawyers and the medical men are specially difficult; the former because the whole system of law in Australia differs from that in some European countries, the latter because the practitioner, once registered, may, under Australian conditions, be called on to perform tasks which the European doctor would seldom, if ever, meet. Other men with professional qualifications, such as degrees or diplomas in agriculture of middle-European countries, found it difficult to realize that most of their knowledge was inapplicable under the climatic and social conditions of Australian farming. Many had been trained to be managers of large mixed-farming properties on which labour was employed, a rare kind of post in Australia. Their training and outlook did not fit them for work as agricultural labourers. As technical men, some found acceptance, but the language difficulty has been great.

The displaced persons, by virtue of their previous unhappy experiences in European concentration camps, were in most cases anxious to be acclimatized, being unhampered by pleasant past memories. The nominated migrants usually came out to posts and have, in general, accepted the circumstances which they have found. Curiously enough, some sections of the British migrants are by no means easy to assimilate, perhaps because they expect too much, and coming from a welfare state they are less able to appreciate the need for initiative in a new and developing country.

### The Land Settlement Problem

SO far the migration scheme has not produced many farm workers. Those from eastern Europe had little or no experience of systems of farming similar to those naturally developed in Australia by climatic and economic factors. On the social side, the isolation of the average farmhouse was strange and unhappy to those used to village life. Italian migrants in numbers have joined compatriots already settled in sugar and horticultural districts. In the dairy industry Dutch migrants have generally been successful.

Nearly all these new-comers are naturally interested in becoming land-owners. In general, no legal obstacle prevents them. The problems are, first, the necessity of learning the tricks of climate, soil and markets, and, secondly, the acquisition of the farm itself. The Commonwealth is still trying to settle those of its returned servicemen who are fitted to and anxious for a life on the land. It would be difficult to launch a scheme for migrants until this demand has been met. The possibility of clearing available areas of second-class land and turning them into farms is being discussed, but the capital required is large unless settlers are prepared to develop their properties slowly and capitalize their savings made by living at a low standard. During the last century this was normal practice, but in the present decade the art of living in a bark hut on meagre rations has few exponents. There are large areas to be tackled; but few, if any, are fertile enough to give quick returns and all need large inescapable expenditure on phosphate and other fertilizers, wire and machinery.

Australia,

February 1953.

## SOUTH AFRICA

### THE GENERAL ELECTION

WHEN this is read South Africa will probably be in the throes of what Dr. Dönges, the Minister of the Interior, said in a recent speech would be "the most bitter election since Union". In South African terms this is saying a great deal. This is being written on the eve of a short pre-election session of Parliament, the purpose of which is to vote supplies to cover the period of the election and a few months after, and to pass emergency legislation to give the Government greater powers to deal with Native violence and also with the passive resistance movement. Parliament will probably sit until the end of February, the election campaign proper should be in full swing in March, and polling-day will probably be April 22 or April 29. The ordinary budget session of Parliament will probably be in July or August.

In the nature of things, the coming session of Parliament will be a curtain-raiser to the main struggle. The programme, with its general supply debates and bills to deal with Native lawlessness, offers full scope for the launching and reiteration of battle-cries and for party manoeuvring. Ministers have said that they propose to take drastic powers, and the Opposition must in principle oppose further concentration in the hands of the Executive of arbitrary powers over the liberties of the citizen. The Nationalists will retort that this is evidence that the United Party is in favour of the passive resisters and covertly sympathizes with the rioters, and the scene is set for the main theme of the general election.

It is too early to describe in detail the issues on which the South African electorate will be asked to pass judgment, but the main lines are clear enough. On the constitutional front the Nationalists have been dealt a formidable blow to their prestige by the Appeal Court decision on the High Court of Parliament Act. This decision put a definite end to the attempts to circumvent the entrenched clauses by direct legislation, and the Opposition can be expected to make the most, both of the attempt to evade a constitutional restriction created by South Africans themselves, and of the humiliating exposure by the courts of the legal incompetence of the Government. The Nationalists will counter-attack with the charge that the courts' decisions are evidence that South Africa is still shackled by "British Imperialism" and with a powerful call to the electorate to assert the sovereignty of the *volkswil* (will of the people). Nationalist spokesmen have already stated that they intend to deal with the situation created by the Appeal Court's judgment, but they have been by no means precise on the actual course of action which they have in mind. To get a genuine two-thirds majority the Nationalists would have to win 23 or 24 seats in addition to those which they hold at present—a formidable task indeed. Such a victory would reduce the United Party representation to something under 40 in the House of Assembly, a level approximating to that of the Malanite Nationalists when they formed an Opposition as a

remnant of the Hertzog Nationalist party at the time of fusion twenty years ago.

On the reasonable assumption that a Nationalist victory of these dimensions is unlikely, there seem to be only two possible devices to circumvent the Constitution. One would be to create sufficient additional nominated senators to achieve a two-thirds majority, a procedure roughly parallel with Mr. Asquith's threat in 1910 to create peers. The obstacles to this course of action are also formidable. On the present strength of parties, about 85 senators would have to be nominated, nearly trebling the size of the Senate and creating a legislative body in which the nominated senators would outnumber the elected by two to one. It is difficult to imagine the country—or the courts—swallowing a manoeuvre of this magnitude. Even if the Nationalists gained 10 or 12 seats—a swinging victory in the circumstances of South Africa today—they would still have almost to double the size of the Senate by creating 45 senators if they wished to get a two-thirds majority.

The other possible course is to enlarge the size of the Appeal Court by the appointment of further appeal judges in order to obtain a favourable legal decision by a majority. The obstacles to this course would be the difficulty of finding sufficient senior judges who would be likely to approve the Government's assertions. It is unlikely that the country would tolerate the appointment to the highest court of the land of junior judges or practising advocates.

On the racial front the Nationalists believe that they have been vastly strengthened by the riots at Port Elizabeth and elsewhere, the passive resistance movement\* among Natives and the happenings in Kenya. The Nationalists will maintain that only they have the will and the power to deal with lawlessness with the strength of hand which is needed and that the United Party, weakened by "liberalism" and allegiance to doctrines of overseas democracy, will be ineffectual in keeping firm control of the huge non-White population. The United Party retort that they are equally determined and able to put down law-breaking and disorder, but that the current situation in South Africa has been largely the creation of Nationalist intolerance and short-sightedness and that the remedy is to be found in something much more constructive and comprehensive than police or military action.

### Programme of the Opposition

THE racial situation, with the constitutional controversy a good second, will draw the main lines of the election battle. Mr. Strauss, the leader of the Opposition, in a speech at Bloemfontein, announced his party's platform in more detail than have the Nationalists. Briefly, he described his programme as

- a middle-of-the-road Native policy on the lines of the Hertzog legislation of 1936, with a determined attempt to take racial policy out of the party arena;
- to retain the identity of the Coloured people but to treat them as an appendage of the European population;
- to deal with the Indian question by negotiations with India;
- to deal with Communism by striking at the root causes which enable that doctrine to flourish;

\*See "*Satyagraha in South Africa*", p. 130.

to build up the European population by immigration, allowances for children, and other means;  
and a "charter for workers".

Apart from emphasizing the need for firm action against the Natives and the battle for the supremacy of the will of the people, the Nationalists have yet to state their election platform in detail. The only other substantial point which has emerged from the Nationalist side is that it is intended to make an issue of the incorporation of the High Commission Territories. As both parties are agreed in principle that the Territories should be incorporated, it is difficult to see how this can become an issue except in the improbable event of the Nationalists' wanting to go farther and to ask the electorate for a mandate to impose economic or other sanctions to force incorporation should a more constitutional approach fail.

To prophesy election results is always a hazardous occupation in South Africa and particularly so at the present time. The total number of voters on the list at the moment is about 1,580,000, an increase of about 180,000 over the total of the roll in the general election of 1948. The allegiance of these new-comers might well be the decisive factor. With the addition of 6 seats in South-West Africa, the Government ends its first Parliament with a majority of 13 in a House of 159. This small majority represents a minority of votes actually polled of about 140,000.

In constituencies of about 10,000 it can be assumed that seats which were won at the last election by majorities of more than 1,000 will not change their allegiance. The Nationalists have 53 such seats and the United and Labour Parties have 62. There are 18 seats where the majority obtained by either party is less than a few hundred and where anything can happen. Of the other seats held by majorities of fewer than 1,000, the United Party has 6 and the Nationalist Party 20. From this calculation it is clear that a fairly small change of opinion can be disastrous for the Nationalists while it would need a fairly strong trend away from United Party thought to weaken that party substantially in comparison with its present strength. The only general conclusion which can be drawn from the by-elections of the last five years is that in the rural areas Nationalist majorities have tended to rise while in urban areas they have tended to fall.


It is interesting to note that Dr. Malan enters this election within a month of his 79th birthday, which is a year older than General Smuts was when he fought his last election. Mr. Havenga, at the moment the probable successor to Dr. Malan, is 71.

South Africa,

February 1953.







HEINRICH FERDINAND VON HAAST

## NEW ZEALAND

### DR. VON HAAST—AN APPRECIATION

THE death of Dr. Von Haast at Wellington on Monday, January 5, removes the last of the original members of the New Zealand Round Table Group—founded in 1910—and of those who were associated with Mr. Lionel Curtis from the outset.

On the death of S. A. Atkinson in 1915 Dr. Von Haast took over the Secretaryship of the Wellington Group and continued until his retirement from that office in 1928. He was greatly attracted by, and gave his interest and devotion to, the constitution and development of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and to the end was an enthusiastic supporter of the views of the founder in advocating the Federation of the British Commonwealth in matters of foreign policy and defence. Throughout the years he has been an ardent supporter of the Group in its later work of the development of the quarterly magazine *THE ROUND TABLE*, and was responsible over the years for very many of the quarterly articles from New Zealand. With that end in view, from 1917 to 1933 he, in conjunction with the Wellington Group, provided a series of papers for publication in the press on the subject of the constitutional position of the Dominions and the best means of securing closer union or co-operation by the members of the Commonwealth. Together with the late A. R. Atkinson, he was responsible for the preparation of a pamphlet which, after consideration and revision by the Wellington Group, was printed and circulated to the leading newspapers of New Zealand as expressing the views of the members of the New Zealand Round Table Group. This was followed up by a questionnaire sent to all Members of Parliament entitled "Imperial Problems—An open letter from the Round Table Group to the Parliament of New Zealand".

Throughout the years he emphasized the strong belief that the Dominions, having attained full freedom under the Centrifugal Movement, should turn their minds, the goal of independence having been reached, to a Centripetal Movement towards not an alliance but a closer association in the British Commonwealth of Nations, and that the most logical, natural and practical form of such an association would be a Federation.

Dr. Von Haast, together with the Honourable Walter Nash and Honourable Downie Stewart, were jointly appointed by the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Round Table Group to represent New Zealand at the I.P.R. Conference at Banff in 1933 and at the subsequent British Commonwealth Relations Conference, to be held at Toronto after the conclusion of the one at Banff. Dr. Von Haast was responsible for the preparation of the New Zealand dossier which included a paper he had read to The Round Table Group entitled "Realities and Fictions", in which he criticized the statement in the Balfour Formula that each of the Dominions is, in fact, autonomous, equal and independent. He was deeply disappointed that the Toronto Conference

did not concern itself with a discussion of vital practical questions and that the defence of the Empire was not placed first and foremost. He was asked to attend the British Commonwealth Relations Conference at Sydney in 1938, but after perusal of the agenda refused to go, since he felt that the vital questions of defence and constitutions were not being emphasized sufficiently.

Almost up to the time of his death, unless prevented by indisposition, he was most regular in his attendance at the meetings of the Wellington Round Table Group. By his death THE ROUND TABLE has lost one of its oldest and most faithful supporters, whose work and influence will long be remembered.

### Forest Conservation and Development

ATTENTION was drawn in a recent issue of THE ROUND TABLE\* to the problems and the promise of the forestry industry in this country. The problems are underlined in the latest Annual Report of the Director of Forestry with the declaration that "a crisis has been reached in the evolution of forest policy". The Director estimates that, at the present rate of cutting, the country's resources of indigenous softwoods will be exhausted in less than twenty years, those of the North Island in less than eleven years. "These calamities", he continues, "can only be avoided by immediately and drastically curtailing the production of indigenous timber and substituting the exotic softwoods for the indigenous."

The main difficulty about this is that timber-users show a marked preference for the increasingly scarce indigenous soft-woods for many building purposes. The exotics require proper drying, preserving and grading to be satisfactory for these purposes, but such treatment has too often been scamped under the extreme pressure of war-time and post-war demand, resulting in what the Director calls an "unfortunate prejudice that has built up against them". At the same time, price control over both native and exotic timbers removes any economic incentive to switch consumption to the more plentiful exotics. Paradoxically enough, in the past year there has been a decided slump in oversea markets for timber, particularly our exotic varieties—enough to cause some unease about their immediate future.

The director sees in this situation its own cures. Establish confidence in soundness of exotic softwoods when properly treated and used. Remove price controls, and its scarcity value will automatically ration the indigenous timber, with little rise, if any, in price of plentiful exotics. Restrict or prohibit the milling of indigenous forests under State control. Pursue an energetic policy of regenerating these slow-growing forests to ensure a small but important supply for special requirements. But there are snags. Mindful of stabilization policy, the Government has not been induced by the Minister of Forests to drop price control. Technical investigations into methods of preserving and protecting exotic softwoods have not yet issued in clear-cut indications to the trade of their value and suitable treatment. And Chambers of Commerce on the west coast of the South Island have been supported by local trade unionists in protesting against the restrictions on native timber-cutting there as threatening unemployment.

\* No. 167, June 1952, pp. 286-90.

The promise of New Zealand forestry is embodied in the Kaingaroa (or "Murapara") timber, pulp and paper project, outlined in the issue already cited. However, it seems that after expert technical and financial investigation, and no doubt influenced by the somewhat uncertain state of the exotic timber market overseas, the Government is proceeding more modestly than at first intended. The original scheme provided for an annual production of 120,000 tons of newsprint, from 45,000 to 50,000 tons of pulp, and 70 million sawn feet of timber. It has now been decided to cut newsprint production to about 60,000 tons a year, to defer for the time being the giant saw-milling scheme, and, because of the development of pulp production by the major private producer in the field, N.Z. Forest Products Ltd., to restrict the quantity of pulp production to the actual requirements of the market.

In a statement to Parliament on October 16 the Prime Minister (Mr. Holland) said that the immediate capital investment proposed by the company formed to develop the enterprise, Tasman Pulp and Paper Co., has been reduced by £2 million to £15 million, consisting of £8 million in share capital and debentures and £7 million covered by government loans to be raised overseas. This will make the Government by far the biggest individual shareholder—though the Prime Minister emphasized that the Government as such would take no direct part in management. Approximately half of the overseas loan money will be sterling, in accordance with the expectation that the bulk of the machinery and equipment will come from Britain. It is proposed to raise £4.4 million in New Zealand, £1.8 million in U.S. dollars, £900,000 in Canadian dollars, £300,000 in Sweden and Switzerland and £300,000 in Australia.

At this stage the Prime Minister was not able to give definite answers to several important questions upon which the success of the enterprise must largely depend. But he prophesied an eventual saving of \$16 million a year in our balance of payments, an improvement of £6 million a year in our trading position, and an indirect annual gain in State revenues of at least £1.2 million. And he foresaw that alongside wool, meat and dairy produce, timber and paper might well become "our fourth great industry", with its healthy implications of a more diversified economy.

### An Uninspiring Session

THE parliamentary session which ended on October 24 was rather like boarding-house pudding—dull though solid in parts. There was a massive consolidation of the shipping and seamen laws; but comprehensive Bills revising the Companies Act and the law dealing with multiple land ownership among the Maori were held over for further consideration.

Perhaps the most important legislative achievements were the Land Settlement Promotion Act,\* the measures for financing the Kaingaroa timber project (see above) and for controlling the development of geothermal steam as a source of power, and the Government Railways Amendment Act, introduced very late in the session, setting up a Commission to control the Government Railways Department. The Act deals with only one of the many

\* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 169, December 1952.



recommendations of the Royal Commission on Railways earlier in the year, and it bears only a superficial resemblance to that. The Commission's term of office is to be three years, instead of seven as recommended. The General Manager, though not a member of the Commission, will continue to be appointed by the Minister, not by the Commission. And the Commission will not have the recommended degree of independence from ministerial control—for example it cannot close an unprofitable line without the Minister's consent. Press comment was critical of the Act, a typical remark being that it looked like a "device to ensure that politicians, while shifting the blame for the railways' losses to a corporation, won't risk losing votes if the corporation is zealous and conscientious". The names of the five members appointed as Commissioners were announced on December 18 last; three are at present expert officers of the Railway Department, and two are civilians, one a former bank manager, and the other, recently retired, head of an oil company.

A disappointing feature of the session was the ineffectiveness of the Opposition in arousing public interest on such controversial questions as have arisen. Modifications brought about in some measures have been due to pressures from outside Parliament, while the Opposition contented itself with its conventional complaints about the cost of living.

### The ANZUS Arrangement

AMONG the matters which Mr. Holland undertook to discuss during his visit to Britain for the Commonwealth Economic Conference was the delicate question of the omission of Great Britain from the ANZUS conference held in the past few months.

The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951, came into force on April 29, 1952. It was the price exacted by Australia and New Zealand for their signatures to a Japanese Peace Treaty that envisaged the rearmament of Japan, though of course it has other significance also in the circumstances prevailing in the Far East and South-East Asia today. There are two points of substance in the treaty. It establishes a Defence Council, of Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consult on individual and collective defence measures by the three parties. And "each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes". The treaty recognizes, in the preamble, that "Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area". And it envisages "the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area".

The first meeting of the Defence Council took place at Honolulu on August 4-7 last. According to reports, the External Affairs Ministers of Australia and New Zealand were thoroughly "briefed" by Mr. Dean Acheson on the world situation, with particular reference to the Pacific area, and had preliminary talks on the part each country might play in Pacific defence;

they discussed ways and means of promoting a regional security system for the area; and they agreed that the Council should meet yearly, one year in the United States and the alternate year in Australia or New Zealand. In a published statement the Foreign Ministers said they had decided not to broaden their defence pact at this early stage, so as to include other Powers as members, nor to invite observers from other countries to attend meetings at present.

The military council under the pact held talks in Honolulu from September 22 to 25, and again no other Powers took part or were present, though it has been said that the United Kingdom Government requested the right to send an observer. Partly as a result of comment from the beginning in British newspapers, there has been a good deal of discussion in the New Zealand press, and a number of questions in Parliament, on this exclusion of direct representation of the United Kingdom at the talks. However, there has been no indication by any government spokesman whether the exclusion was at the instance of the United States, as reported, or whether at the initial Defence Council meeting British participation was proposed, or exclusion supported or resisted, by either of the Dominions. The three governments have simply taken joint responsibility for the decision and refuse to discuss it.

It is probably fair to say that the reaction here is more against this feeling of being kept in the dark than against the fact of Britain's exclusion itself. After the British Government's alleged request to be allowed to send an observer to the meeting of the Military Council in September, there were probably some quite loyal New Zealanders who asked whether these preliminary meetings really concerned Britain, anyway.

On the other hand, Her Majesty's Opposition in New Zealand have for once united with most editorial opinion in protesting strongly at the exclusion of Great Britain without any plausible explanation. Leader-writers have referred to Britain's continuing interests in the Pacific and neighbouring areas, notably Hong Kong and Malaya; to the certainty that she would endeavour to bring aid to the Pacific Dominions in their time of trouble and to her practical co-operation with them in defence measures such as the Woomera rocket range and the Monte Bello atom tests. And they have asked why Britain should be left out of a pact the operation of which might well commit her to a course of action practically without her knowledge.

Ministerial statements, deprecating undue public discussion, have insisted that the United Kingdom Government was being "kept fully informed" of the Anzus deliberations. But a number of newspapers have made the same point as Mr. Nash, the Leader of the Opposition, who said in the House on October 23: "It is idle to say that Britain is being kept informed. Why then cannot she be kept informed by attendance at the meetings? . . . I would like to make a special point of urging on the Prime Minister the necessity to do everything that is possible towards arranging for the participation of Britain in the meetings associated with the ANZUS Pact." The *Evening Star* (Dunedin) went so far as to say on October 13: "Among the people of Britain, and indeed of the whole Commonwealth, the attitude of the United States in this respect will not have made the kind of impression that brings firmer friend-

ship." The *Christchurch Star-Sun* (Oct. 2) said that if the United States was taking over from Britain the leadership of the Commonwealth countries in the Pacific, their people should be told "where they are being led". This perhaps reflects a certain irrational anti-American prejudice which is an interesting undercurrent of some sections of public opinion in this country.

There is an important body of opinion, however, which takes a calmer view of the Anzus issue. It is pointed out that the present arrangement is very far from being a Pacific Defence Pact, and that the time is far from ripe for such a pact. There is respect for what is supposed to be the United States view that, if Britain were asked to become a party to the Anzus discussions at present, it would involve considerable embarrassment if similar requests came from the French, the Philippines, or even Japan. And it is unrealistic to imagine that such embarrassment would be confined to the United States. The Pacific Dominion Governments would probably be the last to press for a step which might in turn lead to premature commitments for them in the South-East Asia area—an area towards which they are disposed to maintain a distinctly reserved attitude for the present. It is clear from an announcement on December 14 that such issues as these have been fully discussed at the face-to-face meeting of Prime Ministers in London. The United Kingdom is no longer pressing for immediate representation at Anzus, but has agreed with the two Dominion governments to discuss the whole question of Pacific and South-East Asian defence directly with the United States.

#### The New Governor General

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR WILLOUGHBY NORRIE arrived in New Zealand with Lady Norrie on December 2, and on the same day took the oath of office as Governor General.

New Zealand,  
February 1953.

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